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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to study customer order flow and its impact on a small open 
emerging economy in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Customer order flow, as a key concept in 
the microstructure approach to exchange rate, deals with signed transaction volumes 
between market-makers and their customers.  The study specifically attempts to 
explore what the data tells us about the role of customer order flow in the market for 
local currency (Ghanaian CEDI) using the standard analytical framework of FX 
microstructure literature.   
The study also examines short-run exchange rate dynamics in an emerging market 
based on the recent microstructure framework of foreign exchange markets where the 
main explanatory variable is the order flow.  First, the study modifies the model to take 
account of a unique feature of the majority of emerging markets, namely the existence 
of a parallel market for FX.  Secondly, it uses a unique proprietary database covering 
almost the complete Ghanaian market, and for a long time span compared to previous 
studies, which uses data for a single market-maker and for a short period of time.  The 
study confirms contemporaneous relationship (between flows and exchange rate) 
suggested by previous literature (Evans and Lyons 2002a) but we also observe a 
lagged interaction between order flow and exchange rates.  These lagged effects are 
due to the delays in the price transmission which are associated with inefficiencies.  
Additionally, the study confirms the connection between the price impact of the order 
flow and the degree of liquidity in the FX market.  Furthermore, our findings 
corroborate the fact that in Ghana, banks provide liquidity to their customers in the 
short-run whiles the central bank acts a liquidity provider in the long-run. 
Finally, our results confirm that there exists a strong relationship between order flow, 
commodity prices and macroeconomic fundamentals in an emerging economy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The failure of traditional exchange rate models in explaining short-run movements has 
been well documented (Meese and Rogoff 1983a).  Exchange rate economics is 
concerned with the variety of variables that interact to determine the exchange rate 
level in the short-to-long term.  Studies have shown that in the short run in particular, 
exchange rates are much more volatile than the macroeconomic fundamentals that 
influence them.  This erratic behaviour of exchange rates is responsible for the 
discrepancies that make it difficult to detect a distinct relationship between the level of 
exchange rate and the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals.  
 
In recent times, most researchers have argued that the microstructure approach to 
exchange rates determination should be the key to the underlying factors. Indeed, it has 
been established that the microstructure models, such as Kyle (1985), highlight that 
market-makers can extract private beliefs and knowledge about the future value of the 
exchange rate from customer trades, and then translate these into price changes. 
Accordingly, they posit that “Customer Order Flow – signed transaction volume 
between market makers and their customers – is key to exchange rates.  
 
Customer order flow can therefore, on one hand, be a source of information. Other 
models, such as Evans and Lyons (2002a), emphasize that once an appropriate risk 
premium is offered, customers are also willing to take over accumulated trading 
exposures from market makers. 
 
 15 
The motivation behind this study is several. Firstly, analysing the link between order 
flows and exchange rate behaviour is relevant for the practice of monetary policy, 
especially for a country such as Ghana. Moreover, Ghana is on the path to becoming 
an emerging economy, and plans to join the West African Monetary Union at some 
point. Therefore, the country might use, under certain circumstances, foreign exchange 
intervention to keep the exchange rate within certain tolerable or prescribed band. 
Knowledge on the nature and the impact of order flows by the authorities may be the 
key to the success of these operations.  
 
Secondly, we wish to examine whether previous results, obtained using data on major 
currency pairs, can be extended to an emerging market's currency. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study of the customer order flow – exchange rate relationship in Africa. 
The relatively unique database collected by the central Bank of Ghana is particularly 
suited for such a study. 
 
The relationship between customer order flow and exchange rates was first examined 
by the pioneering works of Rime (2000), Evans and Lyons (2002a), Fan and Lyons 
(2002), Mende and Menkhoff (2003) and Froot and Ramadorai (2005).The key 
findings of these studies are that a) customer order flow dynamics can explain the 
movements in exchange rates at various frequencies, and b) order flows from different 
customer types usually behave quite differently from each other. 
 
More recently, a few papers explicitly examined the different behaviour of order flows 
from different customers. Carpenter and Wang (2007), for example, analyse spot FX 
transaction data from a major Australian bank. They find that order flow from the 
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central bank and financial institutions has a positive impact on the exchange rate, 
whereas non-financial customers' order flow has no influence on it. They suggest that 
trades with financial institutions carry more information. Mende and Menkhoff (2003), 
using data from a medium-sized German bank, carry out a similar exercise and find 
that financial customers’ order flow is positively related to the exchange rate, whereas 
commercial customers’ flows are negatively related to it, i.e. commercial customers’ 
currency purchases coincide with depreciations.  
 
It is also an empirical fact that market makers generally close their positions at the end 
of each trading day. If this is true for the market as a whole, then it is the customers 
who must absorb the accumulated trading imbalances. Customer order flow thus can 
also be regarded as the ultimate source of market liquidity. 
 
Existing literature shows that the traditional exchange rate models are based on 
monetary fundamentals with three main assumptions that agents are homogeneous, 
information is publicly available and the market structure is unrelated to exchange rate 
determination.  These models enjoy relative success in explaining long-run exchange 
rate movements.  The general equilibrium model of exchange rate determination 
focuses on welfare analysis and takes into account systematic risks.   
 
Nevertheless, in the short-run, the proportion of exchange rate changes these empirical 
models can explain is effectively zero.  The third branch and new way ahead is the 
market microstructure approach to exchange rate determination.  The present value 
model of the exchange rate will be the starting point in the introduction of the 
microstructure approach: 
 17 
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Where ts  is the log normal exchange rate (defined as the domestic price of the foreign 
currency), δ is the discount factor, tf denotes the fundamentals at time t, and 
)( jtt fE + is the market-makers expectation about future fundamentals conditional on 
information available at time t. 
Equation (1.1) simply states that the log of today’s exchange rate is equal to the sum of 
all discounted expected and future fundamentals.  From this formulation, it is clear that 
the fundamentals referred to are unspecified.  Indeed, fundamentals can be broken 
down into two constituent parts, measured and unmeasured (as shown in equation (1.2) 
above).   The measured fundamentals are those that can be measured like money 
supply, interest rates or variables that ought to have an effect on exchange rates.  The 
unmeasured fundamentals are those variables that cannot be measured or have not been 
considered all together. 
 
Despite rigorous research, no group of fundamentals have been found to determine 
exchange rate movements.  This only implies that most of the explanatory powers of a 
majority models are embedded in the error terms.  Consequently, decomposing this 
error term into unmeasured fundamentals and expectational error components, would 
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help in extracting the information contained in the error term, and thus, help us explain 
exchange rate movements and forecasts. 
 
The microstructure approach lays emphasis on the expectational errors and argues that 
changes to expectations about measured fundamentals are vital.  This approach studies 
how dispersed information is embedded into exchange rates through trading decisions.  
Thus the microstructure approach is not ignoring fundamentals as such, but rather 
focusing on the mechanism through which fundamentals influence price.  Because 
fundamentals are not necessarily observable, a proxy is needed.  This proxy is referred 
to as the order flow in foreign exchange microstructure.   
 
Furthermore, this approach argues that the aggregated trading decisions reflect the 
market’s expectations about future fundamentals and as result order flow contains 
information.  Like the asset market approach, the demand for currencies in the micro 
approach emanates from the purchases and sales of assets.  Nevertheless the micro 
approach relaxes three of the asset market approach’s most important assumptions: 
 Information is not publicly available, market participants behave differently in a way 
that influences prices and trading mechanism also differ in ways that affect prices.  
Information is at the centre of the micro approach with order flow being the main 
pillar.   
 
The assumptions that information relevant to exchange rates is publicly available and 
immediately included in prices, implies that order flow has no place in the macro 
approach.  In summary, the microstructure allows for an environment where the FX 
market’s structure, participants and mechanisms have an effect on exchange rate.   
 19 
 
In a seminal paper, Evans and Lyons (2002a) provide evidence that order flow 
significantly explains movements in two major bilateral exchange rates.  Further, they 
observe that the coefficients of determination are substantially larger than those in 
standard macroeconomic models of exchange rates.  Subsequently, results from this 
landmark paper have been confirmed by numerous studies (Froot and Ramadorai, 
2005; Kileen, Lyons and Moore, 2005; Payne, 2003, Marsh and O’Rourke, 2005).  
Aside its explanatory power, the gradual learning of information in the FX market may 
generate some forecasting power in order flow (Evans and Lyons, 2005a, 2006, 2007). 
 
According to Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), the finding that order flow is 
relatively more successful than macro variables at explaining exchange rate 
movements points to the significance of heterogeneous expectations.  Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that this does not imply that order flow is the underlying determinant 
of exchange rates.  It could be that macroeconomic fundamentals are still the main 
drivers of exchange rates, but measures of expected fundamentals are so imprecise that 
an order flow proxy offers a better alternative in estimation. 
 
In spite of the rapidly growing literature in FX microstructure for developed countries, 
little work has been done in emerging markets. Only a handful of FX microstructure 
studies have been conducted on emerging markets.  To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first microstructure study to be conducted in an African country.   
 
Microstructure analysis can help policymakers to understand and improve their FX 
markets.  According to Lyons (2001), ‘Most of these currencies are not traded on a 
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world-wide basis, due to lack of convertibility of one form or another.  Because trading 
in these currencies is largely within-country, it is feasible to legislate market design in 
a way that is not possible in major markets.  Microstructure analysis is well-suited to 
address questions concerning where fledging FX markets should be organised as 
auction markets, dealer markets, or both, as well the level of transparency that should 
be required’.   
 
This, we believe, represents a gap in the FX microstructure literature which this study 
intends to fill.  In light of the fact that most emerging FX markets are under-developed 
and illiquid, this study attempts to investigate whether previous microstructure results 
are robust in an emerging markets environment.  Specifically, we examine the 
Ghanaian FX market through microstructure lenses.   
 
Our unique dataset is the first of its kind in Africa and was obtained from the central 
bank.  In Ghana there is the presence of a thriving large parallel FX market which co-
exists with the official FX market.  Consequently, for the first time in FX 
microstructure, parallel FX market is considered in terms of its relationship with the 
official FX market.  Just like many other emerging markets, the Ghanaian central bank 
is a dominant player in the FX market and this has huge implications for the exchange 
rate determination.  We apply microstructure analysis to investigate the contentious 
issue of FX intervention in order to ascertain the true state of affairs in the FX market. 
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1.2 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the Ghanaian economy over the period 1970 to 
2007. We also highlight the structural features of the economy and assess how these 
features have influenced the performance of the Ghanaian economy.   Subsequent 
analysis also includes the macroeconomic adjustment period (1980 onwards) and the 
effects of these adjustment polices on the macro economy.  We also lay emphasis on 
the nature of shocks experienced by Ghana recently and the relevant policy responses.  
The various sectors (agriculture, industry, external, fiscal, and financial) of the 
economy are discussed in terms of the trends in macroeconomic indicators. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the literature review of the study. In this chapter we briefly 
discuss the role of customer order flow in FX microstructure theory, and provide some 
simple theoretical foundations to the equations estimated subsequently. Existing 
literature on exchange rates describe the exchange rate as a function of a varying set of 
macroeconomic fundamentals including inflation, money supplies, interest rates, 
productivity differentials, government debt, terms of trade and net foreign assets. 
However, most researchers argue that the microstructure approach to exchange rates 
determination should be the key to the underlying factors. We thus, provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the empirical findings of other studies and try to provide the 
theoretical underpinnings of their study. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the econometric issues of the study. Here, the estimation strategy 
of the study is discussed in light of the time series properties of the variables used (i.e. 
the non-stationarity and cointegration ECM). 
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Chapter 5 of the study adopts the Evans and Lyons (2002a) framework to test for a link 
between exchange rate movements and order flow.  As the paper’s main focus is to 
uncover what empirics tell us, rather than to test any particular model of market 
microstructure, we do not provide here a rigorous and detailed theoretical model. We 
simply wish to show the intuition behind the equations that link the order flows of 
different customer groups to the exchange rate.  
 
The Evans and Lyons (E&L) model consists of a hybrid of micro and macro variables.  
Specifically the main variables in their model are order flow and changes in the interest 
rate differential.  This is a static model as it deals with contemporaneous relationships 
and may not be compatible or appropriate for the relatively inefficient Ghanaian FX 
market.  We, however, test the data using E&L’s static model, just to be consistent 
with the previous literature.  To take into account the delayed reaction of exchange 
rates (due to inefficiencies), the static model is transformed into a dynamic one by 
including lags.   
 
Most of the empirical analysis is conducted using OLS estimation.  In each case, 
datasets from both crisis and stable periods are tested to allow for a comparative 
analysis.  We observe a positive relationship between order flow and exchange rate 
movements during the crisis period but observe a negative relation during the relatively 
stable period.   
 
The negative relationship is contrary to what one would expect and might be exhibiting 
early signs of negative feedback trading.  In FX microstructure, it is usually assumed 
that expected flows are already priced into exchange rates by dealers and should not 
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have an effect on exchange rate movements.  It is rather the unexpected (shock) flows 
that should move exchange rates.   
 
Consequently, following the Payne and Love (2008), we use the Campbell-Schiller 
methodology to decompose order flow into its expected and unexpected components.  
Not surprisingly, we find that both components are significant in explaining exchange 
rate movements but the unexpected component is positively signed and has a relatively 
larger magnitude.  As theory would suggest, it is the unexpected flow that matters but 
due to the various inefficiencies expected flow also has some significance.   Of greater 
importance, is the issue of whether the effect of unexpected flows on exchange rates is 
permanent or temporary.  A permanent effect is an indication that order flow is 
informative, while a temporary effect may imply that order flow is due to inventory 
management.  A Wald coefficient restriction test indicates that unexpected order flow 
is informative and has a permanent effect on exchange rates.  
 
The long-run relationship between order flow and exchange rates is examined.  Using 
the Johansen cointegration methodology, we find that results are inconclusive.  In the 
long-run the relationship between order flow and exchange rates is ambiguous and the 
corresponding error-correction model does not make any statistical or economic sense.   
 
These findings could be due to the omission of certain important variables and the fact 
that this model is not the correct representation of the long-run dynamics of the 
Ghanaian FX market.  This is not surprising because in our cointegration model, the 
dominant role of the central bank (BOG) in the FX market is completely ignored.   
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Chapter 6 deals with FX liquidity provision in the context of the role of BOG.  To the 
best of our knowledge only one paper, Bjønnes et al. (2005), critically analyses the 
issue of liquidity provision for a whole FX market.  Chapter 6 attempts to find out 
which group of market participants in Ghana provide liquidity overnight.  It is well 
known that during a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank actively supplies 
(buys/sell FX at given rate) liquidity.  However it has been widely accepted that 
market making banks are the main liquidity providers in a floating exchange rate 
regime.  In sharp contrast to this, other studies Lyons (1995), Bjønnes and Rime (2004) 
have shown that market making banks only supply liquidity intraday.  In fact, this 
raises the question of who is the ultimate liquidity provider in the long-run.  Arguably, 
Ghanaian FX liquidity provision is closely linked to the deeply controversial issue of 
BOG’s perceived intervention on the FX market.  According to Bjønnes et al. (2005), 
‘pull’ customers are liquidity providers who are pulled to the market by returns whiles 
‘push’ customers are liquidity demanders who initiate price changes.  Using the 
Johansen cointegration methodology, Bjønnes et al. find that non-financial customers 
are the liquidity providers (pull agents) while financial customers are the liquidity 
demanders (push agents) for the Swedish Krona market in the long-run.   
 
We apply this framework to the Ghanaian data, but in a slightly different way.  
Contrary to Bjønnes et al. (2005), our dataset consists of bank customers (except 
remittance bank), BOG and banks.  The main aim of the paper is to investigate which 
of these players is providing or demanding FX liquidity.  Initially, Granger causality 
tests indicate that BOG is the liquidity supplier whiles bank customers act as liquidity 
demanders in the long-run.  These results are confirmed by Johansen cointegration 
methodology.  Furthermore the previous positive relationship between order flow and 
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exchange rate in chapter 5, is observed in the cointegration framework between bank 
customers and exchange rate levels.  The error-correction model indicates that the 
exchange rate and customer flows adjust to attain equilibrium in the long-run.  
Generally, the results are robust over the crisis and stable periods.  The dataset for this 
paper commences from March 2002, when BOG initiated a series of sustained 
interventions.  Additionally, the pre-intervention period is analysed to ascertain who 
acts as the liquidity provider in the absence of BOG interventions.   
In trying to identify the fundamental determinants of order flow, we seek to examine 
its relationship with macroeconomic information and commodity prices.  Ghana is 
predominantly an export-driven economy that depends mainly on commodity exports 
and it can be argued that order flow may reflect changes in the prices of these 
commodities.   
 
In chapter 7, we employ monthly macroeconomic and commodity price data to test for 
the existence of such a relationship.  Quarterly GDP data is interpolated into a monthly 
frequency, to enable its use in subsequent empirical analysis.  Using basic Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), we observe very encouraging results that link order flow to 
macroeconomic information.  Specifically, changes in macroeconomic fundamentals 
are significant in explaining monthly order flow.  
Chapter 8 summarises the major findings of the study, and also highlights policy 
options for the management of FX in the country. A set of conclusions concerning FX 
transactions are drawn, as well as the limitations of the study, together with 
suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine the economic background/history of Ghana with a 
special focus on the macroeconomic policies that have been implemented.  As a result, 
we also highlight the structural features of the economy and asses how these features 
have influenced the performance of the Ghanaian economy.   Subsequent analysis also 
includes the macroeconomic adjustment period (1980 onwards) and the effects of these 
adjustment polices on the macro economy.  Additionally, there is a general review of 
the performance of the Ghanaian economy from 1970 to 2007. 
We also lay emphasis on the nature of shocks experienced by Ghana recently and the 
relevant policy responses.  The various sectors (agriculture, industry, external, fiscal, 
and financial) of the economy are discussed in terms of the trends in macroeconomic 
indicators. 
 
2.2 Macroeconomic performance 
The Ghanaian economy can be best described as a relatively small open economy that 
is susceptible to developments/movements on the world market.  The structural 
weakness of the Ghanaian economy is inherent in its dependence on the world market 
for its main exports, oil imports and other vital raw materials needed for domestic 
production.  From independence in 1957 to the eighties, Ghana adopted and adhered to 
an import substitution strategy.  Specifically locally produced goods were to be 
gradually substituted for imports.  At the time the government allocated resources 
directly to vital sectors of the economy.  This strategy formed part of the “socialist 
agenda” of the government which was enshrined in the Seven year Development Plan 
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(1963-1970).  The main aim of this plan was to accelerate growth by stimulating a 
mass production of food for local consumption and pursuing an ambitious 
industrialisation programme. 
During the 1970s, state intervention was endemic in all vital sectors of the economy.  
A large proportion of enterprises/corporations government owned/backed.  Such 
organisations were found in transportation, communication, manufacturing, banking 
and cocoa marketing.  However the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) placed a huge 
strain on government finances in the form of low debt repayments and inadequate 
dividends.  Consequently the SOEs gained monopolies in the production, pricing and 
marketing of agricultural crops for export and local consumption.   Naturally, the SOEs 
emerged as the main importers and exporters in the economy. 
During the 1970s, state intervention meant that domestic prices were not determined 
by market forces.  Producers of export crops were obliged to sell their produce to SOEs 
at prices below world market prices.  Also non-traditional exporters were required to 
surrender their foreign exchange (FX) proceeds and had to deal with a complex system 
of export permits.  For every shipment, exporters were required to obtain new licences.  
Furthermore the relevant ministries were given the power to adjust the number of 
consignments moving between Ghana and the rest of the world. 
Systems of import licensing and strict governmental allocation of FX were 
implemented in order to control importers.  These systems had the effect of squeezing 
importers, especially during times of FX scarcity (see figure 2.1 for gross foreign 
exchange reserves for the period 1970-2008). 
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    Figure 2.1 
 
In a climate of dwindling exports and imports, these restrictive trade measures led to 
the economy experiencing large surpluses between 1970-1983.  During this period, 
import-GDP ratio reduced from 18.5% to 3.6%, while export-GDP fell decreased from 
20.7% to 3.6%. 
The oil crisis of 1974 combined with the worsening terms of trade aggravated the 
economy of Ghana.  Moreover falling exchange rate receipts and largely inefficient 
SOEs led to acute FX shortages.  Industries were seriously affected by the fall in the 
imports of raw and intermediate materials, leaving them with no choice but to operate 
below capacity.  In the meantime, the problem of import shortages and increasing costs 
had the direct effect of weakening the profitability of SOEs and an indirect effect of 
significantly reducing government revenue. 
During the early 1980s, the continuous FX shortages led to a further decline in 
economic activity and fuelled uncertainty about the state of the economy.  Import 
volumes plummeted by an annual average of 8%, while real export earnings fell by an 
annual average of 6.4%.   
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Figure 2.2 
    
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation accelerated at an annual rate of 50% and 
peaked at 123% in 1983.  Domestic savings and investment dropped significantly.  
Many factors contributed to the deplorable state of the economy between 1973 and 
1983.  They included large budget deficits; a fixed and highly over-valued exchange 
rate; unsuitable monetary expansion that fuelled high inflation; imposition of price 
controls over a wide variety of products; abuse of import licensing system which led to 
more inefficiency. 
Natural causes, especially in 1983, were a major contributory factor to the  
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    Figure 2.3 
economic woes of Ghana.  The very vital agricultural sector was virtually crippled with 
severe droughts and bushfires.  Not surprisingly, the industrial sector indirectly 
suffered severe consequences. 
In general the Ghanaian economy was characterised with numerous problems 
including: hyperinflation which reduced real/disposable incomes, stifled productive 
investment, and dented economic growth; fiscal indiscipline which eventually led to 
printing of money to finance the huge deficits; high unemployment rates;  an extremely 
over-valued exchange rate which had the effect of reducing exports’ competitiveness 
and resulted in an over-reliance on cocoa as the source of FX; decaying infrastructure 
due to many years of neglect; a sharp decline in the provision of public services 
(health, education etc) and utilities (water, electricity etc).  It became obvious to 
government that economic reforms were imperative. 
In an attempt to tackle these enormous challenges, the government launched the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983, with the assistance of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  The main function of the ERP was to 
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significantly decrease Ghana’s debts and to ameliorate its trading position in the world 
economy.  Under the ERP, policies were aimed at restoring economic activity in the 
most efficient manner.  These policies included: reducing inflation through strict fiscal, 
monetary and trade polices; boosting the flow of FX into Ghana and allocating it to 
vital sectors; reorganising the economic institutions; reinstating productive incentives; 
repairing infrastructure to improve conditions for the production and export of goods; 
and increasing the accessibility of vital consumer goods.  The ERP was implemented 
in about three stages.  From 1983 the government embarked on a path of slashing its 
expenditures while stimulating private production.  Early cuts in expenditure coupled 
with more efficient tax collection resulted in drastic reduction in the budget deficit 
from 6.3% of GDP in 1982 to 0.1% in 1986.  This had the effect of easing government 
strain on the banking system.  Also export activity was increased through a succession 
of cedi devaluations.  During the second stage, between 1987 and 1989, the 
government privatised most of its assets and pursued more far-reaching FX reforms in 
order to devalue the currency further.  Consequently the parallel (parallel) FX market 
was almost eradicated with the opening FX bureaus in 1988.  The third stage saw the 
government deepening monetary reforms and cutting private corporate taxes to 
enhance private sector growth.   
Generally the ERP enhanced Ghana’s international financial status due to its ability to 
service foreign debt and its return onto the international capital markets after an 
absence of two decades. Nevertheless, the ERP was heavily criticised for failing to 
rectify the structural problems of the Ghanaian economy.  The economy still relied 
heavily on the export of cocoa and other agricultural commodities.  Critics also 
accused the ERP of not being beneficial to the average Ghanaian.  The ERP 
encountered numerous shocks.  At times forecasting or averting the shocks, such as 
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dreadful weather conditions and oil crisis, were beyond government control.  Other 
shocks were induced by polices that had been implemented under the ERPA set of 
conditionality embedded in the ERP were viewed as inappropriate. On the other hand 
the ERP chalked a considerable amount of success in terms of rectifying 
macroeconomic imbalances, liberalising the external sector and also liberalising the 
exchange and trade systems. 
The balance of payments (BOP) recorded surpluses from 1984 to 1991.  There was a 
remarkable improvement in per capita incomes due to real GDP growth of 4.5% per 
annum.  Yet economic activity remained sluggish because continued high and 
fluctuating inflation rates deterred private savings and investment. 
Sluggish implementation of structural reforms in SOEs, agricultural and financial 
sectors held back private investment and economic growth.  Food production was 
virtually neglected as vast amounts of resources were diverted to cocoa rehabilitation 
and other export areas.  Consequently many employees of SOEs were made redundant.  
Percentage of the total budget allocated to agriculture fell from 10% in 1983 to 3.5% in 
1988.  Relative to food crops, cocoa contributed less to GDP but received over 60% of 
recurrent agricultural expenditures due to its high export values. 
In trying to deal with the social costs generated by the ERP, the government instituted 
a Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).  With 
an initial amount of US$85 million, PAMSCAD targeted the poor, artisans and small-
scale miners with particular emphasis on executing labour intensive self-help projects.  
Through PAMSCAD another programme was introduced which aimed at improving 
public services especially health care, education, water supply and sanitation.  
Retrenched government workers also received end-of –service benefits through the 
program.  
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The beginning of the 1990s saw the Ghanaian government press on with the policies of 
the ERP.  The World Bank continued to extend credit on condition that Ghana created 
a conducive environment for private sector development by reviewing and overhauling 
its economic and regulatory laws.  In other words Ghana was to introduce deeper 
reforms in areas of exchange rates, economic liberalisation and deregulation. 
Ghana’s fragile export sector led to a situation where it reluctantly had to depend on 
external assistance.  
During the late 1990s, Ghana faced mixed fortunes.  In 1998, the budget deficit 
financing was transferred to deposit money banks and the public.  Stringent monetary 
and fiscal policies led to the lowest rate of monetary growth since the beginning of the 
ERP in 1983.  Amidst a severe energy crisis, the external sector benefited 
tremendously from high commodity prices on the world markets.  The BOP surplus 
shot up from US$ 25 million in 1997 to US$ 99 million in 1998.  Subsequently the 
exchange rates became relatively stable with the cedi depreciating by only 4% against 
the US dollar.  The rate of inflation plunged from 15.7% in the last quarter of 1998 to 
9.4% in the second half of 1999.  This relative stability was seriously hampered in June 
1999 when Ghana experienced a series of external shocks.  Prices of Ghana’s main 
export commodities, cocoa and gold, plummeted on the world markets while Oil prices 
increased sharply.  To worsen the situation, bilateral and multilateral donors withheld a 
large portion of promised aid referring to the failure of the government to implement 
certain key reforms including the privatisation of SOEs.  Consequently the FX reserves 
gradually declined and the strong demand for imports exerted huge pressure on the 
exchange rate.  Speculation also exacerbated the situation because the end to this crisis 
was nowhere in sight.  The cedi depreciated by more than 33% and inflation rose from 
10.3% in June to 13.8% by year end. 
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Though real GDP grew by 3.7% in 2000, the three main sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, industry and services) recorded a slowdown in growth.  Specifically 
agriculture (which contributed to 40% of GDP) registered a decrease in the growth rate 
from 3.9% in 1999 to 2.1% in 2000.  The industrial sector also recorded a decline in 
growth from 4.9% in 1999 to 3.8% in 2000 while the services sector however 
experienced an increase from 5.0% to 5.4%.  BOP deficit deteriorated from US$93.7 
million to US$194.7 million.  Export receipts too fell by 3.6% while imports, on the 
other hand, shot up by 14%.  Not surprisingly, external debt increased by about US$63 
million and the cedi depreciated further by 99.3%. At the same time the central bank 
was pursuing a tight monetary policy.  Consequently, by the end of 2001 inflation had 
dropped to 21% from 40.5 during previous year.  The cedi gained some stability as it 
depreciated by less than 5% compared with a depreciation rate of 49.5 in 2000.  The 
government reduced the budget deficit by 1.4% and also decreased its domestic 
borrowing requirements.  Furthermore the government transferred the budget deficit 
financing and funding of domestic debt from banks to non-bank sources.  At this point 
Ghana’s external debt stock constituted 575% of revenue in present value terms.  This 
implied that Ghana satisfied the criteria for being eligible for Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative because it had surpassed the 250% for sustainability.  
Ghana opted to join the HIPC initiative in 2001 and reached the decision point in 2002.  
It was projected that Ghana would receive nominal debt relief equivalent to 56% (or 
US$ 3.75 billion) of outstanding external debt stock at the end of 2000.  As a result the 
debt burden was forecast to decline from 24% of budget revenue in 2000 to 8% by 
2003.  It was hoped that the implementation of HIPC would significantly lessen the 
burden on the economy and a positive impact on the debt and growth dynamics.  More 
importantly HIPC would enable the government to deal with genuine obstacles to 
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sustainable growth including human capital, insufficient deteriorating infrastructure 
and weak institutions.  In order to reinforce the central bank’s monetary policy role, the 
Bank of Ghana (BOG) Act was passed at the end of 2001.  The Act gave BOG 
operational independence and the sole responsibility of maintaining of price stability.  
Additionally government borrowing from BOG was not to exceed 10% its annual 
revenue.  The Act also provided for the creation of a monetary policy committee 
(MPC) that would be responsible for devising monetary policy. 
In 2002, BOG introduced the Prime rate.  According to the BOG “it is a rate which the 
central bank uses to signal its monetary policy stance”.  Also it is “the benchmark rate 
used by lenders as a reference to establish the rate to be charged to borrowers”.   
Inflation dropped from 21% to 15.2% by 2002.  Though world cocoa price rose (from 
US$1021 in 2001 to US$1266 in 2002), the volume exported fell slightly and as a 
result Ghana was unable to take full advantage this situation.  The sudden drop in 
volume was due to smuggling activities and diseases that affected the cocoa beans.  
Ghana also benefited from relatively higher gold prices.  Favourable world prices 
combined with the HIPC relief narrowed the budget deficit. 
Petroleum price increases led to a hike in inflation from 16% in January 2003 to 29% 
in February 2003.  The MPC was forced to increase its prime rate to 27.5% and 
consequently money market rates rose during the first half of 2003.  Inflation fell 
significantly from 30% in April to 23.6% in December 2003.  The third quarter saw 
money market rates on a declining path induced by government’s decision to reduce its 
funding of borrowing requirements on the auction market.  As a result the 91-day 
treasury bill halved from 34% in June 2003 to 17% in December.  Similarly interbank 
money rates reduced drastically from 27% in June 2003 to 15% in December and 
commercial bank base rates dipped from 32% to 27%.  The external position improved 
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considerably mainly due to increased cocoa earnings and private inward remittances.  
Private inward remittances (transfers from NGOs, religious organisations and 
individuals) through banks and finance companies shot up drastically by 57.5% from 
US$ 1.374 billion in 2002 to US$ 2.164 billion in 2003.  These favourable 
developments led to a significant build-up in international reserves from US$ 640 
million in 2002 to US$ 1.426 billion, which represented 2.9 months of imports (as 
shown in figure 2.1). 
Naturally the cedi/dollar exchange rate gained relative stability, depreciating by only 
4.7%.  In order to have an early sense of the performance of the real sector of the 
economy since GDP numbers are reported with a long lag, Bog developed a new 
economic indicator, the Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA).  The CIEA 
measures activity in industry, industrial electricity consumption, domestic VAT, port 
activity, imports, exports, and employment contributions.  For the first time, Ghana 
attained a sovereign credit rating.  Standard and Poor’s assigned a B+ rating and Fitch 
Rating assigned a ‘B Positive Outlook’.  The banking and payments systems bill was 
passed in 2003 to strengthen the BOG’s regulatory role and deepen the financial 
intermediation. 
Inflation dropped to 11% in December 2004 from 23.6 in December 2003.  GDP 
growth reached record levels, rising from 5.2% in 2003 to 5.8% in 2004.  This was the 
highest growth rate Ghana had achieved in 20 years.  The trade deficit widened from 
US$670 million in 2003 to US$1.512 billion in 2004.  This was due to a 22.9% 
increase in merchandise imports resulting from domestic demand for mainly capital 
and intermediate goods. Another contributory factor was the 45% increase in the 
expenditure on petroleum imports, emanating from high oil prices which rose from 
US$ 28 per barrel in 2003 to US$ 37 in 2004.  However the overall BOP was 
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strengthened by the external account position.  Specifically, developments in the 
external sector, consisting of private inward remittances and HIPC debt relief, 
compensated for the current account deficit.  An accumulation of an extra US$300 
million led to an increase in the Gross International Reserves to US$1.33 billion, 
equivalent to over 3.8 months of imports.  Upon reaching the HIPC completion point 
in July 2004, Ghana’s external debt stock was reduced by US$2 billion with a further 
US$ 2 billion cancellation over 20 years.  Consequently Ghana’s external debt 
decreased to US$6.1 billion in December 2004 from US$8.03 billion in December 
2003.  The cedi continued to remain relatively stable, depreciating by about 2%.  The 
relatively favourable economic situation encouraged banks and other financial 
institutions to increase their exposure to the private sector against their usual practice 
of investing in treasury bills, thus crowding out the private sector.  The government 
rolled out two and three year fixed and floating rate bonds.  The BOG also introduced 
28 and 56 day bills for open market operations.  The purpose of these notes was to 
increase the average maturity of debt, alleviate funding pressures on debt markets and 
decrease the frequency with which the government has to refinance maturing debt. 
At the beginning of 2005, an increase in the petroleum price hiked inflation from 
11.8% in 2004 to 16.7% in March 2005.  However towards the end of the year reduced 
to 14.8%.  In line with the downward trend in inflation, the MPC reduced the prime 
rate from 18.5% in January to 15.5% in December 2005.  As inflationary pressures 
eased, interest rates generally declined.  Real GDP registered a growth rate of 5.8%.  
There was increased activity in the real sector with the exception of the agricultural 
sector.  The agricultural sector, which contributed 40% to the GDP, recorded a decline 
in growth from 7.5% in 2004 to 6.5% in 2005.  Growth in the industrial sector was 
robust to wage and crude oil shocks as it registered a higher growth from 5.1% in 204 
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to 5.6% in 2005.  The services sector also recorded an increase in growth from 4.7% in 
2004 to 5.4% in 2005.  The overall budget deficit narrowed from 3.2% of GDP in 2004 
to 2.4% in 2005.  In order to promote the private sector as the engine of growth, the 
government resolved to reduce domestic debt as a percentage of GDP to tackle the 
crowding-out of the private sector.  Consequently, public domestic debt as a 
percentage of GDP fell from 21.7 in 2004 to 18.3% in 2005.  The stock market index 
was relatively bearish as it rose by only 29.8% in 2005 compared to a gain of 91.3% in 
2004.  The overall BOP registered a surplus of US$110 million in 2005 from a deficit 
of US$10.4 million, mainly due to large inflows of private and official capital into the 
economy.  These inflows more than compensated for the current account deficit of 
US$ 757.6 million to register a surplus of US$104 million.  Exports increased by only 
1.2%, from US$2.705 billion in 2004 to US$2.737 billion.  However imports increased 
by 22% due to a 41% increase in oil-related imports.  Gross international reserves 
increased marginally to US$1.9 billion in 2005 from US$1.7 billion in 2004, 
representing a decrease in import cover from 3.8 months in 2004 to 3.5 months in 
2005.  The cedi remained relatively stable, depreciating by only 0.9%.  The HIPC 
initiative impacted favourably on external debt, reducing the external debt to GDP 
ratio from 266.3% in 2004 to 63% in 2005. 
Inflation continued to decline.  It dropped from 14.8% in 2005 to 10.5% by December 
2006, mainly due to relatively stable exchange rate, favourable food supply conditions 
and a tight monetary policy.  Subdued inflation expectations led to the MPC reducing 
the prime rate further during 2006.  Money market rates followed suit with the 91 day 
treasury bill rates dropping 11.77% in 2005 to 10.19% in December 2006.  On average, 
bank base rates decreased from 24% at the start of the year to 19%.  Real GDP grew 
from 5.9% in 2005 to 6.2% in 2006.  Most of this growth was attributed to the 
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industrial and services sectors.  Though the agricultural sector experienced higher 
growth from 4.1% in 2005 to 5.7% in 2006 (still below target of 6.2%), its contribution 
to GDP fell slightly from 36% in 2005 to 35.8% in 2006 due to the cocoa and fisheries 
sub-sectors.  Growth in the industrial sector decreased from 7.7% in 2005 to 7.3% in 
2006 but its contribution to GDP improved slightly from 25.1% in 2005 to 25.4% in 
2006.  The service sector surpassed its target of 6.2%, growing by 6.5%.  The 
contribution of the services sector to GDP also improved marginally from 29.9% to 
30% in 2006.  In real terms, the credit extended by banks to public and private 
institutions increased by 27.1% in 2006 compared to 21.9% growth in 2005.  The 
overall budget deficit shot up to 7.8% of GDP in 2006 from 2.7% of GDP in 2005.  
This was mainly due to lower revenues and relatively higher expenditures.  Domestic 
revenue as a percentage of GDP dropped from 24% in 2005 to 22.3% in 2006, 
implying that revenue was unable to keep up with the rapid growth in the economy.  
Total expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 34.1% in 2005 to 34.9% in 
2006, mainly due to the energy crisis and higher wage demands.  Consequently the 
domestic debt to GDP ratio rose to 14.7% in 2006.  Overall BOP improved from 
US$84.5 million in 2005 to US$415.1, representing 3.4% of GDP.  Again large 
surpluses on the capital and financial accounts more than compensated for the increase 
in current account deficit.  Even though exports increased, the trade balance further 
deteriorated.  Increased import of intermediate and capital goods to assist with high 
level of investment activities shot imports up from US$5.35 billion in 2005 to US$6.75 
billion in 2006.  Consequently FX reserves registered an increase of US$371.8 million 
to US$2.27 billion at the end of 2006.  The increase in reserves was due to higher 
export earnings and debt cancellation by the bilateral/multilateral agencies.  Import 
cover, however, decreased from 3.5 months in 2005 to 3 months in 2006.  Naturally, 
 40 
external debt dropped sharply from US$3.98 billion in 2005 to US$2.77 billion in 
2006.  The cedi continued to maintain its relative stability, depreciating by only 1.1%. 
Real GDP grew by 6.3% in 2007.  The services sector was responsible for most of this 
growth.  It grew from 6.9% in 2006 to 8.2% in 2007.  The agricultural sector recorded 
a decrease in growth from 5.7%in 2006 to 4.3% in 2007, due to irregular rainfall 
patterns and decreased activity in fisheries.  Not surprisingly the industrial sector also 
recorded a decline in growth from 9.3% in 2006 to 7.4% in 2007 as a result of the 
severe energy crisis.  Inflation inched up slightly from 10.5% in 2006 to 12.7% in 
2007.  This was mainly driven by food price increases, high petroleum prices (effect of 
high crude oil), and the upward adjustment of utility prices.  The overall BOP 
registered another surplus US$413 million, representing 2.9% of GDP.  As usual the 
relatively larger capital and financial accounts more than offset the increase in the 
current account.  The current account deficit increased from US$1.072 billion in 2006 
to US$1.884 billion in 2007 as the trade balance further deteriorated.  The surplus 
recorded in the capital and financial accounts were from proceeds of the floatation of 
Ghana’s US$750 million 10 year sovereign and increased foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the telecommunications sector.  Gross international reserves increased by 
US$566.9 million to US$2.84 billion in 2007, equivalent to 3.1 months of imports. The 
cedi depreciated by 4.8% against the dollar as a result of increased expenditure on 
energy-related imports and rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure.  External 
debt increased significantly due to disbursement of proceeds of the bond and other 
additional disbursements from multilateral/bilateral creditors.  The external debt 
increased by US$1.41 billion to US$3.59 billion in 2007.   The budget deficit 
continued to widen, reaching an alarming 8.1% of GDP from 4.16% in 2006.  
Domestic revenue as a percentage of GDP increased from 22.3% in 2006 to 26% in 
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2007 while total government expenditure shot up to 40% of GDP.  In real terms, the 
credit extended to the private sector rose by 41.6% compared to a growth rate of 28.7% 
in 2006.  The formal adoption of an inflation targeting framework was announced by 
the MPC in May 2007.  In July 2007, the national currency was redenominated.  The 
main aim of the redenomination was to eliminate the deadweight burden in 
transactions as well as improve efficiency in the economy.  With regards to the 
handling of the economy, it was expected that this exercise would increase efficiency 
in transactions.  Specifically, 10,000 cedis was set to 1 Ghana cedi. 
Foriegn Trade
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    Figure 2.4
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2.3 SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF GHANA 
This section outlines the variations in performance and contribution to growth of the 
three main sectors in the Ghanaian economy during the period between 1970 to 2007 
(see figure 2.5) 
GDP BY SECTOR
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Figure 2.5 
The economy of Ghana is mainly driven by the agricultural sector which accounts for 
about 40% of GDP.  In comparison to most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana’s 
agricultural sector is relatively large.  Cereals (mainly maize) are the main crops and 
account for roughly 20% of GDP.  Naturally this sector heavily depends on labour, land 
and weather production with inadequate mechanisation.  The lack of mechanisation has 
led to low levels of yields and farm productivity in comparison to other African 
countries. 
The 1970s was characterised with low productivity and diminished significantly during 
the economic crises between 1979 and 1983.  The contribution of agriculture to GDP fell 
sharply from 60% in the early 1970s to 53% during the economic crises.  With the 
introduction of the ERP, production recovered slightly and continued its surge 
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throughout the 1980s.  Starting from the mid 1980s, a gradual increase in the area under 
cultivation led to a slight expansion in production.  However the downward trend 
resumed, resulting in a decrease of about 40% in 1990 to 36% in 2000.  
During the 1990s, the growth rate of the agricultural sector points to it lagging behind 
the performance of the industrial and service sectors.  Naturally this situation resulted in 
increased food imports and industrial raw materials.  It has also exerted an upward 
pressure on domestic prices and reduced the volume of vital exports like cocoa. 
Cocoa is the main export commodity and primary source of FX for the Ghanaian 
economy.  FX earnings mainly come from the export of dry cocoa beans, cocoa products 
and   other non-traditional agricultural commodities. Cocoa production is predominantly 
privately owned.  During the 1970s, cocoa production reduced gradually and reached an 
all-time low of 166,000 tons in 1984, which represented less than half of the annual 
output in the early 1970s.  This sharp fall in production was due to high taxation and 
inadequate incentives.  The share of taxes in cocoa export revenue hovered around 40% 
during the 1980s and 90s.  By the late 1990s, Ghana’s share of the world cocoa 
production had dipped to only 13%.  This was in sharp contrast to 1960’s when Ghana 
was the world’s leading producer of cocoa.  In an attempt to revamp cocoa production, 
government introduced a policy which was aimed at enhancing price incentives for 
increased cocoa production.  Specifically, cocoa farmers were paid price compensation 
as and when it is necessary in order to push producer prices up.  Farmers viewed this 
price compensation scheme, which was introduced in the mid 1980s, as a ‘bonus’ and 
expected it each year.   Nevertheless, dwindling world cocoa market prices combined 
with inefficiencies in the internal marketing under the COCOCBOD and excessive 
taxation of the crop have result in lower producer prices, falling yields, and 
disinvestment in Ghana.  Cocoa prices plummeted to US$ 1094 per ton in 2000 from 
US$ 1434 per ton in 1999.  However the price recovered and eventually shot up to US$ 
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1949.50 in 2003 due to political tensions in neighbouring Ivory Coast, the largest 
producer of cocoa.  Again prices dropped significantly to US$ 1586.90 in 2004 but 
gradually recovered to US$ 2072 in 2007.  Cocoa production hovered around 300,000 
tones per annum from 348,031 tonnes in 2000 to 354,775 tonnes in 2003   Due to mass 
cocoa spraying exercises and improved crop growing practices initiated by government, 
cocoa production increased by over 70% to 620,365 tonnes in 2004.  Cocoa production 
for 2007 was estimated at 531,748 tonnes.  The agricultural sector’s share of GDP was 
34.7%, which represented a decrease from 2006.  However it still remains the dominant 
sector. 
  
Industry 
The industrial sector accounted for about 20% of GDP in 1970.  Nevertheless, this share 
rapidly reduced to single digits during the economic crises until the beginning of the 
ERP.  During this period between 1970 to 1983, the industrial sector was saddled with 
low plant utilisation levels.  Plant utilisation levels were estimated to be less than 20% in 
1982.  The severe problem of declining utilisation levels was induced by the 
unavailability of imported inputs, thus private sector employers were forced to downsize 
workforce.  Government, on the other hand, was obliged to do the exact opposite.  The 
main highlight of the Structural Adjustment Program on tackling the serious 
macroeconomic imbalances during the 1970s and early 1980s laid the foundation for 
industrial recovery.  Initially, the adjustment policies resulted in improvements in the 
plant utilisation.  Between 1970 and 1983, industrial output increased gradually.  
Manufacturing, which accounted for 14% of GDP in 1970, contributed to 21.5 % of 
GDP in 1977.  Yet, its share had gradually declined over time, accounting for only 9% of 
GDP.  The manufacturing sub-sector was the slowest to recover during the adjustment 
period.  In 1990 the average production of the manufacturing industries represented only 
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about 60% of the level in the mid-1970s.  With the exception of cement and iron, the 
output in all manufacturing industries was below the 1970s levels.  Estimates from the 
Ghana Statistical service, indicate that the capacity utilisation levels in manufacturing 
was only at 40% in 1990 and has relatively remained unchanged.  Production in the Food 
processing and textile manufacturing sub-sectors is still below 1970s levels. 
In comparison to other industries, cement, petroleum and metal industries have 
experienced grown rapidly.  During the early 1990s, the privatisation of the iron industry 
boosted iron production from a decline of 5% in the 1970s to a six-fold increase in 
volume between 1990 and 1996.  Sawn wood production, after experiencing strong 
growth during the late 1980s to the early 1990s, slowed down considerably due to a ban 
on log exports and new environmental legislature.  Aluminium production increased 
gradually after the initiation of reform programs but by 1992 production was still below 
the 1980 levels.   By 2006, total aluminium production was about 65,000 metric tonnes 
valued at US$ 164 million. 
 
The second half of the 1980s saw an increase in mining sector production, accounting for 
6% of GDP in 1997.  However, the composition of mining output had varied over the 
years.  In terms of volume, diamond extraction was Ghana’s second largest mining 
industry in the 1970s, but almost collapsed in the 1980s.  By 1990, the mining 
production had returned to its 1977 level with strong increases registered in bauxite and 
manganese production.  In 2006 total manganese production was 1,804,155 tonnes 
valued at US$ 40.64 million. This growth has contributed to raising the share of the 
mining sector in total exports.  Gold has emerged as a main FX earner for Ghana with a 
total production of 2,120,230 ounces valued at US$ 1.28 billion.  The 2000s was 
characterised with a severe energy crisis which contributed to the declining growth rates 
in various industrial sub-sectors.  In 2007, this adverse impact was somehow mitigated 
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by relatively high growth rates of 30% and 11% in the mining and construction sub-
sectors respectively.  The growth in mining sector was mainly due to the installation of 
emergency power plants to supplement energy supply shortages.                              
Growth in the construction sector, usually proxied by the growth in the production of 
cement, continuously declined in growth until the late 1980s.  Since the early 1990s, 
output has grown steadily, more than doubling between 1990 and 1996.  Construction 
has grown from 5 percent of GDP in 1975 to 9 percent of GDP in 1998.   Over the year 
the construction sub-sector has experienced sustained growth emanating from increased 
road construction and other infrastructural development throughout the country. In 
addition, a total of 2,010,324 metric tonnes of cement were produced during the 2006 
against 1,896,325 metric tonnes in 2005, thus indicating robust construction activities.  
The contribution of the industrial sector to GDP in 2007 was 26%, a marginal increase 
from 2006. 
 
Services 
The services sector is usually referred to as the tertiary sector of the economy.  The 
development of the primary (agricultural) and secondary (industrial) sectors is expected 
to boost development in the services sector.  Specifically, as the agricultural sector 
advances and industrialisation overshadows it in significance, the services sector would 
eventually emerge as the largest contributor to GDP and economic development.  The 
services sector has a strategic role of inducing economic growth in the economy by 
facilitating the efficient functioning of product and factor markets.  Despite its 
importance the services sector has been somehow neglected by policy makers, who have 
continued to place a larger emphasis on agriculture and industry.  The proposal of the 
USA to include services in GATT negotiations in 1982 has gone a long way in 
stimulating interest in the services sector in sub-Saharan countries like Ghana. 
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In the national accounts of Ghana, the services sector is organised into six main 
categories:  (i) finance, insurance, real estate and business services;  (ii)  wholesale, retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels;  (iii)  transport, storage and communications;  (iv)  
government services;  (v)  producers of private non-profit services;  (vi)  community, 
social and personal services.  A good transport system improves division of labour, and 
lowers the retail prices of food and other domestically produced goods.  Transportation 
system plays a role in determining a country’s competitiveness on the world markets.  
Basic communication facilities include the telephone and mobile phone networks, 
internet, telegraph, and postal services.  Communication services improve the running of 
the product and factor markets by efficiently connecting buyers and seller.  
Telecommunications advancements have allowed consumers and service providers to 
trade efficiently without significant personal contact.  Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants 
and hotels form the largest category of the services sector.  This category includes a 
majority of local entrepreneurs with government participation at a minimum.  Finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services are vital in the mobilisation of domestic 
savings for investment in human and physical capital.  The growth and expansion of 
other sectors of the economy depend on this category.  Nevertheless this category of the 
services sector remained relatively under-developed before the start of the adjustment 
program.  The heavy presence of the SOEs in this category led to increased inefficiency 
and under-performance especially in the banking, insurance and estate businesses.  
Government services consist of sectors of the economy which provide social services 
like health, education and housing.  Government is also heavily involved providing 
community and social welfare services.  Producers of private non-profit services, 
referred to as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), provide assistance to poor and 
underprivileged communities.  The Ghanaian service sector contracted considerably 
during the pre-ERP period.  According to estimates by the Ghana Statistical service, the 
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share of services in terms of value added dropped considerably from the mid 1970s to 
the early 1980s.  After the inception of the ERP, the services sector has been transformed 
significantly.  This sector has been expanding moderately since 1984.  Since 1985 the 
contribution of the service sector to GDP has averaged 40% per annum.  With respect to 
the diminishing contribution of agriculture to GDP since the early 1980s, the services 
sector can be described as a more vibrant sector.  Tourism, though in its early years, is 
emerging as an important service sector which is rapidly developing. Over the years, the 
tourism sector has proved beyond reasonable doubt that it has the potential to attract 
private sector investment, offer employment opportunities and support export 
diversification. FX earning from tourism has increased at an average of 30 per annum 
since 1995, and it employs over 500,000 people.  In 2005, Ghana earned about US$800 
million from the tourism sector.  This figure represented expenditures and receipts from 
about 400,000 tourists with average spending of US$1950 per tourist. 
Other components of GDP 
This section examines the expenditure composition of GDP. 
Aggregate capital formation (Gross investment) 
Investment is vital in the determination of economic growth.  Investment leads to the 
adoption of new technology, creation of employment, increases in income and the 
improvement in people’s living conditions.  If investment is channelled efficiently to the 
relevant projects, it may contribute positively to poverty alleviation.  Yet, successive 
governments have maintained the hostile attitude towards investment, mainly private 
investment, in Ghana.  Immediately after independence in 1957, the government 
implemented an industrialisation strategy through a direct state-owned concept to 
promote growth through rapid industrialisation, and to encourage the mass production of 
food for local consumption.  At the time, President Kwame Nkrumah opposed private 
investment because of the potential threat to his political ambition posed by wealthy 
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entrepreneurs (Killick 1978).  This was evident in his declaration that he favoured the 
creation of Ghanaian co-operatives rather than empowering Ghanaians to start private 
business enterprises. 
Notwithstanding this observation, in 1963, a Capital Investment Act (172) was passed, 
which offered a variety of concessions to potential investors, though accompanied by 
very harsh provisions.  Between 1966 and 1972, various governments vigorously 
pursued more open policies and encouraged private investment.  These governments 
sought to arrange foreign inflows in terms of long-term public and private capital, and 
introduced import liberalisation into Ghana (Leith, 1974).  Yet, not much was done to 
alter the law on state ownership in economic activities.  According to Killick (1978), 43 
out of 53 enterprises that operated in 1971 were state-owned. 
Between 1972 and 1978, a succession of military interventions occurred that transformed 
the economy into a strong command system.  Consequently state intervention in 
economic activities deepened.  In 1973, an Investment Decree (NRCD 141) was enacted, 
followed by the Investment Policy Decree NRCD 329 of 1975, both of which promote 
local and foreign investment.  In 1979, a new military coup brought in the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), with the view to embarking on “some house cleaning” 
exercises.  The new military council “denounced neo-colonialism prevailing in the 
country as the root causes of the economic problems”.  Consequently, it regarded a 
revolution based on the mobilisation of internal and external resources to finance 
productive investments as the means by which the foundations of a self-reliant economy 
could be laid (Sarpong 1993).  After a few months of military rule, the economy was 
returned to a democratic state under President Liman.  Liman’s government was later 
ousted by the leader of the previous military government.  Initially, private entrepreneurs 
were criticised as being corrupt, and for this reason, assets of the majority of investors 
were confiscated by the state.  Subsequently, the Ghana Investment Code (Act 437) was 
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introduced in 1981, which among other things, sought to centralise investment 
promotion activities at the Capital Investment Board, and consolidate all investment 
legislation.  Ghanaians were surprised at this new initiative launched by the same 
government who had earlier made attacks on private investors in Ghana.  In 1985, an 
Investment Code (PNDCL 116) was formulated, which led to the establishment of the 
Ghana Investment Centre, whose main function was to serve as the Centre of investment 
activities in the country.  The investment code offered several incentive packages for 
would-be investors, for instance, incentives in the area of accelerated depreciation 
allowances, exemption from import duties on machinery and equipment, tax holidays, 
and arrangements for repatriation of profits. 
Another issue of importance was the ratification of the convention establishing the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank.  One of the 
prominent aims of MIGA was to encourage equity investment and other forms of direct 
foreign investment in Ghana, “by reducing non-commercial risks” (The World Bank, 
1987).  Subsequently, the Ghana Investment Centre (GIPC) was set up under the GIPC 
Act of 1994, the aim of which was to promote and encourage private investment.  
Among its activities was the revision of the 1985 Investment Code, to enable the country 
to attract the much needed investments in support of its accelerated economic growth 
policies. 
Data on gross domestic investment in Ghana is categorised into public investment 
(including government and public enterprises) and private investment.  Gross domestic 
investment (GDI) is used in this research as an acronym for gross fixed capital formation 
in the data series.  GDI as a percentage of GDP reduced from a peak of 16% in both 
1970 and 1973, to only 4% in 1981-1983.  The gradual decline in GDI cannot be easily 
attributed to a particular component (either public or private), since both fluctuated 
during the period between 1970 and 1983.  The long-lasting economic decline, 
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restrictions in credit and FX markets, combined with the risks faced by investors, 
resulted in the worsening of the problem.  GDI increased from 6% of GDP in 1984, to 
11% of GDP in 1990, before falling to around 8% of GDP in 1991.  It rose again to peak 
at 18% in 1997 before falling again to around 8% of GDP thereafter.  During the period 
1988 to 1995, investment activities in Ghana focused on rehabilitation and expansion 
rather than on new investment.  The trends in investment in Ghana are similar to the 
overall figures in Sub-Saharan Africa.  During the early 1980s when Ghana’s investment 
drive had reached its lowest level, private and public investment as proportions of GDP 
in Sub-Saharan Africa also recorded low ratios. 
Between 1970 and 1975, public investment averaged 5.2% of GDP, moving in the 
opposite direction from that of private investment.  Public investment dropped from a 
peak of 12% of GDP in 1976 to its lowest level of 1% of GDP in 1981 and 1982.  There 
were marginal increases to about 3% of GDP from 1985 to 1991 and also from 1993 to 
1994.  It increased gradually to about 6% in 2000.  It must be noted that at the time of a 
sharp decline in public investment between 1977 and 1983, the economy of Ghana 
experienced a severe recession accompanied by excessive rates of inflation and high 
unemployment amidst high over-valuation of the exchange rate.  The government was 
unable to undertake any development projects, as the state owned industries became a 
burden on the state. 
Private investment was about 10% of GDP 1970 to 1971, but dropped to 3% of GDP in 
1972, mainly because of the military coup, and was around 9% in 1974.  Investment then 
declined to approximately 5% in 1978, reaching its lowest level of 2% of GDP in 1982.  
After 1983, there was a steady increase in the private investment ratio to a peak of 8% in 
1990, before falling again to 4% of GDP in 1994-1995.  Thereafter it fluctuated to reach 
a stable 5% of GDP in 2000.  The recovery of private investment may have been 
encouraged by the improvements in exchange rate liberalisation, elimination of trade 
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barriers such as controls, exchange controls, export and import permits, surrender of 
export receipts, as well as the improvements in roads and transportation networks.  The 
subsequently flat level could be explained by the lack of adequate investible capital. The 
main driver of growth in 2005 appears to have been the increase in investment, both 
private and public, with road construction accounting for most of the projected 9 percent 
real increase in public investment. While private investment matched the increase in 
public investment, suggesting that private investment have been able to respond to the 
opportunities provided by the economic expansion, it appears that there is still scope for 
faster growth through an increase in investment efficiency. At Ghana's current 
investment to GDP ratio, almost 30 percent, if the efficiency of investment were at levels 
comparable to other developing countries, the country could be growing at an additional 
2 to 3 percentage points per year. 
  
2.4 Main Characteristics of the Ghanaian FX market 
Between January to August 2007, average daily market turnover in the Ghanaian FX 
market was approximately $38m ($29m without oil imports).  The domestic currency is 
called the CEDI.  It is primarily a spot market where FX trades involve the exchange of 
domestic currency for foreign currencies for settlement in two days.  The forward FX 
market is non-existent due to the absence of a yield curve on which to base forward 
prices.  The central bank is the main supplier of FX with its main source being export 
receipts, donor inflows and taxes and royalties paid in foreign currency. 
Unlike the major currencies (with liquid markets) that are traded worldwide, a small 
currency like the CEDI is only traded onshore in Ghana.  Central bank regulations 
prohibit the operation of offshore trading of the CEDI and it has the power to impose 
restrictions on its import and export.   The US dollar is the most traded foreign currency 
in Ghana and subsequently plays the role of a vehicle currency in cross currency 
 53 
transactions.  For example the purchase of Indian rupees with CEDIS is performed by 
first purchasing US dollars with CEDIS and then using the US dollars to purchase the 
Indian rupees.  In other words, it is easier to find agents who are willing to exchange 
CEDIS and rupees for US dollars than finding one willing to exchange CEDIS for 
rupees.  This is simply because US dollar market is more liquid with lower transaction 
costs. 
There is a high degree of concentration in the Ghanaian FX market.  Out of the 17 banks 
the top 5 control 80% of the FX transactions.  There are numerous foreign exchange 
bureaus that compete with the banks but they account for small portion of the foreign 
exchange market.  In comparison to customer level transactions, the FX interbank 
market is relatively small. 
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2.4.1 Foreign Exchange Bureaus in the Ghanaian FX market 
In light of the fact that FX bureaus rates have been used as a proxy for parallel market 
rates, it is imperative that we gain a deeper insight into their activities. 
Brief History of FX Bureaus 
In 1981, smuggling and illegal FX operations had become so widespread that the parallel 
market rate was 9.6 times higher than the official rate.  Around this period transactions in 
the parallel economy was accounted for about a third of Ghana’s GDP.  By 1986, the 
government was not directly involved in exchange rate determination. It introduced a 
system where the exchange rate was determined at periodic currency auctions.  These 
currency auctions were under the influence of market forces and consisted of a two-tier 
exchange rate system, one rate for essentials and another for non-essentials.  By 1987, 
the two auctions had merged.  Most of the foreign exchange inflows were allocated 
through the auctions.  In an attempt to combat and eradicate parallel market operations, 
private foreign-exchange bureaus (FX bureaus) were allowed to trade in foreign 
currency.  In July 1989 there were 148 FX bureaus operating all over Ghana.  Eventually 
the huge gap between the auction rate and FX bureau rate had narrowed drastically.  
Specifically the gap reduced from 29% in 1988 to approx. 6% in 1991.  In 1992, the 
auction system was abandoned.  FX bureaus and other purchasers of foreign currency 
were referred to the central bank, which used the market-determined exchange rate.  
Gradually Ghana moved towards a market-determined exchange rate and lowered tariffs 
in order to attract more trade. 
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2.5 The Market Microstructure of the Ghanaian FX market 
There is only one official FX market where all legally permitted FX transactions take 
place.  However there exists a very active parallel (parallel) where illegal but tolerated 
transactions take place.  The existence of the parallel market is largely due to direct and 
indirect intervention in the FX market.  “When access to the official foreign exchange 
market is limited and there are various foreign exchange restrictions on international 
transactions of goods, services and assets, an excess demand develops for foreign 
currency at the official rate, which encourages some of the supply of foreign currency to 
be sold illegally, at a market price higher than the official rate.” (Phylaktis 1997)   
The relatively low interbank activity could imply that the central bank may have accurate 
measures of order flow in the market.  Specifically, in order to have an idea of exchange 
rate pressures, order flow can be deduced from the transactions between banks and their 
customers because it is the customers who initiate the transactions at exchange rates 
quoted by the banks.  Even if the interbank market turnover were to increase in the 
future, the central bank could still obtain an accurate measure of order flow due to its 
strict reporting requirements. 
The Ghanaian FX market is pure dealer market.  Dealers usually provide liquidity to the 
market by absorbing order flow imbalances.  This is achieved through a mixture of 
exchange rate adjustment and inventory management.  Specifically dealers set two-way 
exchange rates at which customers will buy and sell FX, they absorb any excess demand 
or supply and then adjust exchange rates to manage their net open FX positions.  Apart 
from providing liquidity, net open positions allow dealers to speculate against the CEDI 
by building position before expected currency depreciation takes place.   
There are 17 active dealer banks in the foreign exchange market.  The top five banks are 
the main market makers and play a vital role in the determination of the exchange rate. 
The top five account for approximately 82.3% of total volume of transactions on the FX 
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market1.  They quote two-way exchange rates at which they are willing to trade with 
each other.    The bid-ask spread reflects the level of competition among market makers 
and the exchange rate risk associated with possible exchange rate movements.  Unlike 
other emerging FX markets, limits are not imposed by the central bank on net open 
positions.  Rather the central bank has opted for monitoring the foreign exchange 
positions, thus increasing the scope for market making. 
In communicating and trading with each other, dealers agree to trades in telephone 
conversation which are later confirmed by fax or telex.  There are no electronic trading 
platforms (like Reuters spot dealing systems) that allow for bilateral conversations and 
dealing. 
Only licensed banks and foreign exchange bureaus are allowed to perform FX 
intermediation. In Ghana, all the banks (both domestic and foreign-owned) are permitted 
to deal in FX.  The licensing of intermediaries makes it easier for the central bank to 
enforce its regulations concerning the use and exchange of foreign currency.  For 
example, a customer will have to provide the proper documentation relating to the 
underlying economic transaction that is generating the demand for foreign currency.  It is 
regulations like these that make the parallel market a suitable alternative. 
The heavy involvement of the central bank in the FX market limits the scope for price 
discovery.  This is because the central bank has a superior information advantage over 
the other banks due to its ability to obtain private information from the main market 
makers.  From 2002 to present there is evidence of massive central bank intervention on 
the FX market.  The central bank absorbs innovations in the order flow at existing 
exchange rates, usually with the aim of reducing exchange rate volatility.  The central 
bank refers to these actions as ‘balance of payment support’.  The exchange rate is still 
                                                 
1
 June-September 2007 Quarterly Bank of Ghana Report 
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determined by market forces but with the central bank absorbing part of the excess 
demand or supply. 
The high degree of concentration already mentioned above could also lead to higher 
transparency.  Each of the dealers from the top 5 banks observe a significant proportion 
of the market and maybe have a rough idea of the trading flow that they are not involved 
with.  In general the central bank does not disclose information obtained from banks’ 
reporting requirements because of the proprietary nature.  In Ghana, banks are required 
to report each foreign exchange transaction at their respective exchange rates. 
An FX transaction is settled only when the bank account of the seller is irreversibly 
credited and that of the buyer is debited.  This occurs at central bank accounts where 
banks make deposits to meet reserve requirements.  The foreign currency leg of FX 
transactions is usually settled abroad through correspondent banks.  In particular the 
debiting and crediting of FX occurs in nostro accounts opened by domestic banks 
abroad.  At present most banks in Ghana, use SWIFT, a worldwide interbank 
telecommunications network, as the main system for conveying messages with 
international payment instructions and confirmations of FX transactions.  For example a 
bank in Ghana may send a SWIFT message to its correspondent bank in London 
instructing it to transfer US dollars from its nostro account into the nostro account of the 
beneficiary.  The corresponding bank in London then makes the necessary transfers to 
settle the transaction. 
2.5.1 Activities of FX bureaus 
On a typical day, the daily turnover of FX bureau operators situated in the city centre 
ranges from $10-$20k.  However this depends on seasonal factors with peak flows being 
observed during the last quarter of the year, when retailers (importers) prepare for the 
Christmas shopping.  Peak flows are also associated with Muslims’ annual Hajj trip to 
Saudi Arabia.  The USD accounts for about 2/3 of all FX transactions.  Operators 
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attributed this trend to the global dominance of the USD, its use as a vehicle currency 
and the lack of confidence in the domestic currency.   Presently, their main source of FX 
is mainly the general public.  The central bank ceased the supply of FX to the bureaus 
around 2000/2001.  This move seriously affected the profitability of the bureaus because 
CB flows represented a cheap source of funding and fierce competition developed 
between bureaus.   
FX bureaus rarely engage in FX transactions with banks.  Their relationship can be 
described as a typical bank-customer relationship where bureaus operate FX deposit 
account with banks.  Nevertheless they share a special relationship where bureaus use 
bank rates as a guide and banks call bureaus on a daily basis to check their rates. 
On the average bureaus quote ‘higher’ rates than the banks.  The difference between 
bank rate and bureau rates is mainly due to the relative flexibility of the bureaus.  Unlike 
the banks, bureaus can adjust their rates about 3-4 times daily in response to market 
signals.   Depending on the season, the parallel market (FX bureau market) is relatively 
more volatile.  On the other hand banks rates rarely change during the day.  Market 
signals include customer flows, central bank actions, actions of other bureaus etc. As and 
when the bureaus receive market signals, they evaluate and process this information 
before fixing prices accordingly. 
2.5.2 Illegal Activities of FX Bureaus 
FX bureaus are regulated by the central bank.  This consists of the submission of 
monthly returns and financial accounts.  Bureaus’ licences to trade FX are renewed 
annually to ensure strict adherence to rules and regulations.  Additionally bureaus are 
subjected to random spot checks where for example officials check whether cash tally 
with receipts.  Despite efforts by the CB to closely monitor the activities of bureaus, 
sizeable portions still engage in illegal activities.  These illegal activities mainly consist 
of non-issuance of receipts for FX transactions and illegal remittances.  When receipts 
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are not issued, this implies that bureaus do not account for sizable portion of their 
transactions. Thus bureaus’ transaction will be understated and may not be a true 
reflection of the actual situation on the market.  More importantly this illegal practice 
allows bureaus to charge arbitrary rates. 
Also the central bank regulation prohibits bureaus from providing money remittances 
service.  Yet some bureaus engage in these illegal money remittances.  Ghanaian bureaus 
have representative/agents in London who receive remittances on their behalf.  
Consequently the bureaus in Ghana search for scarce FX on the market to pay the 
recipients.  This is contrary to the normal procedure where it is rather the cedi-equivalent 
of the remittance that is paid to recipients. 
Aside the banks, the FX bureaux and the financial services companies for remittances 
constituting the FX market, there is the usual unofficial parallel FX market made up of 
illegal FX dealers who operate from unauthorized locations. According to the central 
bank, their operations constitute less than 5 percent of the FX market turnover. 
 
2.5.3 External Trade and Parallel Foreign Exchange Market Premium 
The Parallel market exchange rate premium measures restrictions on the availability of 
foreign currency, which are necessarily imposed in regimes with multiple exchange rates 
and severely misaligned official rates (IMF, 2000).  Reasons for the sources of this 
premium are not hard to find.  In the 1970s and most of the 1980s, administrative 
controls were used to allocate foreign exchange.  This may have contributed to the 
surfacing of an active parallel foreign exchange market in Ghana.  During the 1970s, the 
parallel FX market premium was persistently large, reducing considerably in the early 
1990s as the restrictions on foreign currency transactions were abolished.  This was due 
to the adoption of a flexible exchange rate policy, which allowed market forces to 
determine the value of the Ghanaian Cedi. 
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In the late 1960s, the collapse of international cocoa prices forced the government to 
devalue the currency in December 1971 to reduce the domestic effects of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade (Aryeetey et al., 2000).  The toppling of the 
government in 1972 was followed by a revaluation of the cedi in stages and then was 
eventually pegged at ¢1.15 to the US dollar in March 1973 (Roe and Schneider, 1992).  
During the remainder of the decade, the authorities were reluctant to devalue the cedi 
when faced with the excessive balance of payment deficits (Dordunoo, 1997).  Instead, 
they preferred to impose ad hoc restrictions on trade and FX transactions.  The 1973 
parity was maintained until June 1978, when the cedi was again devalued to ¢2.75 to the 
US dollar.  It remained relatively unchanged until April 1983, when it was devalued to 
¢9.79 per US dollar as a result the ERP (IMF, 2000) 
In an effort to significantly reduce parallel market operations, the Ghanaian authorities 
allowed FX bureaux to operate in February 1988.  Naturally, this move led to the 
absorption of the parallel market into the redefined legal structure.  However, this 
resulted in a dual exchange rate system with two different spot FX markets and two 
exchange rates: a bureau rate and auction rate.  Additionally an FX inter-bank market 
was established in March 1992, to enable domestic banks to trade in FX amongst 
themselves.  With FX now determined by market mechanisms, restrictions gradually 
declined.  In October 1986, reforms of the exchange rate system were combined with the 
removal of import licensing, rationalisation of import tariffs, and the removal of all 
restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.  Even with 
these reforms, trade within the FX market was limited in the 1990s, with large 
proportion of transactions taking place between the Bank of Ghana and the commercial 
banks, rather than amongst the commercial banks.  The Bank of Ghana quoted an 
exchange rate that was equivalent to the average of indicative rates quoted by the 
commercial banks and thus did not reflect the actual rates for market transactions.  A 
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more serious problem was the suspicion that the Bank of Ghana was using 
administrative pressure and moral persuasion to maintain the currency at an overvalued 
level.  This would enable Ghana to support her external obligations and imports while 
controlling inflation.  In 1999, Ghana suffered a severe terms of trade shock, with the fall 
in cocoa and gold prices and the increase in the crude oil prices.  As a result international 
reserves dropped to very low levels and the cedi had depreciated by over 50% by the end 
of the year.  By the end of 2000, the parallel market premium had become almost 
negligible.  Specifically, the official rates almost equalled their parallel market rates, 
excluding small transaction costs.  Between 2002 and 2007, the parallel exchange rate 
premium on the average fluctuated between 2% to 4%. 
Since the introduction of economic liberalisation, Ghana’s trade balance has been in 
deficit compared with surpluses in the previous years of the control regime.    Despite 
large increases export volumes, declining terms of trade and a substantial increase in 
externally funded imports to increase industrial production have led to a massive deficit.  
The current account has recorded deficits throughout the period between 1983 and 2007.  
The practice of financing persistent current account deficits by borrowing abroad led the 
mounting external debt of Ghana.  
Ghana’s foreign currency reserves increased from US$36.6 million in 1970 to US$207 
million in 1982, and then increased further to US$878 million in 1996.  In 2007, reserves 
stood at US$2.84 billion.  This huge accumulation was mainly due to massive foreign 
capital inflows, increased remittances by Ghanaians resident abroad, cancellation of debt 
under the HIPC initiative and from proceeds of Ghana’s first Sovereign bond.  Recently 
the cedi has been allowed to depreciate freely but it has also been argued that there has 
been a deliberate attempt by the Bank of Ghana to maintain a stable exchange rate by 
intervening on the FX market.  Arguably, a real appreciation in the cedi-dollar exchange 
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rates could lead to a decline in exports, which would counter the export promotion drive 
of Ghana. 
 
2.6 Fiscal Policy 
This subsection examines how the Ghanaian government obtains its revenue and 
allocates its expenditure.  It also examines the associated impact on economic 
development and growth.  Since 1983, fiscal discipline has been the essential element in 
the government’s attempt to achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability.  In the 
Ghanaian context, fiscal discipline refers to the ability to keep expenditures within 
available resources. Available resources comprise government revenue plus foreign 
grants.  We analyse the trend in performance of government’s revenue collection over 
the period 1970 to 2007. 
Invariably, the tax revenues to GDP measure the success in raising revenues through 
non-inflationary means.  Tax revenues, as a ratio of GDP, signals the government’s 
reliance on taxes as opposed to debt accumulation, money creation, or transfers from 
public enterprises, as a way of financing its expenditures (Tanzi and Zee, 1996).  Tanzi 
and Lee claim that countries whose tax revenues are usually below 10% of GDP are 
more likely to run into financial difficulties.  In Ghana, tax collection is administered by 
two main agencies: the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), with responsibility for direct 
taxes; and the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), with responsibility for 
collecting indirect taxes (including taxes on petroleum products) and all import related 
tariffs.  Table   illustrates a detailed breakdown of sources of government revenue over 
the period 1970 to 2007.  In 1970, total revenue as proportion of GDP was estimated at 
25%.  However, this ratio had fallen sharply to 14% in 1972.  This situation was 
temporarily reversed in subsequent years but dropped to 6% of GDP between 1978 and 
1980, and to 5% of GDP between 1983 and 1983.  The movement in total revenue has 
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mirrored the movement in tax revenue, since non-tax revenue has remained well below 
10% of GDP from 1970 to 2007.  Nevertheless, the downward trend of total revenue as a 
percentage of GDP recovered following the initiation of the ERP in 1983.  Total revenue 
increased to 23% of GDP in 1994-1995, but again, embarked on a downward trend from 
1996 to 2000, estimated at about 20% of GDP in 2000.  This ratio recovered again, 
ranging from 30% in 2004 to 32.1% in 2007.  Total direct tax revenue has generally 
remained below 5% of GDP annually but has hovered around 6% of GDP between 2004 
and 2007.  Total indirect tax revenue has ranged between 2% of GDP in 1982 to 19% in 
1970 but now stands at 9.35% in 2007. 
The Ghanaian government acknowledges that revenue enhancement is a key element of 
fiscal sustainability.  Value added tax (VAT) was introduced in March 1995 in order to 
increase the tax base to increase revenue (IMF, 1995).  VAT replaced the domestic and 
sales tax, and was applied to goods and services at the retail level.  Apart from replacing 
the sales tax regime, VAT was intended to bring about a shift from income to 
expenditure related taxation (ISSER, 1997).  These changes improved the efficiency of 
tax collection and helped to broaden the indirect tax base (World bank, 1997).  
Unfortunately, the introduction of VAT coincided with the poor harvest of local 
foodstuffs.  Consequently civil servants embarked on a strike over VAT, forcing the 
government to reluctantly withdraw the tax and return to the previous sales tax rate of 
15%.  Furthermore, the VAT secretariat was faced with problems of some traders 
applying the rate of 17.5% numerous times to times to the same goods and services.  
This was mainly due to inadequate public education on the implementation of the new 
tax system (CEPA, 1996).  Non-registered traders also took advantage and applied the 
VAT rate to their goods.  Transport fares, which had already increased to take account of 
a 20% rise in petroleum prices, were further adjust upwards for VAT.  These 
miscalculations, combined with the simultaneous acute shortage of foodstuffs, led to 
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food price increases.  Aryeetey et al. (2000) argued that the fiscal crises in Ghana since 
the introduction of the ERP were primarily driven by expenditure over-runs rather than 
by the government’s inability to meet revenue targets.  Yet, other experts have argued 
that the revenue collections could have improved significantly.  Specifically the 
problems of inadequate capacity to collect taxes efficiently and effectively combined 
with rampant corruption impacted negatively on revenue collection. 
Throughout the period between 1970 and 1983, the Ghanaian government’s attempt at 
accelerating economic growth caused excessive government spending.  As a result, the 
growth rate of expenditures outpaced that of revenues.  The major driving force behind 
the government’s excessive expenditure has been the ever-increasing recurrent account, 
especially for wages and salaries.  The huge recurrent expenditure was mainly due to 
government’s role as the largest formal sector employer.  A survey by the Ministry of 
Industries, Science and Technology put all plant utilisation rates at less than 20%.  Since 
government owned most of these plants, this places an extra burden on the national 
budget in terms of wages and salaries.  As the small private sector laid off workers due 
to idleness, the SOEs continued expanding their workforce amidst falling capacities 
levels (IMF, 2000).  During the same period, there was little evidence of an effective 
outcome of government’s activities. 
Fiscal imbalances started developing in 1971.  Between 1970 and 1980, total 
government expenditure constituted an average of 21.4% of GDP.  We further observe 
that the gross fiscal deficit of the government, which measures the difference between 
revenues and total expenditure, has been running high since the early 1970s.  A detailed 
breakdown of the expenditure pattern of the central government is shown in table   .  
From -0.44% of GDP in 1971, fiscal deficits became -8% of GDP in 1974.  It then 
plummeted to -15% of GDP in 1977 and 1978.  In 1983, the reforms led to a partial 
improvement in the economy.  Hence, the budget deficits improved from a deficit of 
 65 
around 3% of GDP to one of 2.2% of GDP in 1985, registering a modest surplus of 
about 0.05% of GDP in 1986, and improving steadily thereafter to approximately 2% of 
GDP in 1991.  Sowa (1994) argued that fiscal discipline resulted from drastic cost-
savings and cost recovery measures on the part of the general government sector, 
including the de-subsidisation and de-hiking of expenditure on education, health, and 
agriculture, as well as retrenchment of public servants. 
In 1992, fiscal imbalances re-emerged as a consequence of large salary awards in the 
public sector (Bank of Ghana, 1997).  In the transition to multiparty democracy, the 
government, concerned about the support of public servants, granted substantial wage 
increases amounting to 80% of the total nominal payroll.  Almost all other institutions in 
the countries similarly increased their staff remuneration.  By 1997, government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP had shot up to 34%, but dropped thereafter to 23% 
of GDP in 2000.  By 2006 domestic revenue as share of GDP stood at 26% while total 
expenditure as a share of GDP was 40.1%. 
It seemed like the goal of expenditure reduction by the government appeared to be 
elusive.  The persistent budget deficits have led to increased donor assistance to help 
finance government deficits.  As a consequence, while the overall trend has shown 
improved fiscal consolidation since the inception of the reforms, operational and 
structural weakness have impeded a sustained improvement in the public finances, and 
domestic debt has continued to rise. 
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Figure 2.7 
2.6.1 Government Debt 
International financial institutions, especially the World bank, have been the main source 
of capital inflows into Ghana.  These resources have been used mainly to finance public 
sector projects, but provided as balance of payment support.  As result Ghana is heavily 
indebted to these organisations, including the IMF.  Ghana’s total external debt stock 
stood at US$431 million in 1970 and shot up to US$797 million in 1977.  By 1993, the 
total external debt stock had reached US$4.68 billion, representing 75% of GDP.  This 
continued to increase further till it reached US$6.04 billion in 2000, representing 69% of 
GDP.  By 2004, the external debt stock had risen to US$6.45 billion, representing 73% 
of GDP.  However in 2006, the external debt stock dropped drastically to US$2.18 
billion, accounting for a relatively smaller 17.5% of GDP.  This was mainly due to a 
debt cancellation of about US$3.7 billion as a consequence of Ghana joining the HIPC 
initiative.  However the external debt increased again to US$3.59 billion in 2007 due to 
the disbursement of proceeds from the 10 year Eurobond and other additional 
disbursements from bilateral and multilateral creditors.  The ratio of total debt stock to 
exports rose from 0.68:1 in 1970 to 4.80:1 in 1983.  Afterwards, it fell gradually, 
reaching 3.18:1 by 2000 and dropping considerably to 0.86:1 in 2007.  In 2000, the new 
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government embarked on a programme to reduce domestic debt in relation to GDP to 
enable the private sector access credit and stimulate the growth process.  Consequently 
the domestic debt to GDP ratio dropped significantly from 29.12 in 2002 to 14.7% in 
2006.  However this ratio increased to 18% in 2007 mainly as a result of energy related 
expenditures and infrastructural development.  Government’s persistent fiscal deficits 
have been financed mainly through domestic and foreign sources, with the Bank of 
Ghana providing the largest share.  Islam and Wetzel (1994), and Dordunoo (1993) have 
attributed the high inflationary rates in the 1970s to the Bank of Ghana’s financing of 
deficits during that period.  As already mentioned, fiscal discipline has been a primary 
element of Ghana’s efforts at achieving macroeconomic stability since 1983.  Though 
high level of donor inflows has partly mitigated this problem, a more sustained fiscal 
balance will depend on the government’s efforts to raise domestic revenue. 
 
2.7 Monetary Policy 
 We now examine money supply and its contribution to high inflation rates in Ghana.  
The key aim of monetary policy in Ghana has been to achieve and maintain low, stable 
inflation, and ensure a relatively stable exchange rate.  This is the result of government’s 
acknowledgement of how a low inflationary environment will be conducive to economic 
growth and hence, poverty reduction by encouraging long-term investment and attracting 
foreign direct investment.  Additionally, low inflation preserves the real income of the 
population and helps maintain living standards.   
A critical assessment of the data shows that the expansion of the monetary system was 
engineered largely through government borrowing from the Bank of Ghana.  Roe and 
Schneider (1992) observed that cocoa financing was second to government borrowing, in 
terms of total money supply in Ghana.  Broad money supply continued to grow 
throughout the period 1970 to 1978.  The growth in M2 over the post-ERP period has 
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followed a pattern similar to that of the pre-ERP era.  Even though money creation has 
been mitigated by the growth in the foreign asset component (Sowa, 1994), the rate of 
growth appears to be responding to the changing growth rates of government spending.  
Growth of broad money increased from 10% in 1971 to 34% in 1972, before dropping to 
around 17% in 1973, and rising once more to a peak of 74% in 1975.  After that, the 
growth rate of money supply fell to around -6% in 1977, shooting up to 54% in 1978.  
Since then the rate of growth of broad money has followed a chequered pattern.  
Although the growth of broad money appears to have been controlled during the reform 
era, expansion of broad money could not be kept below 15% per annum. 
The acceleration in money supply was mainly due to increases in both the net foreign 
assets and net domestic assets of the banking system.  However, the rate of expansion in 
money supply decreased, as a result of tight monetary policy pursued by the BOG.  The 
net foreign assets of the BOG, on the other hand, fell considerably during the early 1970s 
to mid-1980s, improving marginally between 1994 and 1999, before falling further in 
2000.  This pattern was due to the scarcity of FX inflows in the face of mounting debt.  
The net domestic assets of the banking system increased steadily throughout the period 
1970 to 2000, reflecting exceptionally strong domestic credit growth during the period.  
In 2002, broad money including foreign currency deposits (M2+) increased drastically to 
50% mainly due a 190.6% growth in net foreign assets and a 26.3% growth in net 
domestic assets.  This resulted from a surge in the foreign exchange reserves.  
Afterwards, there was a general slowdown in the growth of the monetary aggregates 
with the rate of growth of M2+ decreasing to a rate of 14.3% in 2005.  Nevertheless, the 
rate of growth of M2+ shot up to 38.8% in 2006.  This increase was attributed to strong 
growth in net foreign assets (39.5%), resulting from strong cocoa export receipts and 
relief granted under the multilateral debt relief initiative.  The increase in net domestic 
assets (38.1%) was due to increases in banking system net claims on private sector 
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(42.2%), public sector (31.5%) and government (11.3%).  Continued strong increases in 
both net domestic assets and net foreign assets of the banking system resulted in M2+ 
growth of 36.3% in 2007. 
In the past, the BOG used indirect instruments for monetary policy.  Specifically the 
BOG issued Treasury Bills (T-Bills) to control liquidity in the economy and meet 
government’s borrowing requirements.  Since the commercial banks were the major 
buyers of the t-bills, this contributed to a crowding-out of private investment.  However, 
recent experience suggests that the TB sales alone are inadequate in responding to the 
more complex monetary policy requirements of a liberalised financial system.  To enable 
a quick response to current market conditions, the Bank of Ghana introduced the use of 
repurchase agreements with commercial banks.  In 2002, the Bank of Ghana prime rate 
was introduced.  According to BOG, the prime rate is to be “used as an anchor for 
money market rates and to signal the bank’s assessment of inflationary pressures and 
monetary policy stance”. 
Effective liquidity management using open market operations depends very much on the 
level of capital development in the country.  Clearly, capital markets are very important 
in the mobilisation of investment capital.  Despite having been operational for a number 
of years, the capital market in Ghana is still very shallow.  A majority of Ghanaian firms 
are generally small and uncompetitive.  Furthermore, they have huge tax arrears which 
make them unwilling to disclose information required by the Capital market Board. 
Interest rats have barely responded to changes in the macroeconomic environment over 
the period 1970 to 2000.  Between 1970 and 1986, interest rates were controlled by the 
Central Bank.  This policy was labelled “financial repression” by Shaw (1973).  
Bhagwati (1978) detailed the web of physical and quantitative controls common in many 
developing countries, examining the economic consequences of such controls.  Particular 
emphasis was on the ineffectiveness of this monetary policy during the pre-ERP period.  
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In fact, real interest rates were largely negative, due to the high rates of domestic 
inflation prevalent in Ghana at the time.  However, after the commencement of the 
financial liberalisation programme, management of interest rates were liberalised.  
Consequently, the rate rose gradually peaking at around 35 per annum in 1998, and 
ranging between 30-40% over the period 1999-2000.  Afterwards, interest rates 
gradually decreased, reflecting a relative improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals.  
In 2002, the prime rate was set at 24.5% with the inter-bank rates ranging from 21.7% to 
26.6%.  The range in rates usually reflects liquidity conditions related to injection of 
money for cocoa purchases and Christmas spending.  In Ghana, a majority of 
government instruments sold were 91-day t-bills, as investors preferred short-term 
assets.  The 91-day t-bill rate stood at 26.6%.  By 2006, the prime rate had been reduced 
to 12.5% with the t-bill rate dropping to 10.19%.  Commercial bank base rates had also 
reduced from 32% in 2002 to 19% in 2006.  However, interest rose marginally as 
inflationary pressures increased in 2007.  The prime rate was increased to 13.5% whiles 
the t-bill rate rose slightly to 10.60%.  Bank base rates also rose to 23.8%. 
At present the BOG continues to use its open market operations, reverse repurchase 
agreements and prime rate to achieve price and exchange rate stability. 
2.7.1 Inflation 
Since 1970, the Ghanaian economy has been saddled with relatively high rates of 
inflation.  According to various studies, the control of inflation by developing countries 
like Ghana has represented a major macroeconomic adjustment process, usually highly 
valued by the policy makers.  The government’s heavy intervention in the economy 
through the use of price controls to curb inflation, of distributive controls to counter 
scarcities of goods and services, and of import controls to counter BOP deficits, as well 
as the enhanced role of SOEs during the pre-ERP ERS, discouraged production, saving 
and investment.  In spite of these controls, consumer price inflation increased gradually 
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from 3% in 1970 to 121% in 1977 (table).  In 1983, prices soared further to reach a peak 
inflation rate of 123%.  Even though the rate has dropped considerably since the start of 
the ERP, it has begun to rise once again throughout the liberalisation.  Indeed, high 
government spending, accompanied by money printing, would have been advantageous 
if they had been associated with increases in real output (Sowah, 1994).  According to 
the Economic survey of the Ghana Statistical Service (1981), the main sources of 
government deficits registered during the period 1970-1981 were mainly due to the 
losses incurred by the SOEs. 
However, it is important to note that the main objectives of the reforms was to reduce 
inflation and ensure increased growth at an accelerated pace.  Annual growth has 
remained positive, averaging about 4.2% throughout the reforms period (table ).  High 
inflation rates in Ghana have always been accompanied by high growth rates in broad 
money throughout the period.  By contrast, high GDP growth rates have not necessarily 
been accompanied by substantial increases in money supply.   
2.8 Financial Sector 
The first commercial banks set up in Ghana at the beginning of the twentieth century still 
operate today: Barclays Bank of Ghana and Standard Chartered Bank. Under colonial 
rule, their main business was trade finance and primarily served the expatriate 
community. In 1953, the first indigenous commercial bank, now called Ghana 
Commercial Bank (GCB) opened to provide credit services to the local population. 
Following independence in 1957, the Bank of Ghana was established to serve as a 
central bank and to take over some of the functions previously carried out by the West 
African Currency Board. From 1957 to 1983, the government followed a policy of 
intervention in economic activity and held a controlling interest in all commercial banks. 
Three state banks were established during this period: the National Investment bank 
(NIB), the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), and the Bank for Housing and 
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Construction (BHC). After the launch of the Economic Recovery Program in 1983, 
financial sector reforms were initiated allowing private commercial banks to operate. 
  
In the 1980s, after decades of state management, Ghana's banking system was in distress. 
Banks suffered from the effects of undue political influence, weak management, 
inadequate capital, poor internal controls, and obsolete information and accounting 
systems. Moreover, they held substantial portfolios of non-performing loans, insufficient 
provisions against losses, and were often overexposed to a few clients, in particular other 
state enterprises. At the end of 1989, the banking system was close to a crisis, as non-
performing loans reached 41 percent of total credit. Faced with this situation, the 
government adopted a reform program with the objective of restructuring the banking 
system while enhancing its competitiveness and efficiency. A new banking law was 
enacted that year that laid out the basic regulatory framework for the banking system: 
minimum capital requirements, adequacy ratios, prudential lending ratios, exposure 
limits, and accounting and auditing regulations. The supervisory activities of the Bank of 
Ghana were also strengthened, and banks were required to submit accounts for off-site 
monitoring. Annual on-site inspections, as well as off-site surveillance, were conducted 
to verify compliance with regulations. 
  
During 1990 and 1991, most non-performing loans on the banks' balance sheets were 
swapped for government guaranteed interest-bearing bonds issued by the Bank of Ghana 
or offset against liabilities to the government or the Central Bank. A total of C62 billion 
in non-performing loans was removed from banks' portfolios, of which C47 billion was 
replaced with bonds paying 7, 9, and 15 percent annual interest at two- to five-year 
maturities. These bonds have since been rolled over. A Non-Performing Assets Recovery 
Trust (NPART) was formed in 1990. Its performance as evaluated in 1990 was very 
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impressive: C13 billion was recovered out of a total of C18 billion outstanding. 
However, this assessment did not take into account years of high inflation, which meant 
the amounts eventually collected represented much smaller amount in real terms. 
  
In February 1992, the government announced a strategy to divest its share in the 
commercial banks. The divestiture was intended to increase competition and efficiency 
in the banking system. The program made early progress but eventually stalled. The 
Social Security Bank and the National Savings and Credit Bank were restructured and 
merged; 21 percent of the merged bank's shares were divested through a public offer in 
March 1995 and 40 percent were sold to strategic investor. 
  
In February 1996, 30 percent of the shares of GCB, the largest state bank targeted for 
divestiture, were floated. After the initial offer was over-subscribed, the government 
decided to increase the public offer to 42 percent while looking for strategic investor for 
40 percent. Substantial delays were encountered in the negotiations with the strategic 
investor, partly because in 1997 the UK supervisory authorities objected to the proposed 
ownership transfer of the London branch of GCB. Instead, the London branch was 
converted into an independent bank, the Ghana International Bank. 
As at the end of 1999, the banking system in Ghana consisted of seventeen main banks: 
nine commercial banks, four development banks, and four merchant banks. Altogether, 
they account for about 90 percent of deposits in the banking system. The financial sector 
also includes 107 rural banks and several non-bank institutions including four brokerage 
companies, two discount houses, seven savings and loans institutions, the Social Security 
and National Insurance Trust, and some other minor financial institutions. In January 
2000, two more commercial banks were licensed to operate, and two more state-owned 
banks, both of them development banks, were liquidated. 
 74 
  
Ghana's banking penetration ratio is relatively high for Sub-Sahara Africa. On average, 
Ghana has a bank branch for every 54,000 persons. The Greater Accra region has an 
average of one branch per 15,000 but the density in the north is much lower, with only 
one branch for every 85,000 persons. About half of the banks have branches in the 
interior of the country, but GCB owns about half of all local branches and is represented 
in all regions of the country. 
  
Although the number of financial institutions in Ghana is high, and has grown 
considerably since the early 1990s, financial intermediation remains relatively modest. 
In 1997, the ratio of M2 to GDP was 17% excluding foreign currency deposits. The ratio 
including foreign currency deposits was 23.5%. This is not too different from other 
countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, but only about 30% of the level in most industrial 
countries. This ratio changed only marginally between 1980 and 1999, showing little 
progress toward financial deepening. Holdings of currency are relatively high in Ghana 
at about 6% of GDP, but remain virtually unchanged since 1990. After growing 
sluggishly during most of the 1990s, credit to the private sector as a share of GDP 
increased rapidly in 1998 and 1999 to reach 14 percent or three times its level at the 
beginning of the reforms. However, actual levels remain well below the average for Sub-
Sahara Africa. The M1/M2 ratio has not shown any appreciable decline in the last 
decade, a development characteristic of note in a country prone to inflation (see figure 
8). Ghana seems to be moving towards increasing the depth of its financial system, albeit 
at a slow pace. 
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     Figure 2.8  
Financial activity remains concentrated in a small number of core banks, although 
changes from the late 1980s are most visible in this area. The potential for competition is 
well above the average for Sub-Sahara Africa as none of the five largest banks is 
excessively dominant. 
Interest rates have scarcely responded to changes in the macroeconomic environment. In 
1995, the average yearly inflation rate was 50%, yet lending rates were about 40% and 
savings rates barely reached 30 percent, both negative in real terms. In 1998, inflation 
more than halved, but lending rates remained at around 30-40%. The presence of state 
owned banks with large shares of non-performing loans might be one reason for this 
behaviour. In general, demand deposits, which represent 33% of total deposits, yield 
little or no interest. This implies that in the event of a downward adjustment in the 
interest rate received on credits, banks would not be able to adjust the interest rate paid 
on deposits. Thus, their cost of funds would be mainly unaffected. Their cost structures 
suggest that declines in interest rates are likely to reduce bank spreads, possibly to levels 
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that would make the banks unprofitable. Finally, interest rates did start to decline in 
response to the lower inflation numbers in the last quarter of 1998, although real interest 
rates remained high throughout 1999. However, at the end of the year rates were 
increased once again as a result of the rapid depreciation of the currency. 
Another feature of the banking system is its high dollarization: 34 percent of total assets 
and 29 percent of deposits were denominated in foreign currency as of December 1999. 
For borrowers the main attraction of foreign currency credits is the interest rates, which 
are much lower than on domestic currency loans. In December 1999, interest rates on 
foreign currency loans were 27-34% points lower than domestic currency loans. The 
dollarization of the banking system in Ghana has led the supervisory authorities to 
closely monitor the foreign exchange exposure of individual banks to ensure they are not 
taking excessive risks. New foreign exchange exposure limits were implemented in 
1999, but the net open positions of many of the Ghanaian banks (calculated as the ratio 
of the difference between assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency to 
shareholder funds) have remained high. The net open position of the consolidated 
banking system at the end of 1999 was about 40 percent of shareholder funds. Indeed, 
public sector and merchant banks continue to have very high exposure ratios - some 
above the regulatory limits. Therefore, the banking system in Ghana is highly vulnerable 
to exchange rate movements that could result in large losses in relation to shareholder 
funds. 
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2.9 Conclusion  
The reforms program in Ghana has a long way to go because it has yet to accelerate 
growth, stimulate investment and domestic savings and create the basis for a sustained 
growth process which can lead to greater self-reliance in terms of reduced borrowing and 
substantial reduction in mass poverty. There has been a sizable fiscal adjustment since 
1983, but the successes of the reforms depends crucially on the role of the state in 
creating realistically optimistic expectations through the credibility of the policy makers 
and through State's role in promoting investment in infrastructure such as power, 
transport, communications, etc. A sizable portion of the adjustment has come from a 
reduction in domestic investment, which has to be stepped up in order to attain long term 
growth. It is also worth mentioning that though some successes have been attained in the 
reform program, the two crucial parameters of the economic situation, namely, the 
inflation and adverse BOP position have remained still serious. 
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Table 2.1 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS 2000-2007 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP Growth 4.40 3.70 4.20 4.50 5.20 5.80 5.80 6.20 6.30 
          
          
Inflation (%)          
Year-on-Year 13.80 40.50 21.30 15.20 23.60 11.80 14.80 10.50 12.70 
Annual average 12.40 25.20 32.90 14.80 26.70 12.60 15.20 10.90 10.70 
          
          
Exchange Rate (End Period)          
 per US$ 3,535.10 7,047.70 7,321.90 8,438.80 8,852.30 9,051.30 9,130.82 9,235.30 9,704.00 
 per UK$ 5,715.50 10,189.90 10,596.70 13,305.20 15,296.00 17,411.50 15,673.30 18,102.70 19,511.00 
 per EURO 3,577.30 6,343.50 6,500.50 8,511.60 10,986.30 12,309.00 10,814.97 12,144.50 14,398.00 
          
          
Growth (year-on-year,%)          
Reserve Money 35.80 52.60 31.30 42.60 33.40 18.80 11.20 30.80 30.60 
Broad Money (M2+) 23.90 46.50 41.40 50.00 37.80 26.00 14.10 38.80 36.30 
Broad Money (M2) 24.80 33.40 48.40 50.00 40.50 26.60 13.80 39.40 43.50 
          
          
External Sector          
Exports of goods and services (US$'m) 2,473.10 2,440.60 2,398.80 2,570.10 3,192.40 3,486.90 4,211.20 3,735.10 4,194.70 
Imports of goods and services (US$'m) 3,925.90 3,350.20 3,574.50 3,327.90 4,132.60 5,355.70 6,295.40 6,523.60 8,073.60 
Current account Balance (US$'m) -964.60 -386.50 -324.60 -31.90 302.30 -151.20 -382.20 -555.90 -1,884.70 
Overall Balance of Payments (US$'m) -90.70 -116.80 8.60 39.80 558.30 -123.40 110.00 415.10 413.10 
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Reserves (end of period, in US$m) 420.10 233.40 364.80 640.40 1,425.60 1,732.40 1,894.90 2,266.70 2,836.70 
Reserves(in months of imports) 1.20 0.80 1.20 2.20 3.90 3.80 3.50 3.00 3.10 
External Debt (US$'m) 5,960.00 6,062.00 6,376.80 6,131.30 7,548.90 6,447.90 6,347.80 2,177.20 3,586.70 
          
Interest Rates (End Period,%)          
Banking of Ghana Prime Lending Rate N/A N/A N/A 24.50 21.50 18.50 15.50 12.50 13.50 
91-days Treasury Bills 31.50 42.00 28.90 26.60 18.70 17.10 11.45 10.70 10.60 
182-days Treasury Bills 26.00 42.40 28.90 27.20 20.30 17.90 12.78 10.70 10.70 
1-year Treasury Notes 22.30 31.00 29.90 27.70 20.50 17.90 16.50 13.50 12.30 
          
Nominal GDP (in billions cedis) 20,580.00 27,153.00 38,071.00 48,862.00 66,158.00 79,803.70 97,260.60 114,903.20 139,767.00 
          
Commodity Prices          
Cocoa (US$/tonne) 1,434.00 1,094.00 1,021.00 1,260.00 1,949.50 1,586.90 1,524.69 1,719.85 2,072.00 
Gold(US$/fine ounce) 278.70 280.40 271.60 309.50 364.50 409.90 445.28 628.90 807.20 
Oil (US$/barrel) 18.60 28.40 25.00 25.00 28.40 37.80 55.44 62.50 91.90 
          
Oil Imports (US$M)  
         
641.8  
         
562.9  
         
507.8  
         
562.9  
         
775.0  
      
1,127.5  
         
1,646.2  
         
2,049.4  
Inter-bank FX Purchases (US$M)  677.90 824.20 931.20 1270.20 2071.70 2668.50 3105.70 5028.90 
Inter-bank FX Sales (US$M)  636.00 792.60 896.70 1269.60 2236.20 3048.30 3193.20 4360.20 
Net Claims on Government (bn cedis)          
          
Government Budget (% of GDP)          
Total Revenue  16.52 17.70 18.10 18.00 20.80 23.80 23.80 22.30 26.00 
Grants 1.47 2.10 6.90 3.10 4.70 6.20 5.20 5.50 6.10 
Total Expenditure 24.12 27.70 32.10 26.10 29.00 32.90 30.70 33.80 40.10 
Overall Balance (including Grants) -6.51 -9.70 -9.00 -6.80 -4.50 -3.20 -2.30 -7.80 -8.10 
Domestic primary balance 2.31 2.60 3.80 2.00 2.20 0.70 3.40 -4.80 -6.20 
                    
 81 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Macroeconomic Models of exchange rate determination 
Empirical literature on exchange rates modelling define bilateral exchange rate as the 
relative price of the monies in context of a two-country framework.  Many of these 
models have described the exchange rate as a function of a varying set of 
macroeconomic fundamentals including inflation, money supplies, interest rates, 
productivity differentials, government debt, terms of trade and net foreign assets.  
Models of exchange rate determination with their underlying macroeconomic variables 
have failed to explain and forecast exchange rate movements.  Groundbreaking work by 
Meese and Rogoff (1983) shows that none of the existing models are able to consistently 
outperform a naïve random walk at short-to-medium term horizons even though actual 
future values of explanatory variables are used. This analysis is well documented in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) who coin the term ‘exchange rate disconnect puzzle’, to 
refer to the relatively weak link between exchange rates and  macroeconomic variables. 
Invariably, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argue that at horizons less than two years 
exchange rate determination remains a puzzle.  According to these researchers, the 
Meese and Rogoff analysis at short horizons has never been convincingly overturned or 
explained. They argue that the puzzle has exerted a pessimistic effect on the field of 
empirical exchange rate modelling in particular and international finance in general. 
They believe that no model, based on such standard fundamentals like money supply, 
real income, interest rates, inflation rates, and current account balances can ever succeed 
in explaining or predicting a high percentage of the variation in the exchange rate, at 
short- or medium-term frequencies. 
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3.2 The Microstructure approach to exchange rate determination 
Foreign exchange microstructure research has been motivated by the need to understand 
exchange rate dynamics at short horizons.3 The dominant exchange rate models of the 
recent decades take a macro perspective and come from the macro modelling tradition 
and have some relative value at long horizons.  The search to find a new framework to 
explain short-run exchange rate dynamics has led to the microstructure approach to 
exchange rates, which takes into account the currency trading process.  These micro-
based models set out to model the structure of the foreign exchange market in a more 
realistic manner.  In this setting, information is dispersed and heterogeneous agents have 
different information sets.  The trading process itself is not transparent and agents may 
have access to private information about fundamentals or non-fundamental variables that 
can be exploited in the short-run.  Consequently the transactions of better-informed 
agents may have a larger effect on exchange rates than those of uninformed agents.  
Thus, the microstructure approach not only recognises private information as being 
important for exchange rate determination but also takes into account how differences 
between agents and trading mechanisms affect exchange rates. (see Evans and Lyons, 
2002a).  This is in contrast to macro models, which assume that all relevant information 
is commonly known and all participants are the same.4   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
  For a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature see Osler (2008). 
4
 Earlier works on FX microstructure have used surveys of FX market participants to 
support strong heterogeneity of expectations and an increasing diffusion of expectations. 
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3.2.1 Order Flow Concept 
Thus, one of the most important explanatory variables in the microstructure approach to 
exchange rates is order flow.  Order flow, as defined by Evans and Lyons (2002a) refers 
to “net of buyer-initiated and seller initiated orders; it is a measure of net buying 
pressure.”  Order flow consists of ‘signed’ transaction volumes.  When a participant 
initiates a transaction by selling the base currency in exchange for foreign currency, the 
order has a negative sign.  On the contrary, if participants buy foreign currency in 
exchange for base currency, the order has a positive sign. 
By observing order flow, a participant might be able to have an idea of the sort of 
information others may hold.  For example, if an initiator’s expectation is that the base 
currency will fall, this may lead to a sale of the base currency in exchange for the foreign 
currency.  This order flow will, thus, provide vital information to other participants and 
might result in the strengthening of the foreign currency.  Order flow is viewed as a 
transmission mechanism through which information is transmitted to price.  The extent 
to which order flow is informative depends on the factors that cause it. It is most 
informative when it transmits private information about macroeconomic fundamentals 
that is scattered among agents.  By aggregating information in this way, order flow 
establishes a connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate 
movements.  On the other hand, order flow is less informative when it is as a result of 
inventory control activities in reaction to liquidity shocks.  Nevertheless, the importance 
of order flow in exchange rate determination does not mean that it is the underlying 
cause of exchange rate movements.  Rather it is a proximate cause with information 
being the underlying cause.  The problem lies in identifying what information determines 
order flow.  
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3.2.2 Hot potato trading and the information content of order flow 
In an attempt to address the question, Lyons (1997) present a simultaneous trade model 
of spot FX that captures the actual dynamics and structure of the FX market.  This model 
takes into account inter-dealer trading and customer order flow as a source of private 
information and the risk aversion of dealers.  These features sharply contrast with those 
of previous trading models.  Because trading is simultaneous, dealers cannot condition 
their trades on other dealers’ trades.  This leads to shocks to dealers’ inventories, 
resulting in unwanted positions.  The risk aversion of dealers makes these imbalances 
less attractive.  This sparks off what is referred to as hot potato trading.  It describes the 
passing of unwanted positions amongst dealers for the purposes of risk management.  
The private information observed by dealers through order flow allows them to take 
speculative positions.  Hot potato trading introduces noise into order flow because it 
reduces the information content of inter-dealer trades.  Consequently this affects price 
because it is the inter-dealer trades that determine prices.  The two contrasting roles of 
the dealer, one as an information intermediary and the other as a speculator, will make 
price less informative. 
 
Additionally, Lyons (1995) identify the asymmetric-information and inventory-control 
as the main channels through which order flow influences price.  The inventory-control 
path involves manipulating the prices to control the inventory caused by order flow 
whilst the asymmetric information path involves changing the prices to account for 
private information reflected in the order flow.  Lyons tests for the significance of both 
approaches using one week trading data obtained from a large dealer in the USD/DM 
market.  This dealer trades an average of $1bn daily.  The paper adopts a Bayesian 
model of pricing behaviour which is an extension of the Mandhavan-Smidt model.  The 
model incorporates the role of inventory-control and asymmetric-information thus 
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capturing the nature and dynamics of the FX market.  For example, the FX market is 
decentralised with multiple dealers and the ability of a dealer to shift inventory at other 
dealers’ prices.  Model estimation reveals that both asymmetric-information and 
inventory-control variables are significant and correctly signed.   
 
3.2.3 Order flow’s explanatory power 
Evans and Lyons (2002a) use inter-dealer data from Reuters Dealing 2000-1 to analyse 
the contemporaneous relationship between order flow and exchange rate movements.  
The FX markets under consideration are the DM/USD and JPY/USD.  They propose a 
transaction frequency model called the ‘portfolio shifts model’ which focuses on the 
information content of order flow.  It is a hybrid model which combines both micro and 
macro variables.  A unique feature of the model is that it allows the use of daily 
frequency data.  According to this model daily exchange rate movements depend on 
signed order flow and changes in the interest differential.  Therefore the equation to be 
estimated, 
)*( tttt iixS −∆+=∆ αβ                                                                                                (3.1) 
Where tS∆ is the change in the log spot exchange rate from the end of day 1−t  to the 
end of day t , tx  represents the inter-dealer order flow from the end of day 1−t  to the 
end of day t  and )*( tt ii −∆ is the change in the nominal interest differential where i is the 
nominal dollar interest rate and *i  is the nominal non-dollar interest rate. 
The change in interest differential is preferred to other macro determinants because its 
data is available at a daily frequency and it is usually the main variable in exchange rate 
determination models.  We should expect a positively signed interest differential.  Under 
the model’s null hypothesis, causality runs strictly from order flow to price.  The order 
flow coefficient is significant and positively (correctly) signed for both equations.  This 
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means that net dollar purchases leads to an increase in DM and JPY prices of dollars.  
The model explains about 64% and 46% of movements in the DM/USD and YEN/USD 
respectively.  More specifically these exchange rate movements are mainly due to order 
flow, while changes in interest rates account for very little. The paper concludes that a 
net order flow of $1bn leads the USD to appreciate by 0.5%.   
The dataset covers the period between May 1st and August 31st 1996. It includes the 
quantity of buy and sell orders and the exchange rates at which they are transacted.  
However the transaction size and counterparty identity are not included.  Because of the 
strict causality running from order flow to price, the model does not allow for the case 
where exchange rate movements could cause order flow (feedback effects).  In the 
presence of feedback effects, the coefficient estimate of order flow is biased and the 
results from the model could be misleading. 
 
3.2.4 Evans and Lyons Model 
Evans and Lyons (2002a) develop a model with three trading rounds each day.  In the 
first round, dealers trade with their customers.  The second round involves inter-dealer 
trading to enable dealers share the resulting inventory risk from the first round.  During 
the third round dealers trade again with their customers to share inventory risk more 
broadly. 
 
 
Figure 3.1- Evans and Lyons 2002 model 
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They consider a pure exchange economy with T trading periods and two assets, one 
riskless and one risky.  The T +1 payoff on the risky foreign exchange asset is given by 
R, which constitutes a series of increments: 

+
=
∆=
1
1
T
t
trR                                                                                                                    (3.2) 
The tr∆  increments represent the innovations in public macroeconomic information.  
Before quoting in round 1, dealers receive public macro information based on which 
they simultaneously and independently quote scalar prices to their customers at which 
buy and sell orders will be executed.  The price of dealer i on day t  during round 1 is 
given by 1itP .  After quoting in round 1, each dealer receives market orders 
=
N
i i
C
1 1
 from 
his/her own customer.  Each dealer’s customer order cannot be observed by other 
dealers. Consequently, they are regarded as “private information”. 
In round 2, each dealer simultaneously and independently quotes a scalar price to other 
dealers at which buy and sell orders will be executed.  These quotes can be observed by 
all dealers.  Dealers do not want to reveal their private information ( 22 PPi = ) so they 
simultaneously and independently trade on other dealers’ quotes in order to share 
inventory risk and speculate on their private information from round 1 customer trades.  
The net inter-dealer trades initiated by dealer i and is proportional to customer order in 
round 1 is denoted by 2iT .  At the close of round 2, all dealers observe the net inter-dealer 
order flow from that period: 

=
=∆
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2                                                                                                                  (3.3) 
In round 3, dealers use information from net inter-dealer order flow in round 2 to 
simultaneously and independently quote scalar prices at which customers are willing to 
absorb all dealer imbalances.  In order to set the round 3 quote, dealer need to have an 
idea of the total flow the customers need to absorb by observing x∆ and also need to 
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know the customers’ risk-bearing capacity.  For example, if dealers on the average are 
short in dollars, they must increase the price for dollars to induce customers to sell 
dollars.  Round 3 price is   
xPPPi β+== 233                                                                                                        (3.4) 
Where β  is constant depending on the customers’ demand and the dealers’ trading 
strategy. 
If customers who buy (dollars) orders exceed sell orders in round 1, the total inter-dealer 
order flow observed at the end of round two will be positive because dealers will attempt 
to buy back dollars.  Since dealers dispose of all their inventory in round 3, this implies 
that total customer order flow in round 1 and 3 must be of similar size but with opposite 
sign.  Thus 
31
1
cxc −=∆=
γ
                                                                                                           (3.5) 
 
3.2.5 Possible feedback effects of exchange rate movements on order flow 
Unlike Evans and Lyons (2002a), Payne (2003) takes into account the possibility of 
feedback trading rules by applying a simple VAR methodology introduced in Hasbrouck 
(1991).  This linear VAR model consists of trades and quote revisions.  The dataset 
covers all inter-dealer trades transacted through the Reuters Dealing 2000-2 system in 
the spot USD/DEM market over the week spanning October 6th to October 10th 1997.  
The paper analyses the impact of order flow on quotes and whether this relationship is 
affected by the level of market activity.  According to the paper, the information 
conveyed by inter-dealer traders is what induces the permanent effect on quotes.  It does 
not matter whether information is about future fundamentals or future risk premia.   
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Consequently Payne attempts to test for this permanent price effect by applying a 
bivariate VAR model for quote revisions and signed trades as shown below: 
 
                                                                                   (3.6)                        
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Where tr is the return on foreign currency and tx  is a vector containing trades 
information. 
The innovation terms, t1ε and t2ε , are assumed to be uncorrelated.  t1ε  refers to quote 
revisions brought about by the arrival of public information.  t2ε  corresponds to 
unpredictable trading activity, probably related to private information.  Payne obtains 
impulse-response functions linked to news releases and trade innovations.  Thus the 
long-run response of exchange rates to trade innovations can be regarded as a measure of 
the information content of order flow.   
 
Payne also uses Variance decomposition analysis to distinguish the component of total 
volatility of exchange rate which is attributable to public information from that which is 
due to trade innovations.  The results show that about 40% of exchange rate variability is 
due to unpredictable trading activity.  Notwithstanding this relatively high percentage 
variation, he argues that order flow still has significant (both statistically and 
economically) impact on exchange rates.  Also during period of high volume and 
liquidity, intense competition between agents results in a reduced impact of trades on 
price.  Even when feedback trading is taken into account, order flow continues to be the 
fundamental determinant of exchange rate movements. 
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Danielsson and Love (2004) also examine the issue of feedback trading.  Their paper 
looks at contemporaneous feedback trading and its effect on the informativeness of order 
flow.  Contemporaneous feedback trading occurs when order flow at date t  depends on 
date t asset return.  They note that previous VAR models have allowed for some sort of 
feedback trading but not contemporaneous feedback.  The VAR specification differs 
from that of Payne 2003 in the sense that order flow is allowed to depend on current 
exchange rate returns.  Instrumental variables are used estimate the VAR on brokered 
inter-dealer data for the spot USD/EUR.  Like Payne 2003, impulse response functions 
of spot rates to trade innovations which take into account contemporaneous feedback 
trading are obtained.  The main findings indicate that when contemporaneous feedback 
trading is allowed, the impact of order flow shock is larger compared to the previous 
case. 
 
3.2.6 Order Flow, fundamentals and exchange rate determination 
Using data from State Street Corporation, Froot and Ramadorai (2005) attempt to 
investigate how institution-investor flow might affect currency values.  The dataset spans 
7 years and includes 19 currencies.  This is after removing fixed or pegged currencies 
and rarely traded currencies.  Specifically they examine the relationship between order 
flow, exchange rate returns and fundamentals.  Froot and Ramadorai present three 
different ways in which flows could cause movements in exchange rates. The “strong 
flow-centric” view states that flows convey private information about fundamentals and 
thus induces a permanent effect on exchange rates.  This view is in line with Evans and 
Lyons (2002a).  The “weak flow-centric” view also states that flows rather convey 
private information about deviations from fundamentals and thus induces only transitory 
effects on exchange rates.  However with the “fundamentals-only view”, flows are not 
connected to exchange rates.  Fundamentals are the only determinants of exchange rates.   
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Initially, Froot and Ramadorai replicate the Evans and Lyons (2002) methodology by 
estimating the following equation: 
jtjtjzjt pzpr ,,,,1 )()( εβα ++=+                                                                                    (3.8) 
where )(
,1 pr jt+ is the p-period cumulative return on currency j against a basket of major 
currencies, )(
,
pz jt represents the corresponding cumulative for the signed order flow 
size. They find a strong positive correlation of about 30% between flows and returns.  At 
longer horizons of about 1 or 2 months, the correlation peaks at 45% and then gradually 
falls (until it becomes negative) as the horizon continues to increase.  This substantial 
initial increase is due to non-contemporaneous correlation.  Effects of flows appear to be 
transitory. Consequently, they infer that the positive correlation between order flow and 
exchange rate over short horizons is not linked to fundamentals but is the result of trend 
chasing activity of some investors.  
 
To validate their inference, Froot and Ramadorai use a combination of Campbell-Shiller 
decomposition and VAR model to separate unexpected currency returns into permanent 
and transitory components.  The decomposition allows for the analysis of how changes 
in flows and fundamentals interact with exchange rates.  The main focus of their analysis 
is the impulse-response function associated with the VAR.  These impulse response-
functions allow them to calculate the short and long-run covariances between order flow 
and returns.  They find that contemporaneous covariance between order flow and 
exchange rate return is positive.  They also find that the covariance between current 
order flow and short-term future exchange rate returns is also positive.  This means that 
order flow is able to positively predict short-term movements in exchange rates.  On the 
other hand, this positive relationship turns negative over the long-term.  Additionally the 
covariance between short-term future cumulative innovations in order flow and current 
exchange rate returns is positive.  This could be as a result of some investors using 
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positive feedback trading rules over the short-term.  The negative covariance between 
long-term future cumulative innovations in order flow and current exchange rate returns 
could be the result of negative feedback trading.  In general, it seems investors use 
positive feedback trading rules to build up their speculative positions in the short-run and 
eventually offload these position using negative feedback trading rules in the long-term.     
                                                                                                    
Furthermore current exchange rate returns are positively correlated with short-term 
future changes in interest rates and current order flow is positively correlated with short-
term future changes in interest rates.  According to Vitale (2006), this could imply that 
order flow is at least linked to fundamentals in the short-term. 
Breedon and Vitale (2004) use six months of inter-dealer flows from EBS and Reuters to 
investigate whether the impact of order flow on exchange rates is due to information 
effects or liquidity effects.  In view of the fact that it is difficult to untie these two 
effects, the paper adopts the Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) framework.  This framework 
is modified by making a few assumptions that take into account private information 
through customer order flow.  They point out that the persistent effects of order flow on 
exchange rates can also be induced by liquidity effects.  This is contrary to the common 
view in microstructure that the persistent effects of order flow on exchange rates are 
induced by only information effects.  Using GMM techniques, they find that the high 
explanatory power attributed to order flow is due to liquidity effects.  Specifically the 
impact of order flow on exchange rates is not due to aggregation of private dispersed 
information but rather due to FX dealers risk aversion.  FX dealers are only willing to 
hold unwanted inventory if they are adequately compensated for bearing the risk  
Also, the type of FX transactions used by Froot and Ramadorai cover only a portion of 
customer transactions in the FX market and does not cover all the information content in 
order flow.  Numerous studies including Marsh and O’Rourke (2005), Carpenter and 
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Wang (2007), Mende and Menkhoff (2003) and Evans and Lyons (2003b, 2005a) have 
examined the information content of disaggregated order flow in FX market. 
Marsh and O’Rourke use daily customer order flow of Royal Bank of Scotland between 
June 2004 and August 2004, to distinguish between the explanations for the strong 
positive correlations between spot exchange rates and order flow.  In previous literature, 
private information, liquidity effects and feedback trading are the main suggestions that 
have been used to explain this strong correlation.  The order flow data is split into 
various customer groups.  This allows for a detailed comparison of information content 
of order flow between the different customer categories.  The exchange rate is regressed 
on disaggregated order flows and thus relaxes the constraint that the effect of order flow 
on exchange rate are equal for all customer groups.   
t
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where Corptx  represents Non-financial corporate flows, 
Unlev
tx  represents un-leveraged 
financial flows, Levtx represents the leveraged financial flows and 
Other
tx  represents other 
financial flows. 
The results indicate that financial customers order flow is positively correlated with 
exchange rate movements whilst non-financial customer order flow is negatively 
correlated.  They interpret these results as meaning that financial customer flows contain 
price relevant information with non-financial customers following negative feedback 
trading rules.  The different impacts of order flow effectively discount any liquidity 
effects.  Also they find that the probability of informed trading (PIN) is relatively higher 
for financial customers.  This is not surprising since financial customers are more 
aggressive in the FX market and have a better access to price relevant signals.  Non-
financials, on the other hand, exploit short-term movements in spot rates to conduct their 
transactions for purely non-speculative reasons.  Furthermore, Marsh and O’Rourke find 
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that order flow in one currency market could affect spot rate movements in another 
market.  The previous result that liquidity effects are not the main reasons for the strong 
correlations is reinforced by the presence of cross-market flow effects. 
Other studies have looked at the issue of heterogonous sample.  Carpenter and Wang 
(2007) also report similar results.  Using tick-by-tick customer data from a large 
Australian, they investigate the price impact from different participants in the FX 
market.  They find that non-bank financial customer flows have a large impact on dealer 
pricing whilst corporate order flows have the least impact.  
Employing Citibank data spanning 6.5 years, Evans and Lyons (2005a) argue that order 
flow of the different customer segments behave differently and the information content 
of their respective order flows is dollar for dollar also different. 
Wei and Kim (1997) find that though the currency positions of large market participants 
are positively correlated with exchange rate volatility, they are not able to forecast future 
exchange rate movements and may be trading on noise rather than on private 
information.  Bjonnes and Rime (2001) show that customer trading has a relatively 
larger price effect than inter-bank trading. 
However, it should be noted that data for these studies have been obtained from single 
banks and as a result their customer order flow may not be a good representation of 
market-wide order flow.  
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3.2.7 Heterogeneous Information, Order flow and Exchange rates 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) introduce information heterogeneity into a standard 
model of exchange rate determination.  If risk-averse traders have heterogeneous beliefs 
and expectations about future macroeconomic fundamentals and observe imperfectly 
correlated fundamental signals, portfolio shifts will result in a permanent and significant 
effect on exchange rates.  The paper proposes a noisy rational expectations model where 
investors have private information and the auction market is order-driven.  In the short-
run, rational confusion is responsible for the failure of fundamentals to explain exchange 
rate movements.  This is because investors are unsure whether exchange rate movements 
are as a result of changes in private information about future fundamentals or hedged 
trades.  This confusion leads to a magnified effect of unobserved hedge trades in 
exchange rates.   
 
In a heterogeneous information setting, these hedge trades are a source of volatility.  
However in a homogenous setting they have no such effect.  In the long-run, rational 
confusion slowly wears out as investors gain access to more information about future 
fundamentals.  The effect of unobserved trades on exchange rates eventually diminishes.  
This implies that the effect of private signals on future fundamentals will have a 
relatively larger effect on exchange rate movements.  In the long-run, exchange rate and 
cumulative order flow are closely connected when the fundamental has a permanent 
component.  Because private information about permanent future fundamental changes is 
conveyed to the market through order flow, order flow has a permanent effect on 
exchange rates. 
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3.2.8 Order Flow in Emerging Markets 
While most order flow studies have focused on developed economies, only a couple of 
studies have examined order flow in emerging economies.  One of those studies is Wu 
(2007) which studies the behaviour of order flow and its influence on the exchange rate 
dynamics in Brazil.  The dataset used consists of daily customer transactions spanning a 
period of 4years, from July 1999 to June 2003, and represents 100% of the official 
Brazilian market.  Customers are further divided into three sub-categories: commercial 
customers, financial customers and central bank.   
 
Wu’s model is similar to that of previous microstructure models but with two key 
changes.  First, Wu favours a general equilibrium model where customers’ demand for 
FX is induced by macro fundamentals, including contemporaneous changes in the 
exchange rate.  Secondly, unlike Evans and Lyons model, FX dealers do not have to 
close with zero net positions at the end of each trading day.  These dealers may decide to 
provide extra liquidity in the case where there is an imbalance between customer buy 
and sell orders.  They will only do this if they believe it is optimal to do so.   
The model also allows for a two-way relationship between customer order flow and 
exchange rates.  The first relationship refers to the situation where an exchange rate 
appreciation makes foreign goods and assets cheaper and induces an increased demand 
for FX by customers.   
 
The second relationship is as a result of the portfolio balance effect.  FX dealers charge a 
risk premium for providing extra liquidity and the corresponding price change causes the 
exchange rate to depreciate.  This suggests an endogenous relationship between 
customer order flow and exchange rates.   
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The presence of endogeniety is first tested using a bivariate Granger causality test 
between exchange rate and the different types of order flow.  The null hypothesis that 
exchange rates do not granger cause order flow is rejected for all the 3 order flow 
variables.  Further evidence of endogeneity is provided by running a simple OLS 
regression, similar to that of Evans and Lyons (2002a), where the dependent variable is 
the change in the log of exchange rate and the regressor is the total customer order flow.  
Not surprisingly, the purchase of FX drives up the exchange rate..   
Consequently Wu employs a Structural VAR approach to identify this endogenous 
relationship between exchange rates and order flow.                                                                                       
The underlying assumption is that financial flow and commercial flow do not influence 
each other contemporaneously but this does not imply that they are uncorrelated at a 
daily frequency. 
 
Estimations from the VAR relationship indicate that dealers need to increase the 
domestic price of the dollar by approximately 2.7% in order to meet a customer flow of 
US$1bn.  Also a 1% depreciation rate reduces commercial flow by US$ 46m and the 
financial flow by US$111m. 
 
Gereben, Gyomai and Kiss M. (2005) examine the role of customer order flow in the 
Hungarian forint (EUR/HUF) market.  Their study is mainly based on the Evans and 
Lyons (2002a) framework.  Not only do they test whether customer order flow aids in 
explaining exchange rate, they also identify the roles played by different customer types.  
They also examine whether customer order flow can forecast future exchange rate 
movements. The dataset employed consists of 4 years of daily customer order flow 
obtained from the central bank of Hungary.  Customer order flow data is further divided 
into domestic (non-market making) banks, domestic non-banks, the central bank, foreign 
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banks and foreign non-banks.  Using maximum likelihood approach, they estimate a 
generic model at a daily frequency where all the different order flow variables are 
included, 
t
i
t
i
it xS εαα ++=∆ 0  , { }cbdodbfofbi ,,,,=                                                        (3.10) 
Where tS∆ is the change in the log of exchange rate and 
i
tx are the various components 
of customer order flow, specifically foreign banks order flow )( fbtx , foreign non-bank 
customer flow )( fotx , domestic non-market making banks )( dbtx , domestic non-bank 
customer flow )( dotx , and the central bank )( CBtx . 
The results indicate that the estimated coefficients of the foreign banks’, foreign non-
banks’ and central bank’s order flow are negative and significant.  This implies that 
purchases of domestic currency by these customers cause an appreciation in the 
Hungarian currency relative to the Euro.  However the coefficients of the domestic bank 
and non-banks were not significant. 
In view of the above, the researchers adopt Bjonnes, Rimes and Solheim (2005) 
alternative to the Evans and Lyons (2002a) framework and distinguished between “push” 
and “pull” customers by running two separate regressions for the two subgroups.  Push-
customers instigate price rises or falls through their buying and selling and as result their 
transactions are positively correlated with price movements.  These transactions are 
understood to convey private information.   
Pull-customers, on the other hand, are attracted to prices which they find suitable and 
their transactions are negatively correlated to price movements.  They are assumed to 
provide liquidity to the market.   
The above equation is estimated for the two groups.  For the push-equation, the 
coefficients of foreign and central bank flows are significant and positive, implying that  
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that order flow from foreign customers and central bank are the main drivers of 
exchange rate variations.  For the pull- equation, the coefficients of domestic flows 
become highly significant and positive.  This means that the purchase of domestic 
currency by domestic customers causes the Hungarian forint to depreciate.  In other 
words, domestic customers act as pull-customers and supply liquidity to the FX market 
whilst foreign customers and central bank play the role of push-customers.  These results 
are, however, contrary to studies like Marsh et al. (2004), who find that in determining 
the sign of order flows’, it is the difference between financial and non-financial 
customers that matters rather than the difference between domestic and foreign 
customers. 
 
Indeed, this research has been criticised by other renowned economists. The reason 
being the dataset did not differentiate between financial and non-financial flows.  
Another legitimate excuse could be that Hungary which is an emerging economy is 
heavily reliant on foreign inflows and as a result a large portion of its macro 
fundamentals are dependent on external factors.  Therefore it could be argued that 
foreign customer flow may convey more private information about future fundamentals 
than that domestic customer flows. 
 
3.2.9 Order Flow and FX Liquidity Provision 
Using data from the Swedish Krona market, Bjønnes et al. (2005) attempt to identify the 
long-run liquidity providers.  Their data spans 6 years and is split into 4 main categories 
namely: market-making banks, non-financial customers, financial customers and central 
bank.   
Their analysis was based on the Evans and Lyons (2002a) model.  Bjønnes et al. (2005) 
tag round one customers as ‘active’ and round three customers as ‘passive’, 
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terminologies first used by Sager and Taylor (2006).   ‘Push’ customers are usually the 
‘active’ party in trades and initiate price movements through their buy/sell transactions.  
Net flows of ‘push’ customers will be positively correlated with exchange rate 
movements.  ‘Pull’ customers, on the other hand, are usually ‘passive’ in trades and are 
drawn into the market by attractive prices which are beneficial to themselves.  Net flows 
of pull customers are negatively correlated with exchange rate movements.  Thus push 
customers demand liquidity while pull customers provide liquidity. 
Using Granger causality and Cointegration tests, Bjønnes et al. (2005) find that financial 
customers demand liquidity whiles non-financial customers supply liquidity in the long-
run.  In other words, financial customers ‘push’ the market whiles non-financial 
customers are ‘pulled’ by the market. 
 
A study by King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) examine the macroeconomic determinants of 
the Canadian dollar/US dollar (CAD), using a unique dataset consisting  11 years of 
disaggregated order flow based on spot transactions reported by Canadian-based dealers.  
The study argues that Canada is an open economy that has strong trade relations with the 
US economy which is the destination of 80% of its exports.  So far as the FX 
microstructure approach is concerned, the study rests heavily on the seminal paper by 
Evans and Lyons (2002a) which dwells on a partial equilibrium model that links order 
flow to contemporaneous changes in the exchange rate.  Additionally, the study draws 
motivation from Evans and Lyons (2005a) which argues that order flow captures 
changes in expectations for macroeconomic fundamentals and responds to changes in 
commodity prices. King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) confirm that order flow respond to 
changes in commodity futures especially gold and aluminium prices.  Besides, adding 
order flow to regressions on exchange rate returns that include commodity variables and 
interest rate expectations significantly improves that the fit of the model. 
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King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) use the present value formulation5 of exchange rate 
modelling, which highlights the role of order flow as a proxy for aggregating 
heterogeneous beliefs on macroeconomic information.  Results from the study indicate 
that over 25% of the available macroeconomic news can explain fluctuation in order 
flow. 
In another study, Evans and Lyons (2008) investigated the response of order flow to 
macroeconomic news and find that when investors are well informed about 
macroeconomic developments preceding the announcement, any possible 
macroeconomic surprise that could generate erratic movements in exchange rates could 
be mitigated.  Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010), on the other hand, posit that order flow 
should reflect changes in expectations with respect to current economic conditions.  
Chen, Rogoff and Rossi (2008) also establish a direct link between exchange rate of 
commodity exporting countries and commodity prices.  This link is further corroborated 
by King, Sarno and Sojli (2010). 
This thesis intends to build on existing FX microstructure literature in three key chapters.  
In chapter 5, we apply equation 3.9 to Ghana taking into account the peculiar nature of 
the Ghanaian FX market.  The Evans and Lyons (2002a) model will form the basis for 
this chapter.  Chapter 6 applies the Bjønnes et al. (2005) framework to identify the 
liquidity providers in the FX market.  Unlike Bjønnes et al. (2005) who divide their data 
set into financial and non-financial customers, we divide our dataset into bank customers 
and central bank.  This approach is to enhance the study and to enable us to identify the 
long-run liquidity providers in FX market. 
Finally, chapter 7 is essentially an application of King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) which 
investigated the macroeconomic determinants of order flow for Canadian dollar. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 METHODOLOGY-Choice of Estimation Technique 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Traditionally, econometric modelling consists of three phases: specification, estimation 
and validation. This chapter discusses the estimation and validation approaches adopted 
for the study. The rest of the chapter has been organised as follows. Section 4.2 deals 
with the techniques used to investigate the time series characteristics of all the series 
used in the model. This has been done in order to avoid the problem of spurious 
regression that exists among microstructure and macroeconomic time series variables. 
Investigations are carried out to ascertain the order of integration of each variable in the 
model, which will establish the degree of non-stationarity and the number of times the 
variable should be differenced to attain stationarity. Issues involved in the testing for 
cointegration and estimation of error-correction models (ECM) are considered in 
Sections 4.4, with emphasis on the Johansen’s Multivariate approach - the main 
approach used for this study.  The Johansen Multivariate approach examines the 
possibility of more than one cointegration relationship. Section 4.5 treats other 
alternative approaches to ideal estimation, and discuses the problems inherent in each, 
while the approaches used to determine the adequacy of the estimated model are also 
treated in Section 4.6.  
 
 
 
4.2 Times Series Characteristics of the data 
Collecting data for the research of this kind requires the utilisation of a variety of 
sources, which for this research; include the Bank of Ghana for financial data, and the 
Statistical Service of Ghana for real data. A detailed description of the variables and their 
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sources are presented in Appendix 1. In this section, an investigation is carried out to 
determine the time series characteristics of all the series used in the model. This was 
done in order to avoid the spurious regression problem, by ensuring the existence of a 
meaningful economic relationship. The investigation was therefore, designed to ascertain 
the order of integration of each variable in the model, that is, the number of times the 
variable should be differenced to induce stationarity. 
Econometric theory has shown that the validity of traditional econometric analysis is 
dependent upon the assumption of stationarity. It is widely acknowledged that the vast 
majority of macroeconomic variables are non-stationary, and when such variables are 
included in a regression, they are likely to cause a spurious regression problem. In other 
words, the high correlation found among those variables may not represent the true 
economic relationship, but simply common trends in the variables. For this reason, until 
the 1980s, it was assumed that individual time series must be made stationary by pre-
filtering data, using seasonal adjustment, difference or elimination of deterministic 
trends. One drawback of the procedure for differencing was that it could result in a loss 
of valuable long-run information in the data.  
 
Subsequent studies have adopted many approaches to testing for the presence of a unit 
root, among which the Augmented Dickey is-Fuller (ADF) approach, popular among 
researchers because of its simplicity. This test estimates 
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With the null H0 : ≥ρ  1 against the alternative H1 : ρ < 1. 
 In this approach, the lag length is usually set to avoid autocorrelation in .ty∆  The 
critical values of the asymptotic distributions of these t-statistics are tabulated in Dickey 
and Fuller (1981) and MacKinnon (1991). In addition, the limiting distributions of these 
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researchers are derived on the assumptions that the error terms are iid. (0,σ 2), but are 
also valid in the presence of some heterogeneity in the innovation process. If the errors 
are serially correlated, the statistics have to be modified. The simplest approach is to use 
equation (4.1),i.e.  the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, to add as many lags of the 
dependent variable as necessary to ensure that the residuals of the regression appear to 
be white noise. 
 An alternative approach to test for the existence of unit root is that suggested by 
Phillips (1987), and extended by Perron (1988) and Phillips-Perron (1988). These 
researchers showed that if a series was stationary around a deterministic time trend that 
had undergone a permanent shift sometime during the period under consideration, then 
failure to take account of this change in the slope would be mistake by the usual ADF 
unit root test as a persistent innovation to a stochastic trend, they recommend a non-
parametric correction to the underlying t-test statistics to be undertaken to account for 
any autocorrelation that would emerge if the data-generating process was not AR(1). 
Other tests, such as Sargan-Bhargava (1983) cointegration regression Durbin-Watson 
tests, based on the usual Durbin Watson statistic, are applicable on the level of each 
emerging variable and are defined as: 
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where ty stands for the arithmetic mean of ty . 
Following these tests, the Ogaki (1992), and Kwiatkowski, Phillips Schmidt and Shin 
(1992) (KPSS) tests for stationarity also emerged. 
 Since the ADF has remained the most popular approach, this study has used them 
in testing for the order of integration of the series. 
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 The next section discusses the Johansen approach to model estimation, adopted in 
the present study for the estimation of the equations in the model.  
 
4.3 The Johansen Methodology 
The Johansen and Juselius (1992) technique was developed to address the main 
problems inherent in the use of the Engle and Granger technique. It was known that 
using a single equation representation simply implied the assumption that all the 
explanatory variables were exogenous, which may not be the case. Moreover, if there 
were more than two variables in a model, there could be more than one cointegration 
relationship, possibly rendering traditional estimation techniques inappropriate. In this 
regard, it became common practice not to begin by using a single-equation model, but 
rather by adopting a more general simultaneous equation formulation, in which each 
variable was modelled in terms of lagged values of all the other variables. 
 
 In order to corroborate the rank results of the EG methodology, this study uses the 
Johansen and Juselius (1992) approach to show that the existing CI is, in fact, unique. 
This is particularly useful because when one assumes there to be one CI when, in fact, 
there are more, leads to inefficiency. Appropriate lags are added to ensure that the error 
terms are all distributed white noise. 
 The Johansen approach starts by defining an unrestricted vector auto regression 
(VAR) of Zt of n potentially endogenous variables that involve up to k-lags, which the 
data generating process states as: 
 
    Zt = A1 Zt-1 + ……….+ Ak Zt-k + µ t                                                      µ t ~ IID(0, Σ )         (4.5) 
where Zt is (n x 1) and each if the Ai is an (n x n) matrix of parameters. 
We can reformulate equation (3.5) into VECM of form 
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1Γ=∆ tZ tktktkt uZZZ +∏+∆Γ++∆ −+−−− 111 ...........                                                  (4.6) 
Where ).........( 1 ii AAI −−−−=Γ and ).1,.......,1( −= ki  Also )....( 1 kAAI −−−=∏  
 Through this formulation, the system then contains information on both the short-
run and long-run adjustment to changes in Zt through the estimates of 
Λ
Γ  and 
∏
Λ
respectively. It is also shown that ∏  = αβ / , where α represents the speed of 
adjustment to disequilibrium and is a matrix of long-run coefficients, such that the term 
β /Zt-k which was embedded in equation (4.6) represents up to (n-1) cointegration 
relationships in this multivariate model, assuming that Zt is a vector of nonstationary I(1) 
variables. This also implies that Z∏ t-k contains the stationary long-run error correction 
relations, and should be stationary, in order for ut to be “white noise”. This occurs when 
∏ = αβ / has reduced rank, implying that there are r ≤  (n – 1) cointegration vectors 
present in β . In this case, testing for cointegration implies the finding of the number of 
linearly independent columns in ∏ , which is also equivalent to testing that the last (n-1) 
columns of α are insignificantly small. It is shown that if ∏ has full rank, then the 
variables in Zt are I(0), while if the rank of ∏ is zero, then there are no cointegration 
relationships. More usually, ∏ has a reduced rank, in which case there are r<(n-r) 
cointegration vectors present. 
 Johansen’s maximum likelihood approach to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors amount to a reduced rank regression which provides n eigenvalues. 
The Johansen maximum eigenvalue test statistics used for carrying out this operation are 
defined as – T (1- µ j) derived from the minimisation of the product of the concentrated 
likelihood of the function, the significance of the largest λ r  is the so-called maximum 
eigenvalue or λ - max statistic, given by: 
                         λ max = - T log (1 - λ r+1)                       r = 0,1,2………n-1.          (4.7)      
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This demonstrates that there are r- CI vectors against the alternative that r +1. another 
test if significance us called trace. This is estimated by 
 
   λ trace = -2log(Q) 
)1log(
1

+=
−−=
n
ri
iT λ                         1,2,......1,0 −−= nnr                                                 (4.8) 
where Q = Restricted maximum likelihood 
                     Unrestricted maximum likelihood 
 
These approaches demonstrate that if the researcher faces a small sample problem, then 
there is the likelihood of problems with regard to power and size properties when using 
the asymptotic critical values. In this respect, Lutkepohl et al. (2001) examined both the 
race and –max tests, concluding that the former had power size properties, while the 
latter suffered from loss of power. 
4.4 Statistical Diagnostics 
In this study, particular emphasis is placed on the reliability of the complete model and 
statistical appropriateness of the individual equations, tested through a series of 
diagnostic checks. First, to ensure that the estimated parameters had a statistically 
desirable property, and second that there existed a meaningful and interpretable 
economic relationship among the endogenous variables, residuals were checked for 
normal, independent and identical distribution (white noise- CHECK). The model was 
also checked for possible mis-specification. The reported diagnostic statistics included 
adjusted R2 , which is a measure of the goodness of fit of the model (i.e. the percentage 
of the total variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables). 
Additionally, an F-test, in which all the right hand side explanatory variables except the 
constant are checked to have zero parameter coefficients; the standard deviation of the 
regression; the Durbin Watson (DW) test for the first order auto-correlation up to the k – 
th, (k ≥  1) (which is strictly not valid when the model has a lagged dependent variable); 
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a Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation up to the k-th 
lag, obtained by regression, the DW statistic would be biased towards 2, resulting in too 
frequent acceptance of the null hypothesis of no AR(1) errors. Durbin developed an 
alternative test, Durbin’s h-statistic, defined as 
VT
T
rh Λ
−
=
1
1                                                                                                     (4.9) 
Where r1 = 1 – ½ DW, 
∧
V  was the estimated variance of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, and T was the number of observations. This statistic was known to 
be asymptotically standard normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Other tests employed were an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic 
(ARCH) test, obtained by regressing the squared residuals from the model on their lags 
and a constant; White’s heteroscedasticity/ functional mis-specification test, based on 
auxiliary regression of the squared residuals on all squares and cross products of the 
original regressors; Ramsey’s RESER general test of mis-specification test, obtained by 
adding powers of the fitted values from the values from the model to the original 
regression equation; and the Jarque-Bera test for normality. 
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4.5 DATA 
4.5.1 Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Data 
The Central Bank of Ghana is the main source of data on the spot foreign exchange 
market.  The data set includes both the daily official and parallel (parallel market) 
cedi/dollar rates between 3rd January 2000 and 29th December 2007.  With the 
exception of the parallel market, foreign exchange trading takes place during normal 
banking hours (9am to 4/5pm).   These transaction quotes represent the mid-rate between 
the bids and ask quotes at the close of each day.  In this study transaction rates are used 
rather than indicative rates because they provide a better picture of price dynamics in the 
foreign exchange market.  Indicative quotes are usually provided to attract customers and 
usually differ from the transaction quotes.   
 
For an emerging market like Ghana, it would be unwise to disregard the thriving parallel 
market for exchange rates.  The Ghanaian Central bank acknowledges this fact and 
therefore incorporates parallel market exchange rates in its analysis and decision making. 
The FX bureau rate (proxy for parallel market rate) is the average of the individual FX 
bureau rates.  The bank rates (official rates) comprise the indicative and transaction rates.  
The indicative rate (average opening rates) is the average of all individual banks’ 
indicative rates.  Typically, the indicative rates are advertised in banking halls of all 
banks, and are normally used for all FX transactions, including money remittances.   
However the transaction rate is a weighted average of the rates charged for the banks’ 
various FX transactions.  The volumes are used as the weights. 
The central bank requires all banks in the country to submit daily returns on their 
respective FX market purchases and sales and their related dealing or transaction rates. It 
derives its USDGH currency pair rates from the market weighted position, and uses 
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these rates against the international cross rates to derive the domestic currencies 
equivalent of other foreign currencies. 
These two rates are both referred to as the interbank rates.  The transaction rate charged 
by a particular bank will depend on the availability of FX at that point in time.   
FX bureau data is collected by the central bank daily.  FX bureaus do not observe any 
customer order flow on the FX market.  The dependent variable, the daily log change in 
exchange rate, is constructed by taking the logarithmic difference of the exchange rate 
series. 
The interest rate differential is the difference between the Ghana daily three-month 
Treasury bill rate and the US daily three-month Treasury bill rate, expressed on an 
annual basis.  The Ghanaian rates were collected from the central bank of Ghana while 
the US data was obtained from the Federal Reserve website. 
 
The data sample is diverse in the sense that it contains a period of relative stability and a 
period of turbulence. Therefore the sample is divided into two sub samples.  The first sub 
sample represents the crisis period spanning the whole of the year 2000.  In 2000 Ghana 
suffered a severe terms of trade loss due to falling cocoa exports and increasing prices on 
imported petrol.  The situation was worsened with a shortfall in divestiture receipts and 
donor inflows.  During this crisis period, consumer price inflation (CPI) shot up to 42% 
and the Ghanaian currency (CEDI) depreciated by over 50% (figure 4.2).  
 
The second sub sample represents the relatively stable period spanning 2002-2007.  By 
2002 the prices of Ghana’s main export, cocoa and gold, had recovered slightly and the 
authorities were able to stabilise the main macroeconomic indicators.  Equally important 
in 2002 was the resumption of intervention activity on the FX market by the central 
bank.  By the end of 2001 CPI stood at 21% and the CEDI depreciated by only 3.5% 
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(figure 4.3).  This was the result of tight monetary and fiscal policies.  These 
developments contributed to the restoration of business confidence in Ghana.  Data 
analysis will show that the exchange rate behaves differently during these two periods.   
Although the original data is at a daily frequency, preliminary regressions indicate that 
daily data is noisy.  Consequently we aggregate the data into weekly frequency in an 
attempt to solve the problem.  It is also interesting to note that intervention activity 
coincided with the relative stability of the official exchange rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 weekly spot Exchange rates for the whole sample period 
3500.00
4500.00
5500.00
6500.00
7500.00
8500.00
9500.00
10500.00
07
/0
1/
20
00
07
/0
5/
20
00
07
/0
9/
20
00
07
/0
1/
20
01
07
/0
5/
20
01
07
/0
9/
20
01
07
/0
1/
20
02
07
/0
5/
20
02
07
/0
9/
20
02
07
/0
1/
20
03
07
/0
5/
20
03
07
/0
9/
20
03
07
/0
1/
20
04
07
/0
5/
20
04
07
/0
9/
20
04
07
/0
1/
20
05
07
/0
5/
20
05
07
/0
9/
20
05
07
/0
1/
20
06
07
/0
5/
20
06
07
/0
9/
20
06
07
/0
1/
20
07
07
/0
5/
20
07
07
/0
9/
20
07
c
e
di
s
/$
spot black
 
Source: Bank of Ghana (Central Bank of Ghana).Trading occurs during normal banking hours, 9am to 4pm, except for the parallel market.  The daily spot exchange rates represent 
the transaction rates of the market-making commercial banks.  The daily FX bureau transaction rates are used as proxies for the parallel market rates. 
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Figure 4.2 weekly spot Exchange rates during crisis period 
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Source: Bank of Ghana (Central Bank of Ghana). During 2000, the cedi depreciated by about 50% due to external shocks.  Generally we observe a negative parallel market 
premium (Parallel market exchange rate minus Official rate) during this period. 
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Figure 4.3 weekly spot Exchange rates during stable period 
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Source: Bank of Ghana (Central Bank of Ghana).The cedi remained relatively stable, depreciating by about 20% over six years (2001-2007). Generally we observe a positive 
parallel market premium (Parallel market exchange rate minus Official rate) during this period.
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The parallel market premium is defined as the spread between the parallel market rate 
and the official rate.  Generally there was a parallel market discount for most of the crisis 
period.  There was an uncharacteristically huge hike in the premium during the middle of 
2000. 
 
The crisis period was characterised with spiralling inflation and rapid deprecation of the 
cedi.  During 2000, the cedi depreciated by about 50% against the US dollar (figure 4.2).  
This situation could be attributed to falling prices of Ghana’s major exports commodities 
(main foreign exchange earners) namely cocoa, gold and timber.  The average price per 
tonne of cocoa plummeted from around $1400 in 1999 to $1000 in 2000.  The average 
price per ounce of gold also fell from pre-crisis levels of $400 to $250 in 2000.  The 
price of timber followed the same pattern, falling from $400 to $350.  To further 
exacerbate this situation, the price of imported crude oil which previously hovered 
around $10 per barrel, soared to $34 by mid 2000.  Official donor inflows, which 
hitherto, had been supporting the economy, were withheld in 2000.   The expected figure 
was around $200million. 
 
Against all these challenges, Ghana had to pay about $200million every month towards 
foreign debt obligation by drawing on the already depleting foreign exchange reserves.  
This created an acute shortage of foreign currency (mainly dollars) as demand for dollars 
far outstripped their supply.  In light of the fact that the nation is heavily dependent on 
imports, the scarcity of FX fuelled inflationary pressures.  Low business confidence and 
political uncertainty over the outcome of the December 2000 presidential elections led to 
massive capital outflows around the middle of 2000.  At this point, the relative scarcity 
of FX allowed the parallel market agents to demand huge premiums.  This could have 
contributed to the huge spike in the premium during July 2000 (figure 4.4.) 
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On the other hand the stable period was characterised with a positive premium starting 
from 2002.  It is interesting to note that also in 2002, the central bank embarked on a 
program of sustained FX interventions which is still on-going.  This was made possible 
due to the country’s replenished FX reserves resulting from a recovery in commodity 
prices, a fall in crude oil prices and the resumption in foreign donor inflows.  At start of 
2004, there is another big hike in the premium due to political uncertainty over the 
outcome of the December 2004 elections. 
 
Table 4.1: Unit Root test on Parallel market Premium 
 
Crisis Period Stable period 
ADF, P-value 0.0454 0.0041 
 
 
To have an idea of the long-run relationship between the official and parallel exchange 
rates, we test for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  The null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favour of the stationarity alternative for both 
periods.  This is an indication that the parallel market premium is stationary for both 
periods.  In other words, the official and parallel rates move in tandem in the long-run. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for changes in exchange rates for whole period 
 Changes in spot Changes in parallel 
Mean 0.2428 0.2474 
Median 0.0638 0.0631 
Maximum 4.3725 6.2064 
Minimum -0.8962 -1.7375 
Std. Dev. 0.6225 0.7977 
Observations 412 412 
Descriptive statistics for weekly changes in log of exchange rates calculated over the period 
January 2000 to December 2007 
 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for changes in exchange rates for crisis period 
 Changes in spot Changes in parallel 
Mean 1.3130 1.2634 
Median 1.0953 0.6221 
Maximum 4.3725 6.2064 
Minimum -0.8847 -1.7375 
Std. Dev. 1.2429 1.7591 
Observations 51 51 
Descriptive statistics for weekly changes in log of exchange rates calculated over the period 
January 2000 to December 2000 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for changes in exchange rates for stable period 
 Changes in spot Changes in parallel 
Mean 0.0850 0.0851 
Median 0.0407 0.0641 
Maximum 0.9732 1.6969 
Minimum -0.7421 -1.3977 
Std. Dev. 0.1894 0.3303 
Observations 300 300 
Descriptive statistics for weekly changes in log of exchange rates calculated over the period 
March 2002 to December 2007 
 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the exchange rates are very volatile during the 
crisis period but are relatively stable during the stable period.  The standard deviations 
are abnormally high during the crisis period compared to that of the stable period.  In 
order to give an idea of scale, we compare these movements to that of a larger and more 
liquid market like the euro-dollar.  Specifically we compare the movements of the 
CEDI/USD to the EUR/USD over the crisis and stable period.  
 
 Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for euro-dollar movements during the Ghanaian crisis 
and stable periods 
 Crisis period stable period 
Mean -0.000319 0.000253 
Median -0.000492 0.000322 
Maximum 0.042041 0.02521 
Minimum -0.02252 -0.021333 
Std. Dev. 0.008665 0.005724 
Observations 254 1767 
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In comparison to the CEDI/USD movements, the EUR/USD has enjoyed extreme 
stability.  The relative stability experienced by the Ghanaian CEDI would be equivalent 
to a currency crisis for the Euro. (Fig 4.3) 
 
Table 4.6: Autocorrelation Function for changes in official exchange rate for crisis period 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
       
      **|.      |       **|.      | 1 -0.299 -0.299 21.558 0.000 
      **|.      |      ***|.      | 2 -0.224 -0.344 33.658 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 3 0.238 0.057 47.455 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 4 -0.128 -0.114 51.429 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 5 -0.031 -0.031 51.66 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 6 0.074 -0.027 52.993 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 7 -0.119 -0.11 56.48 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 8 0.098 0.041 58.843 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 9 0.116 0.129 62.204 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 10 -0.177 -0.038 70.088 0.000 
 
 
Table 4.7: Autocorrelation Function for changes in parallel exchange rate for crisis period 
Autocorrelation 
Partial 
Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
       
       .|.      |        .|.      | 1 -0.035 -0.035 0.2888 0.591 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 2 -0.054 -0.055 0.9865 0.611 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 3 -0.057 -0.061 1.7661 0.622 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 4 0.103 0.097 4.3785 0.357 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 5 0.117 0.12 7.7131 0.173 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 6 -0.017 0 7.7827 0.254 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 7 -0.016 0.006 7.8462 0.346 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 8 -0.057 -0.058 8.6492 0.373 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 9 0.043 0.013 9.1168 0.427 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 10 0.131 0.119 13.389 0.203 
 
Table 4.8: Autocorrelation Function for changes in official exchange rate for stable period 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
       
     ***|       |      ***|       | 1 -0.448 -0.448 295.17 0.000 
        |       |       **|       | 2 0.008 -0.241 295.26 0.000 
        |       |        *|       | 3 0.049 -0.072 298.86 0.000 
       *|       |        *|       | 4 -0.063 -0.087 304.71 0.000 
        |*      |         |*      | 5 0.129 0.093 329.08 0.000 
       *|       |         |       | 6 -0.085 0.022 339.8 0.000 
        |*      |         |*      | 7 0.098 0.124 353.91 0.000 
        |       |         |*      | 8 -0.023 0.091 354.66 0.000 
        |       |         |       | 9 -0.008 0.064 354.74 0.000 
        |*      |         |*      | 10 0.082 0.119 364.67 0.000 
 121 
Table 4.9: Autocorrelation Function for changes in parallel exchange rate for stable period 
Autocorrelation 
Partial 
Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
       
        |*      |         |*      | 1 0.105 0.105 16.224 0.000 
        |*      |         |*      | 2 0.164 0.155 55.883 0.000 
        |*      |         |*      | 3 0.094 0.066 68.938 0.000 
        |*      |         |       | 4 0.08 0.043 78.343 0.000 
        |*      |         |       | 5 0.067 0.034 84.915 0.000 
        |       |         |       | 6 0.04 0.008 87.247 0.000 
        |       |         |       | 7 0.001 -0.027 87.25 0.000 
        |       |         |       | 8 0.033 0.019 88.889 0.000 
        |       |         |       | 9 -0.012 -0.021 89.086 0.000 
        |       |         |       | 10 -0.01 -0.018 89.241 0.000 
 
With the exception of parallel market rate changes during the crisis period, exchange rate 
changes are generally serially correlated. All the autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients are statistically significant.  This could be evidence of huge 
inefficiencies in an under-developed and illiquid market.  This issue will be addressed 
when considering our modelling strategy in subsequent chapters. 
 
4.5.2 Order Flow Data 
Most banks consider their customer trades to be highly confidential and are usually 
reluctant to release such data to the public.   In Ghana, it is a regulatory requirement for 
all market making banks (both Ghanaian and foreign) to report all their daily foreign 
exchange transactions to the central bank.  These commercial banks register every single 
foreign exchange trade (purchase and sale) with their customers at respective transaction 
rates.  For spot FX, commercial banks have a more natural customer base than 
investment banks (Lyons 2001).  This study will examine the cedi/US dollar market 
covering a period of seven years (January 2000 to December 2007). The dataset will 
cover the five largest banks (market-makers) in the foreign exchange market, who 
account for over 80% of the transactions.   This leads to a high degree of transparency 
because an individual big bank observes a substantial portion of the market and may 
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have an idea of order flow in the other big banks. The banks are ranked in terms of net 
interest income, deposits, profits etc (Table 4.10).    They are Barclays Bank (BBG), 
Standard Chartered (SCB), Social Security Bank (SSB), Agricultural Development Bank 
(ADB) and Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB).  They form the 1st quartile of the banking 
industry.  As of 2007, there were 17 active dealer banks in the foreign exchange market.  
 
Table 4.10: Industry statistics of top five banks 
BANKS Net Interest  Profit  Share of deposits Number of 
  income Ranking   branches 
GCB 15.90% 3 17.89% 131 
BBG 14.00% 1 15.44% 32 
SCB 12.40% 2 13.33% 18 
ADB 8.00% 7 6.80% 48 
SSB 14.10% 4 6.67% 36 
Source: PriceWaterHouseCoopers Ghana Banking Survey 2006.  Findings of annual Survey of the 
Ghanaian banking industry.  The survey focuses on the last 5 years beginning 2000 and includes 20 banks. 
 
A brief background and structure of these banks will help in the interpretation of the 
subsequent results. 
SCB & BBG were the first banks to be set up in Ghana at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Their main line of business was trade finance and they mainly served the 
expatriate community.  This trend has continued with a majority of their customers being 
multinationals and large and medium-scaled enterprises. 
GCB was the first indigenous bank to be set up in 1953.  Its main objective was to 
extend credit to the local population.  GCB owns about 50% of all branches in Ghana.  
Its customer base is well diversified with customers ranging from state enterprises to 
private individuals. It is the largest bank in Ghana in terms of deposits and assets. 
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ADB was a development bank established in 1965 to cater for the needs of the 
agricultural sector.  It has a vital role since the agricultural sector is still the largest 
contributor to the GDP.  Until 2005 it was the sole agent for Western Union money 
transfer.  As a result remittances account for about 90% of its foreign flows.  Customer 
base consists of mainly small to medium scaled enterprises and privates individuals. 
 
SSB is the smallest bank in the 1st quartile.  It was set up by the social security and 
national insurance trust in 1977.  Societe Generale, the French Bank, acquired 
controlling interest in the bank in March 2003.   
 
This data set provides us with a relatively complete picture of the cedi/dollar market.  
This is similar to the datasets of Rime (2000) and Bjønnes, Rime and Solheim (2004) 
which account for about 90% of the Norwegian and Swedish markets respectively.  The 
trades are aggregated over each day for each bank and for the total of the five banks.  
Daily order flow is calculated by taking the difference between the number of buyer 
initiated trades and the number of seller initiated trades.  A positive order flow denotes 
net dollar purchases.   
 
In order to determine the sign of the trades we make the widely used assumption that 
trades between banks and customers are initiated from the customer side.  This 
assumption is based on the fact that trading between banks and their customers is likely 
to occur when customers demand this service and therefore become initiators.  Banks act 
as the middlemen between the interbank market and the customers.  Customers place 
orders with their banks and then the banks trade with each other on the interbank market.  
The resulting order flow is what aggregates information into prices. 
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Unfortunately, this data set does not allow us to distinguish between the various 
customer groups.  Generally the big commercial banks experience large customer order 
flows due to the nature of their customer base.  Their customers are usually large non-
banking firms (big corporations and multinationals).    
 
Some earlier studies like Marsh and O’Rourke (2005), Bjønnes et al (2005) and Mende 
and Menkhoff (2003) have been able to split non-bank customer categories into financial 
and non-financial customers to enable them analyse the impact of these different order 
flows.  Nevertheless this dataset is unique in so many ways.  To the best of our 
knowledge this is the most complete data set for an African country.  In calculating order 
flow, Evan and Lyons (2002a) used the quantity of buyer and seller initiated trades 
whiles this study uses the actual transaction volumes.  It seems that actual transactions of 
customers provide a better measure of the underlying sources of demand and supply for 
foreign exchange in the economy (Lyons 2001).  Our dataset gives a more complete 
picture of the FX market than studies like Evans and Lyons (2002a), Froot and 
Ramadorai (2005), Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) who use data for just for a single 
market-maker.  The data set for this study makes use of transaction volumes covering 
almost the whole Ghanaian foreign exchange market and as a result most of the 
significant trades.  The longer time span also allows for a more precise estimation of the 
impact of daily order flow on weekly exchange rate movements. 
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Figure 4.5: Average daily absolute flows.  This pie chart illustrates each bank’s share of the 
daily volumes traded.  It is obvious that the FX market is dominated by two main foreign banks 
(Standard Chartered Bank & Barclays bank).  The relatively high figure of 20% for ADB, a local 
bank, could be as a result of its Western Union remittance flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Absolute flow gives an indication of the actual value of transactions disregarding 
whether transactions are purchases or sales.  From table 4.11 and figure 4.5 it is obvious 
that the two foreign banks (Barclays & Standard chartered) are by far the biggest players 
in the Ghanaian foreign exchange market.  This could mean that they have superior 
information with regards to exchange rate movements.  This is not surprising because 
they mainly serve the expatriate community in Ghana.  The relatively high value of 
transactions recorded by ADB could be misleading because its main source of foreign 
exchange is their remittance flows.  The two other local banks (GCB & SSB) control a 
significantly small portion of the foreign exchange market.  According to the central 
bank, during the 3rd quarter of 2007, one bank dominated the FX market with 23.2% of 
total volume of transactions whiles the other four banks accounted for 59.1%. 
 
ADB 
20%
BBG 
32%GCB 
7%
SCB 
35%
SSB 
6%
average daily absolute flow
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Table 4.11: Descriptive statistics of weekly order flow 
 ADB BBG GCB SCB SSB 
Mean -1.07 1.31 1.43 1.64 1.02 
Median -1.20 1.08 -0.01 1.09 -0.15 
Maximum 21.91 19.38 27.10 18.55 9.75 
Minimum -9.62 -14.62 -2.90 -6.48 -0.99 
Std. Dev. 2.43 2.80 3.32 2.92 2.03 
Observations 413 413 413 413 413 
Source:  Central Bank of Ghana.  Weekly spot trading from January 2000 to December 2007.  All numbers 
in million USD.  Positive order flow indicates that customers are net buyers of dollars and negative flow 
indicates that they are net sellers of dollars 
 
 
 
Table 4.12: Correlations between individual banks flows for the whole period 
  ADB BBG GCB SCB SSB 
ADB 1.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 
BBG -0.02 1.00 -0.04 0.08 0.13 
GCB -0.06 -0.04 1.00 0.18 0.43 
SCB -0.11 0.08 0.18 1.00 0.18 
SSB -0.07 0.13 0.43 0.18 1.00 
 
Table 4.13: Correlations between individual banks flows for the crisis period 
  ADB BBG GCB SCB SSB 
ADB 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.36 -0.09 
BBG 0.00 1.00 -0.08 0.10 0.04 
GCB 0.21 -0.08 1.00 0.39 0.03 
SCB 0.36 0.10 0.39 1.00 -0.21 
SSB -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.21 1.00 
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Table 4.14: Correlations between individual banks flows for the stable period 
  ADB BBG GCB SCB SSB 
ADB 1.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 
BBG 0.01 1.00 -0.08 0.05 0.09 
GCB -0.05 -0.08 1.00 0.14 0.38 
SCB -0.11 0.05 0.14 1.00 0.14 
SSB -0.06 0.09 0.38 0.14 1.00 
 
 
Normally one would expect the flows of the individual banks to be somehow correlated.  
Rather surprisingly, the individual bank flows are almost uncorrelated.  This reflects the 
differences in customer types.  The flows of GCB and SSB, the two banks that serve 
significant portion of the indigenous Ghanaian community, are relatively highly 
correlated. 
Figure 4.6: This graph presents the weekly customer order flow calculated from January 2000 to 
December 2007.  There seems to be an increase in customer trading activity from 2002 onwards. 
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Figure 4.7: This graph presents the cumulative customer order flow calculated from January 
2000 to December 2007. This provides evidence that customers have remained net buyers of 
dollars over the whole period. There seems to be an increase in customer trading activity from 
2002 onwards. 
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Figure 4.6 shows the daily order flow for the five banks over the whole sample period. In 
this case order flow is from the point of view of the customer.  Therefore a positive order 
flow means customers are buying dollars and selling cedis contemporaneously.  Figure 
4.7 shows the cumulative net order flow for the whole period.   
 
From the two graphs it is obvious that transaction activity increased dramatically from 
mid 2002 onwards.  The direction of this activity was towards the purchase of dollars, 
evident in the positive order flow.  Generally order flow has remained positive for the 
whole period.  This is not a surprising feature since in Ghana, a large proportion of the 
customers of these top banks maintain a high proportion of their deposits in foreign 
currency.  They view the dollar as a ‘safe haven’.  This could be attributed to positive 
real interest rates, the continued lack of confidence in the sustainability of the 
appropriate economic policies and the heavy dependence of Ghanaian economy on 
imports.   
 
 129 
The only exception was ADB as it exhibited negative order flow throughout the period.  
For several years ADB was the main agent for Western Union Money transfer in Ghana.  
The beneficiaries received the cedi-equivalent of the remittances.  This was equivalent to 
them selling dollars and buying cedis, hence the negative order flow.  Another 
significant development was the cancellation of Ghana’s debt by the Paris club of donors 
in 2001 as a result of adopting the highly indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative.  Non 
payment of debt coupled with the revival of cocoa and gold prices increased the foreign 
exchange reserves of Ghana.    
 
4.5.3 Central Bank Flow data 
In the discharge of its activities, BOG has created a permanent window to buy and sell 
Foreign Exchange (FX).  It thus, sells FX for the following purposes; 
(a) To commercial banks to enable them cover oil import bills and sometimes for 
BOP   support (i.e. non-oil FX sales). 
(b)  To the Government to cover debt repayments, important imports, and other 
required service payments.  
 
Despite the fact that the market operates independent of the BOG, it is incumbent on the 
Bank to keep foreign exchange reserves accounts for all commercial banks as a statutory 
requirement.  Consequently, all multi-donor, bilateral and agency donor inflows are 
channelled through the Bank. In addition, about ninety-eight percent (98%) of export 
proceeds from cocoa plus 20% to 40% portion of Gold export proceeds are also 
channelled through the BOG.  
 
The amount of FX the BOG sells to the market to cover oil payments or to provide ‘BOP 
support’ is not pre-announced. Moreover, the BOG sells FX at rates derived from the 
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interbank market.  Most bank treasurers argue that on average the rates at which BOG 
sold FX to banks were below market rates.  They are of the view that the intention of 
BOG is to slow down the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate.   
 
On the contrary, BOG states that it does not buy FX from or sell to the market for the 
purpose of intervening but as a result of regulatory requirement (e.g. surrender amounts), 
or payment for oil to the country or for ‘BOP support’. Accordingly, the BOG’s support 
to the market to cover oil import bills and BOP is always accounted for in its annual cash 
flow programme.   Implicitly, the BOG’s entry into the market is not to smoothen out the 
market in terms of volatility but to cover a programmed need or payment.   
Clearly, as shown in Figure 4.8, the negative order flow exhibited by BOG could be due 
to the frequent provision of FX to be supplied to banks.  This data is categorized as ‘non-
oil FX sales to banks’ in the records of the Central Bank. 
 
On a normal day, banks usually approach the central bank and submit FX buy orders 
(resulting from customer orders). The BOG supplies the required FX to the needy banks 
as and when the requests are made.  By so doing, BOG appears to be rationing its FX 
supplies to the needy commercial banks.   
 
The records show that for each order submitted by a bank, BOG supplies only about 40-
50% of the required volume.  During crisis times, BOG is able to meet only about 10% 
of the required volume.  However, data on volumes sold are not made available to the 
market, they are highly confidential. Banks only have an idea of their own volumes.  
BOG provides aggregate volume information (e.g. quarterly data, yearly etc) with a 
significant lag at monthly frequencies.  We were, however, able to assemble the weekly 
data through special arrangements at BOG. In light of the fact that the remittance bank 
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and BOG are both net-sellers of dollars, we combine their flows into one group (BOG) 
in subsequent analysis. 
 
All the macroeconomic dataset used for the study (i.e. GDP, M2 money, consumer 
prices, exports/imports, gross reserves, interest rates) were obtained from various 
publications of BOG.  
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 The graph (Fig 4.8) illustrates the dominant role of BOG in the FX market and raises the issue of the impact of its actions on exchange rate 
movements.  Customer order flow is almost a mirror image of the BOG flow.  As already mentioned, the BOG pursues a one-sided policy of selling 
FX to banks that make requests.  It could therefore be inferred that the banks merely act as ‘middlemen’ between BOG and the bank customers. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ORDER FLOW AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS IN GHANA 
5.1 Introduction 
Exchange rate may be regarded as an open economy’s most important price. It has a direct 
effect on most macroeconomic variables such as imports, exports, wages and inflation. 
The exchange rate has a direct bearing on consumer prices, both through increases in 
import prices of final goods (the direct channel), and through the price of imported 
intermediate inputs (the indirect channel): this is known as exchange rate pass-through.  
Undoubtedly, exchange rate instability can cause havoc to both the real economy and the 
inflation rate. Thus, there can be no macroeconomic stability (of inflation and/or real 
GDP) without exchange rate stability. 
In the light of the importance of the exchange rate for the macro economy, it is noticeable 
that traditional macroeconomic models fail to explain exchange rate behaviour in the short 
run. In other words, most macroeconomic approaches to exchange rates, e.g. Meese and 
Rogoff (1983) suggest empirical failures. 
Existing literature seem to suggest that after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and 
the move to generalized floating among the major currencies, it became clear that large 
movements in exchange rates were occurring far more frequently than many flexible rate 
advocates had expected.  Indeed the rates fluctuated widely in unanticipated directions and 
magnitudes. These swings affected interest rate movements as the monetary authorities 
tried to influence exchange rates through movements in interest rates.  
Consequently, the microstructure approach to exchange rate determination has attempted 
to understand the systems inducing these large deviations from macroeconomic 
fundamentals which have characterised exchange rate movements.  The microstructure 
approach has tried to tackle these empirical failures by looking at issues “such as 
transmission of information between market participants, the behaviour of market agents, 
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the relationship between information flows, the importance of order flow, the 
heterogeneity of agents’ expectations and the implications of such heterogeneity for 
trading volume and exchange rate volatility” Sarno and Taylor (2002).  Earlier works on 
FX microstructure have used surveys of FX market participants to support strong 
heterogeneity of expectations and an increasing diffusion of expectations. 
Indeed, it is argued that exchange rates are determined by market participants’ 
expectations of future exchange rates.  Furthermore, these expectations are based on 
information available at any point in time. In other words, if for example, a significant 
amount of people expect the British pound to appreciate, due to the information they have, 
demand for the British pound will rise, resulting in a corresponding increase in the price of 
the British pound.  Market participants are also influenced by risk.  When an asset is 
viewed as risky, one might be willing to pay less for holding it.  With the persistent 
volatility of these factors, firms that are exposed to the impact of exchange rate could be 
largely affected by these unanticipated movements and could cause very large gains or 
losses if the risks remain unmanaged. Nevertheless, the difficulty in explaining changes in 
exchange rates arises because neither expectations, nor information (which forms the basis 
of expectations), nor market participants’ assessment of risk can be observed.  More so all 
these factors vary over time. 
One of the most important explanatory variables in FX microstructure is order flow.  In the 
landmark paper of Evans and Lyons (2002a), “order flow is defined as the net of buyer-
initiated and seller-initiated orders: it is measure of net buying pressure”.  Even though 
order flow has high explanatory power in explaining, it does not imply that it is the 
underlying cause.  Macroeconomic fundamentals could still be the underlying causes but 
the manner in which they have been measured could be inaccurate, making the order flow 
proxy a better candidate for estimation (Sarno and Taylor 2002).  Hence order flow is a 
proximate cause.  Order flow is considered to be informative when it conveys private 
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information about future fundamentals and less informative when it results from liquidity 
shocks. 
All African financial markets are relatively under-researched but often that is because the 
data is unavailable for long periods.  Applying the exchange rate models to African rates is 
not very appealing.  Two ways ahead would be to either use very sophisticated 
econometrics (which also runs the risk of still not working because the data is poor) or 
trying the only successful thing we have at the moment - customer order flows.   
This study tries to explain the behaviour of the exchange rate in an emerging market, 
namely Ghana, based on the recent microstructure framework of foreign exchange 
markets. This is one of the very few studies to apply such a framework to an emerging 
market. To the best of our knowledge, with the exception of Brazil and Hungary6, no 
known studies have been done in emerging markets.  One key premise of the 
microstructure approach is the explanatory role of the order flow in the behaviour of the 
exchange rate.  The study uses a unique database, which covers 80% of the customer order 
flow of the Ghanaian FX market.7 This is in contrast to previous studies, such as Evans 
and Lyons (2002a), Mende and Menkhoff (2003) and Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) that use 
data for a single market-maker and often for a short period of time.  In addition, the longer 
time span also allows for a more precise estimation of the impact of daily order flow on 
weekly exchange rate movements.  Furthermore, the study takes into account a unique 
feature of the majority of emerging markets, namely the existence of a parallel market for 
FX.  Thus, we consider the interaction of the parallel market and order flow, and parallel 
market and official market, in addition to the interaction between the official rate and order 
flow.  Thus, the parallel market could an additional channel for disseminating public 
and/or private information.   
                                                 
6
 Wu (2007) for Brazil and Aron Gereben, Gyorgy Gyomai and Norbert Kiss M (2006) for Hungary 
7
 The data were provided through contacts at the Central Bank of Ghana 
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The paper makes two main contributions to the literature.  First, it modifies the model to 
take account of a unique feature of the majority of emerging markets, namely the existence 
of a parallel market for FX.  Secondly, it uses a unique database covering almost the 
complete Ghanaian market, and for a long time span compared to previous studies, which 
use data for a single market-maker and for a short period of time.  The study confirms the 
contemporaneous relationship (between flows and exchange rates) suggested by previous 
literature (Evans and Lyons (2002a) but it also finds a lagged interaction between order 
flow and exchange rates, which could be due to the delays in the price transmission, which 
are associated with inefficiencies.  Order flow impacts on exchange rates through the 
official market, while its impact on the parallel market is only temporary.  Additionally, 
the study confirms the connection between the price impact of the order flow and the 
degree of liquidity in the FX market. 
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5.2 Econometric Analysis 
We start our analysis with the static framework proposed by Evans and Lyons (2002a).  
Nevertheless it is unlikely that this static model will be successful at capturing the 
dynamics of a largely inefficient, under-developed and illiquid FX market.  As we will 
discuss in the next section, this specification has problems.  Specifically it assumes a static 
framework and ignores the relationship between official and parallel markets.  However, 
we do this to be consistent with previous literature (like Evans & Lyons 2002a) and as a 
starting point in the analysis.  Our dynamic model takes into account these inefficiencies 
by including lags of exchanges rates, order flow and interest differential.  Furthermore we 
use an enriched version of the Love and Payne (2008) VAR framework to decompose 
order flow into its expected and unexpected components and find out which of these 
components account for movements in the exchange rates.  In light of the long-run 
relationship between official and parallel rates, we include a lagged parallel market 
premium variable. Finally we investigate whether the effects of flows on exchange rates 
are temporary or permanent. Accordingly we test for the significance of the aggregated 
effect of flows by conducting Wald coefficient restrictions tests. 
 
5.2.1 Generic Model 
In this section we use basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to examine the relationship 
between customer order flow and exchange rates.  In Ghana, we observe two exchange 
rates, official and parallel market rates, and so we will separately examine the relationship 
between order flow and these two exchange rates.  In Ghana, the parallel market rate is 
usually regarded as the ‘true’exchange rate in the economy.   For our regression analysis 
we estimate using the Evans & Lyons (2002a) generic order flow model.  This static model 
can be represented by an equation of the form: 
              tttt rXS εγβα +∆+∆+=∆ 0                                             (5.1)                             
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Where tS∆  is the daily change in the log exchange rate (Ghanaian cedi/US dollar) and tX  
is the total customer order flow from the top five Ghanaian commercial banks.  tr∆  
represents the change in the nominal interest rate differential, )( ∗−∆ ii where i is the daily 
nominal Ghanaian three-month treasury bill (t-bill) rate and ∗i  is the daily nominal US 
three-month t-bill rate.  Customer Order flow is measured in million US dollars.  When β , 
the coefficient of order flow, is positive (correctly signed) and significant we say that the 
purchase of dollars by customers results in a depreciation of the cedi/dollar exchange rate. 
This refers to the null hypothesis of the order flow concept.  
 
Hypothesis: The null hypothesis states that information from order flow causes exchange 
rate changes.   
 
An increase in the exchange rate corresponds to depreciation and vice versa.  To correct 
for serially correlated and heterscedastic errors, we need to use appropriately modified 
standard error estimates.  We apply the Newey-West procedure which results in standard 
errors that are consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
 
Table 5.1 generic model 1: Regressing weekly change in log exchange rates (both official & 
parallel market) on total order flow and change in interest differential over the whole sample 
period: spanning 3rd January 2000 to 29th December 2007: tttt rXS εγβα +∆+∆+=∆ 0  
 Official Exchange rate Parallel market rate 
tx∆  -1.548 (-3.085) -1.727 (-3.354) 
tr∆  0.249 (1.576) 0.308 (1.244) 
   
2R  0.076 0.061 
 Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.00 0.000 
heteroscedaticity 0.001 0.000 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow by multiplying by 100. 
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Table 5.1, above, reports the estimates of the generic model.  This model is estimated 
using basic OLS. The dependent variable is the daily log change in cedi/dollar exchange 
rate.  The t-statistics are in parentheses.  The regressor tX∆  is the daily net customer order 
flow.  The regressor )( r∆ represents the change in the interest rate differential.  The 
sample spans eight years (January 2000 to December 2007).   
Customer order flows are significant in this generic static model.  In other words, customer 
order flows are able to explain contemporaneous movements in the exchange rate.  
Nevertheless, order flow variables are negatively signed, contrary to what is expected. 
Thus over the whole period, customer trades may not convey any incremental information 
relevant to exchange rates.  These negative results could emanate from the heterogeneity 
of our data sample and/or the static nature of our model.  As already discussed we tackle 
heterogeneity by dividing the sample into sub samples.  The first sub sample represents the 
crisis period spanning January 2000 to December 2000 when the exchange rate 
depreciated by almost 50%.  The second sub sample corresponds to the relatively stable 
period spanning March 2002 (when central bank resumed intervention) to December 2007.  
We believe that these different sub samples may have an effect on the relationship between 
order flow and exchange rates.  The generic model is estimated for the different sub 
samples. 
Table 5.2 generic model 2: Regressing weekly change in log exchange rates (both official & 
parallel market) on total order flow and change in interest differential over the crisis period 
spanning 3rd January 2000 to 29th December 2000: tttt rXS εγβα +∆+∆+=∆ 0  
 Official Exchange rate Parallel market rate 
tx∆  1.259 (2.456) 0.494 (0.741) 
tr∆  0.538 (4.325) 0.900 (3.000) 
   
2R  0.146 0.138 
 Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.010 0.149 
heteroscedaticity 0.902 0.789 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficient by multiplying by  10. 
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For the crisis period (table 5.2), the order flow variable is positively signed and significant 
in explaining movements in the official exchange rate.  This means that a net purchase of 
dollars by customers is associated with a depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi.  The interest 
differential is also positively signed and significant as expected.  When the dependent 
variable is the change in the parallel market rate, order flow is not significant.  In other 
words, flows have no explanatory power in the parallel market during the crisis period. 
The interest differential is however highly significant and correctly signed. 
 
Table 5.3 generic model 2: Regressing weekly change in log exchange rates (both official & 
parallel market) on total order flow and change in interest differential over the stable period 
spanning March 2002 to 29th December 2007 : tttt rXS εγβα +∆+∆+=∆ 0  
 Official Exchange rate Parallel market rate 
tx∆  -3.965 (-2.364) -3.471 (-1.506) 
tr∆  -0.004 (-2.364) 0.001 (0.013) 
   
2R  0.003 -0.001 
 Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.062 0.000 
heteroscedaticity 0.298 0.162 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficient by multiplying by 310 . 
 
During the stable period (table 5.3), both order flow are highly significant but negatively 
signed with the official exchange rate as the dependent variable.  In the parallel market rate 
order flow is only significant at 10% significance level and negatively signed.  The interest 
differential is insignificant.     
 
5.2.2 Dynamic Model 
This static model allows for only a contemporaneous relationship between customer order 
flows and exchange rates where changes in the net flows cause an instant change to the 
exchange rate.  In general, the change in an explanatory variable will not immediately have 
an effect on the dependent variable during that same period but rather with a lag over 
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several time periods.  However as we witnessed earlier, the autocorrelation present in the 
exchange rates is an indication of inefficiencies in the Ghanaian FX market (tables 4.6-
4.9).  For that reason a static model may not be able to fully capture the dynamics of the 
Ghanaian foreign exchange (FX) market    When customer trades are executed, there may 
be some delays (due to various reasons) in the time it takes for the information conveyed 
by trades to be embedded in exchange rate.  The dynamic model includes lagged values of 
both the explanatory and dependent variables which would allow us to capture the 
dynamic structure in the exchange rates. By including lags, we are taking into account the 
fact that changes in order flow  and interest rate differential will not affect the exchange 
rate immediately but rather with a lag over several time periods. The transformation of a 
static model into a dynamic model may help in reducing or even removing the serial 
correlation present in the residuals.  Initially we ignore parallel market rates and 
premiums, which are later included in the decomposition of flows into expected and 
unexpected components. 
 
The dynamic model is represented by the equation of the form:  
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4
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4
1
4
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0                                           (5.2) 
 
We choose a maximum lag length of 4 which is the equivalent of 4 trading weeks.  This 
takes into account the inefficiencies in the FX market which could result in lagged 
interactions between the variables.  Akaike Information criterion (AIC) is used to 
determine the appropriate lag length for the variables in this dynamic equation.   
We use the general to specific modelling approach.  We start with a model containing 4 
lags of changes in exchange rate and total order flow.  
  142 
Table 5.4 Dynamic model 1: Regressing weekly change in log official exchange rates on its own 
lags and lags of total order flow and change in interest differential over the crisis period spanning 
3rd January 2000 to 29th December 2000: 
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 Official Exchange 
rate 
tx∆  1.585 (4.046) 
2−∆ ts  -0411 (-3.020) 
tr∆  0.289 (3.078) 
1−∆ tr  0.371 (2.544) 
  
2R  0.399 
Diagnostics 
serial 0.026 
heteroscedasticity 0.384 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficient by multiplying by  10. 
 
During the crisis period (table 5.4), changes in the official exchange rate depend on current 
order flow, lagged changes in interest differential and exchange rates.  The order flow 
variable is correctly signed and is the most significant variable in the regression. In other 
words, a net purchase of dollars will result/associated with depreciation in the official 
exchange rate.  A purchase of $1m will result in 0.15% depreciation in the exchange rate. 
Interest differential are also correctly signed and significant.  The R-squared is relatively 
high at 0.399.   
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Table 5.5 Dynamic model 2: Regressing weekly change in log official exchange rates on its own 
lags and lags of total order flow and change in interest differential over the stable period spanning 
1st March 2002 to 29th December 2007: 
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T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by  310 . 
 
During the stable period table (5.5), changes in the official exchange rate depend on lagged 
total order flow.  Changes in the official exchange rate also depend on their past values.  
This could be evidence that FX traders following negative feedback trading rules.  
Subsequent tests will confirm whether or not there is negative feedback trading.  
Specifically, negatively signed and highly significant lagged exchange rate variables in the 
order flow VAR would confirm the presence of negative feedback trading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Official Exchange 
rate 
2−∆ tx  -2.310 (-2.169) 
1−∆ ts  -0.205 (-1.705) 
2−∆ ts  0.122 (2.329) 
3−∆ ts  0.462 (6.014) 
4−∆ ts  0.153 (1.755) 
1−∆ tr  0.040 (2.193) 
3−∆ tr  -0.027 (-1.621) 
  
2R  0.266 
Diagnostics 
serial 0.316 
heteroscedasticity 0.000 
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5.2.3 Expected and Unexpected Order flows 
We need to find out whether the explanatory power of order flow comes from its expected, 
unexpected component or both.  In the Evans and Lyons (2002a) model, all order flow is 
unexpected because it is assumed that the expected component should already be priced 
into the exchange rate. Evans and Lyons find that order flow’s explanatory power comes 
from the unexpected component.  However, it is possible that explanatory power comes 
from both the expected and unexpected components. In this case, whilst unexpected order 
flow measures price discovery in the FX market, expected flow would be an indication of 
inefficiencies in the FX market.  When order flow is unexpected, it should carry more 
informational content.  By employing an ‘enriched’ version of the Love and Payne (2008) 
VAR framework, we decompose order flow into expected and unexpected components and 
determine which component accounts for movements in the official and parallel exchange 
rates.  We say ‘enriched’ in the sense that, though we drop the news variable, we include 
lagged changes in the parallel market rate, lagged changes in the interest differential and 
lagged parallel market premium.    
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Where tS∆ is the log change in official exchange rate, tX∆ is the net order flow, tB∆ is the 
log change in the parallel market rate, tr∆ is the change in the interest differential and 1tP−∆  
is the lagged parallel market premium.  
The VAR equations are estimated individually using basic OLS.  We decompose 
contemporaneous order flow into its expected and unexpected components by running an 
order flow regression.  We store the fitted values as expected flows and the residuals as 
unexpected (shock) flows.  We then substitute the flow variables in the exchange rate 
equation and run the regression.  This is done for both the official and parallel market 
exchange rates.  Specifically one equation has changes in the official exchange rate as the 
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dependent variable whilst the other has changes in the parallel market rate as the 
dependent variable.   
We adopt the general to specific modelling approach.  Specifically we start with an 
extremely general model, which is over-parameterised, then we reduce it to the most 
parsimonious model by testing various coefficient restrictions.  As previously explained 
we start with a maximum lag length of 4. AIC is used to determine the appropriate lag 
length for the variables in this dynamic equation.   
 
Table 5.6:  Order Flow VAR for crisis period.  Order flow is regressed on its own lags, lagged 
exchange rate changes, lagged parallel exchange rate changes and lagged interest differential: 
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T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients 
1−∆ tx  -3.885 (-3.180) 
2−∆ tx  -2.801 (-3.233) 
1−∆ ts  -0.593 (-2.011) 
2−∆ tB  0.681 (2.207) 
3−∆ tB  -0.159 (2.262) 
1−∆ tr  -0.860 (-3.451) 
4−∆ tr  -0.477 (-3.478) 
  
2R  0.376 
Diagnostics 
serial 0.861 
heteroscedasticity 0.024 
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Table 5.7: Expected and unexpected order flows for crisis period.  Changes in the official 
exchange rate are regressed on its own lags, current and lagged expected and unexpected order 
flows, lagged parallel exchange rate changes, lagged interest differential: 
ttit
i
iit
i
i
i
it
i
itit
i
it PrBsUFEFs µσδγτβα +∆+∆++∆+∆+∆+=∆ −−
=
−
==
−
=
−
=
 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0
4
0
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 10. 
 
Current and lagged flows (expected and unexpected) contribute to movements in the 
official exchange rate (table 5.7).  Specifically, the aggregate impact of unexpected flows 
is larger and positive, as expected.  This means that an increase in the unexpected flow (net 
purchase of dollars) results in a depreciation of the domestic currency.  Additionally 
lagged changes in interest differential, official rate and parallel market rate are also 
significant in explaining official exchange rate returns.  The flow variables are relatively 
more significant in comparison to the other variables. The lagged parallel market premium, 
however, is not significant.  The R-squared is relatively high at 0.542.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients 
tEF∆  2.854 (4.121) 
3−∆ tEF  -1.748 (-3.641) 
tUF∆  2.367 (4.059) 
2−∆ tUF  1.379 (1.836) 
1−∆ tr  0.838 (4.424) 
3−∆ tr  -0.469 (-4.001) 
1−∆ ts  0.202 (2.693) 
2−∆ ts  0.363 (3.252) 
2−∆ tB  -0.201 (-2.587) 
3−∆ tB  0.354 (4.319) 
  
2R  0.542 
Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.227 
heteroscedasticity 0.997 
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Table 5.8: Expected and unexpected order flows for crisis period.  Changes in the Parallel market 
exchange rate are regressed on its own lags, current and lagged expected and unexpected order 
flows, lagged official exchange rate changes, lagged interest differential and lagged change in 
parallel market premium. 
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T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 10. 
 
Lagged flows (expected and unexpected) are significant in explaining movements in 
parallel market rate (table 5.8).  Their overall signs are positive but expected flows have a 
larger aggregate impact than unexpected flows. Though lagged changes in official and 
parallel rates are significant, we also observe that the lagged parallel market premium is 
highly significant.  The adjusted R-squared is 0.303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients 
2−∆ tEF  1.793 (2.149) 
3−∆ tEF  2.537(1.849) 
2−∆ tUF  1.779 (1.958) 
1−∆ ts  0.331 (2.535) 
1−∆ tB  0.426 (3.305) 
1−∆ tP  -0.300 (-3.282) 
  
2R  0.303 
Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.979 
heteroscedasticity 0.059 
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Table 5.9: Order Flow VAR for stable period.  Order flow is regressed on its own lags, lagged 
exchange rate changes, lagged parallel exchange rate changes, lagged interest differential  
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T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 100. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients 
1−∆ tx  1.361 (2.243) 
2−∆ tx  1.824 (2.878) 
3−∆ tx  1.521 (2.605) 
4−∆ tx  1.706 (2.627) 
1−∆ ts  -0.501 (-1.942) 
2−∆ ts  -0.396 (-2.086) 
  
2R  0.296 
Diagnostics 
serial 0.102 
heteroscedasticity 0.074 
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Table 5.10: Expected and unexpected order flows for stable period.  Changes in the official 
exchange rate are regressed on its own lags, current and lagged expected and unexpected order 
flows, lagged parallel exchange rate changes, lagged interest differential  
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T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 100. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients 
tEF∆  -10.650 (-9.289) 
1−∆ tEF  5.134 (5.985) 
2−∆ tEF  4.914 (5.418) 
3−∆ tEF  -1.411 (-2.874) 
1−∆ tUF  1.480 (7.150) 
2−∆ tUF  1.458 (7.938) 
3−∆ tUF  0.358 (2.264) 
1−∆ ts  -0.369 (-4.755) 
2−∆ ts  0.397 (9.188) 
3−∆ ts  0.266 (4.201) 
2−∆ tB  -0.048 (2.924) 
2−∆ tr  0.036 (3.034) 
3−∆ tr  -0.033 (-3.121) 
  
2R  0.697 
Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.000 
heteroscedasticity 0.000 
  150 
Table 5.11: Expected and unexpected order flows for stable period.  Changes in the parallel 
market exchange rate are regressed on its own lags, current and lagged expected and unexpected 
order flows, lagged official exchange rate changes and lagged interest differential  
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T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.  All equations are estimated using basic OLS.  
We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 100. 
 
In general, both expected and unexpected components (current and/or lagged) of order 
flow are significant in explaining movements in the exchange rates (tables 5.10 & 5.11).  
Specifically, during the crisis period, expected and unexpected flows have an 
instantaneous and lagged effect on the official exchange rate.  However they both have 
only lagged effects on the parallel market exchange rate.   
 
During the stable period, expected and unexpected flows again have only lagged effects on 
official and parallel market rates.  Additionally we observe positive momentum trading in 
customer flows.  This is evident in the consistent positive sign of order flow coefficients in 
the order flow VAR (table 5.9).  Perhaps, one of the most important observations is the 
significance and negative sign of the lagged parallel market premium variable in the 
parallel market equation (table 5.11).  This negative correlation means that an increase in 
 Coefficients 
2−∆ tEF  1.828 (1.700) 
3−∆ tEF  -2.513 (-2.361) 
1−∆ tUF  0.453 (2.006) 
3−∆ tUF  -0.591 (-2.119) 
1−∆ tB  0.471 (6.142) 
2−∆ tB  -0.099 (-1.709) 
1−∆ tP  -0.059 (-3.119) 
  
2R  0.246 
Diagnostics 
Serial  
correlation 0.386 
heteroscedasticity 0.029 
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the parallel market premium results in the appreciation of the parallel market rate.  Thus, 
contrary to the norm, it is rather the parallel market rate that adjusts to the official rate. 
 
Table 5.12: Aggregate impact of Flows 
Crisis Period Stable Period  
Official  Parallel  Official  Parallel  
UF 0.5940 0.6316 0.0327 0.0071  
General EF 1.0185 1.9673 -0.0201 -0.0130 
UF 0.3748 0.1780 0.0330 -0.0014 
Specific 
EF 0.1105 0.4330 -0.0202 -0.0070 
In order to calculate the overall impact, we just add up the coefficients of the lags.  
 
We calculate the overall impact of flows by adding up the coefficients of the lags in the 
specific model.  For example, an unexpected net customer purchase of $1m over the 
previous four weeks during the crisis period will result in 0.37% depreciation of today’s 
exchange rate (table 5.12). 
In the official market, unexpected order flow has a larger impact on exchange rates relative 
to expected order flow and is correctly (positively) signed for both crisis and stable 
periods.  Results for the parallel market are mixed. Unexpected order flow has a relatively 
smaller impact for both periods but is negatively signed during the stable period (table 
5.12).   
 
We also observe that the coefficients during the crisis are generally much larger in 
magnitude compared to those in the stable period.  In other words the dollar impact of 
flows on exchange rates is much larger in the crisis period.  This is consistent with 
findings by Marsh and O’Rourke (2005).  They find that there is a connection between the 
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magnitude of coefficients and the liquidity of the FX market.  Specifically in very liquid 
markets (like the euro-dollar and dollar yen) coefficients are relatively small in comparison 
to the larger coefficients in the smaller, less liquid markets (like the euro-yen and pound-
yen).  Similarly in our case the magnitude of the coefficients are much larger during the 
crisis period when the cedi-dollar market is almost illiquid compared to the coefficients in 
the stable period when the market is relatively liquid.  In other words, the magnitude of the 
impact of order flows on exchange rates depends on the level of liquidity in the Ghanaian 
FX market. 
 
In most cases other variables like the lagged changes in exchanges rates (official & 
parallel) are very significant.  As discussed previously, this is consistent with the 
inefficiencies and under-development in the Ghanaian FX market.  As a result agents’ 
speculation about future exchange rate movements is based on immediate past values of 
the exchange rate itself.  Subsequently an initial depreciation induces a series of buying 
which causes a further depreciation of the domestic currency.   
 
5.2.4 Temporary or Permanent effects of Flow? 
It is critical to order flow literature to ascertain whether impacts are temporary or 
permanent.  If the effects of unexpected flows are permanent then that means information 
is being conveyed by flows.  On the other hand the temporary effect of unexpected flows 
could be as a result of a variety of liquidity effects.  To find out whether effects of flows 
are temporary or permanent, we need to test for the significance of aggregated effect.  
Subsequently, we conduct a Wald coefficient restriction test on the flow variables.   
This consists of an F-test with a null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero e.g. 
C (1) +C (2)…. +C (N) =0.  In other words the null hypothesis states that the aggregate 
effect of flows is temporary.   
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A rejection of the null in favour of the alternative could mean that the aggregate effects of 
flows are permanent and vice versa.   The Wald tests were conducted on both general and 
specific models.  We share the same view with econometricians that a general model 
which is over-parameterised may result in a situation where a group of variables may be 
proxying the same thing.  Results may be biased because this situation could lead to a 
restriction not being rejected when it should have been rejected.  In light of this, we focus 
on the results from the specific model. 
 
Table 5.13: P-values from Wald coefficient restriction test for specific and general models 
P-values are in parenthesis 
Unexpected order flow has a permanent effect on both periods only in the official market 
(table 5.13).  This could be interpreted to mean that unexpected order flow conveys 
incremental information which causes changes in the exchange rate. 
 
5.3 Interpretation of Results 
During the crisis period, unexpected order flow has a larger permanent effect on official 
and is positively (correctly) signed.  Though unexpected order flow is positively signed in 
the parallel market, its aggregate effect is only temporary (tables 5.12 & 5.13).  According 
to literature this is what we should expect.  During this turbulent period, falling cocoa and 
gold prices coupled with rising oil prices and donor inflows being withheld led to 
    CRISIS STABLE 
    Official Parallel Official Parallel 
UF 0.594 (0.004) 0.632 (0.018) 0.033 (0.000) 0.007 [0.376] 
General 
  
  
EF 1.019 (0.069) 1.967 (0.082) -0.020 (0.000) -0.001 [0.045] 
UF 0.375 (0.000) 
 
0.178 (0.057) 
 
0.033 (0.000) -0.001 [0.662] 
Specific 
  
  
EF 0.111 (0.073) 0.433 (0.049) -0.020 (0.000) -0.007 [0.095] 
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expectations of poor future fundamentals.  This induced an excess demand for FX and 
economic agents, who were in a state of panic, were willing to pay high premiums for 
already scarce commodity.  This continuous bidding-up of FX at high premiums led to a 
spiralling of the exchange rate.  This contributed to the 50% depreciation.   
 
During the stable period, both expected and unexpected flows, have a permanent impact 
on the official exchange rate (tables 5.12 & 5.13).  Again, unexpected order flow has a 
relatively larger impact and is positively signed.  Nevertheless the price-impact of 
unexpected order flow is much lower during the stable period.  As previously discussed, 
this could be related to the level of liquidity during both periods.  Interestingly, even 
though expected order flow has a smaller impact, its effect is permanent and is negatively 
signed. During this relatively calm period, a significant portion of the FX transactions are 
carried out by firms (mostly multinationals) who follow negative feedback trading rules.  
In other words, firms buy the currency that has just depreciated.   
 
According to existing literature firms usually take advantage of these short-term exchange 
rate movements to exchange money for non-speculative reasons like repatriation of funds 
and import of raw materials.  The presence of negative feedback trading is confirmed by 
the highly significant and negatively signed lagged exchange rate variables in the order 
flow VAR (table 5.9).    Thus negative feedback trading of firms is over-shadowed by the 
price discovery/information aggregation process.  On the parallel market, expected and 
unexpected order flow have only temporary effects and are both negatively signed (table 
5.13).  The absence of price discovery reflects the nature of transactions on the parallel 
market. The official FX market is relatively stable and it costs relatively cheaper (and 
more convenient) for customers (individuals and institutions) to obtain FX from the banks.  
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As a result, a majority of the flows are seen by commercial banks. By observing the 
coefficients we see that the price-impact is relatively small in comparison to the other 
flows.  This is because there are many small players on the parallel market who observe 
significantly lesser flows in comparison to the banks.  These results further confirm 
previous findings that it is rather the parallel market rate that adjusts to the official spot 
rate. 
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  5.4 Modelling the long-run relationship between exchange rate and order flows 
Previous tests we conducted have been aimed at capturing the short-term dynamics in the 
Ghanaian FX market. Next, we attempt to investigate the long-run relationship between 
the levels of exchange rate and the cumulative customer order flow.  Since the parallel 
market rate is rather adjusting to the official rate, we have resolved to include only the 
level of the official rate in our subsequent cointegration analysis. 
 
Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (table 5.14), we confirm that the two series 
are non-stationary.  According to the Johansen procedure, the null is rejected at 5 percent 
level which further suggests that there is only one cointegrating vector (table 5.15)  We 
determine the lag length of 4 for the VAR using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  We 
estimate the vector error-correction model.  The coefficients of the cointegrating 
relationship are significant and correctly signed (table 5.16).  Results from the short-run 
dynamics are reinforced as the cumulative customer order flow is positively correlated 
with the levels of official exchange rate. In order to have an idea of which variables 
provide adjustment to equilibrium, we examine the error correction coefficients, 
coefficients of lagged changes in official rate and customer order flow.   
 
The error correction term is highly significant in both the order flow and exchange rate 
equations (table 5.17).  This means that tests for weak exogeneity have been strongly 
rejected for both variables.  The load of adjustment to long- run equilibrium falls solely on 
the official exchange rate.  The negative (wrong) sign of the error correction in the flows 
equation indicates that flows do not adjust to cause equilibrium but rather move in the 
opposite direction.  However the relatively higher speed of adjustment of flows means that 
eventually flows should ‘catch up’ with the official exchange rate in order for the whole 
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system to attain the equilibrium.  Clearly these cointegration results could be described as 
weak because the adjustment process is ambiguous. 
 
Table 5.14: Unit Root test on level of Official rate and cumulative order flow 
Unit root test Levels of official rate Cumulative order flow 
P-value 0.722 1.000 
t-statistic -1.085 4.439 
   
 
 
 
Table 5.15: Cointegration relationship between exchange rates and cumulative order flows 
 Max. Eigenvalue 
statistic 
Trace test statistic 
 46.758 
(15.892)* 
54.473 
(20.262)* 
* 5% critical value of unrestricted cointegration rank test.  Both denote significance 
 
 
Table 5.16: Cointegration equation 
 
Cointegrating Eq CointEq1 
1tP−  
 
1tX −  
1.000 
 
-0.001 
[-5.725] 
                      t-statistics in brackets 
 
Table 5.17: Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 
D variable tP∆  tX∆  
ECM Coefficient -0.001(-4.437) -5.305 (-6.946) 
1−∆ tP  -2.318 (-4.437) -758.634 (-3.183) 
2−∆ tP  0.042 (0.693) -790.349 (-3.225) 
3−∆ tP  0.384 (6.411) -444.026 (-1.817) 
1−∆ tX  -0.000 (0.967) 0.059 (0.948) 
2−∆ tX  -0.000 (-2.041) 0.108 (1.741) 
3−∆ tX  -0.000 (-2.032) 0.075 (1.209) 
2R  0.219 0.273 
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5.5 Robustness Checks 
We conducted additional exercises to check the robustness of our results. We check 
whether the inclusion of ADB flows, mainly consisting of remittance flows, to total order 
flow has biased our results.  Consequently we excluded the remittance flows so that total 
order flow consisted of only flows from the other 4 banks and then repeated all our 
regressions.  Generally there were no major changes in the significance and signs of the 
coefficients. 
 
Cointegration results are very sensitive to the choice of lag length.  Choosing one lag 
above or below (for example 3 or 5) the optimal lag length of 4, results in no cointegration 
whatsoever. 
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5.6  Discussion and Conclusion 
In Ghana, customer order flow greatly influences exchange rates, reinforcing the 
importance of order flow stated in previous literature.  In considering an emerging market 
like Ghana, we need to consider some distinct features of the economy.  The economic 
fundamentals governing the Ghanaian cedi are mainly dependent on external factors, 
mainly world commodity prices and foreign capital flows.  For several years the Ghanaian 
cedi has remained vulnerable. Therefore it could be argued that the trades of customers of 
the top foreign banks, who control about 80% of the FX market, may convey more 
superior private information about future fundamentals than their local counterparts.  
Additionally we can not ignore the existence of a parallel market for foreign exchange.   
We test our data using the Evans and Lyons (2002a) model.  Before estimation we 
aggregate the data at a weekly frequency to reduce the noise that we experience at a daily 
frequency.  Initially, we find that there is a contemporaneous relationship between order 
flow and exchange rates (both official and parallel market), but the order flow coefficient 
is negatively (wrongly) signed.  This could be as a result of the heterogeneity in the data 
sample.  The issue of the heterogeneity of the data sample is dealt with by dividing the 
sample into crisis and stable periods.  Consequently during the crisis period both order 
flow and the interest differential are significant in explaining contemporaneous movements 
in the official exchange rate.  More importantly order flow is positively (correctly) signed.  
In this case net purchases of $1m would result in an exchange rate depreciation of about 
0.16%.  Order flow is not significant in explaining the movements in the parallel market 
rate. 
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During the stable period order flow is highly significant but negatively signed.  In other 
words the net buying of the dollar leads to an appreciation of the official exchange rate.  
This could be evidence of negative feedback trading where the direction of causation runs 
from changes in the official exchange rate to net order flow. The presence of negative 
feedback is further confirmed by the negative coefficients of the lagged values of 
exchange rate in the order flow VAR.  This is consistent with Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) 
and Mende and Menkhoff (2003) who find that non-financial customer order flow is 
negatively correlated to exchange rate movements and attribute this to negative feedback 
trading rules.  Also significant portions of the customer base of the top five banks are non-
financial customers or corporations.    Again order flow is insignificant in explaining the 
parallel market rate. 
 
The Ghanaian economy is characterised with various inefficiencies, poor infrastructure 
and lack of advanced technology which create delays in the price transmission mechanism.  
We attempt to capture these delays and other inefficiencies by introducing a dynamic 
model.  For the crisis period weekly changes in the official exchange rate depend on 
current order flow and lagged changes in the exchange rate and interest differential.   
 
Overall, the order flow variables are correctly (positively) signed and significant.  R-
squared is relatively high at 40%.    For the stable period, the official exchange rates 
depend on lagged order flow exchange rates. In general, the order flow variables are 
significant and again negatively correlated with changes in the official exchange rate.  This 
reinforces the possible existence of feedback trading.   The magnitude of the effect of 
customer order flow on exchange rate is relatively high in comparison to previous 
microstructure studies.   
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The cedi/US dollar FX market is relatively small and less liquid and it is normal for the 
price impact of a trade to be larger in the less liquid market where it is more difficult to 
enter or exit a position.  Also just like in other emerging economies, the cedi is relatively 
volatile compared to currencies of other developed countries.  This makes it more risky to 
hold, and as a result a large price change is required for a risk averse agent to hold it.   
 
Furthermore, we investigate which component (expected or unexpected) of order flow is 
responsible for movements in the exchange rates. We use the Love and Payne (2008) VAR 
framework to decompose order flow and find out which components of order flow 
influence movements in exchange rates.  Though we drop the news variable, we enrich 
their model by including lagged changes in parallel market rates, lagged changes in 
interest differential and lagged parallel market premium to the right-hand side.  
Additionally we test for the significance of the aggregated effect of flows to find out if 
they have a permanent or temporary effect.   
 
Evidence of a permanent effect of unexpected flows would mean that they convey private 
information and as a result there is price discovery.  The main measure of price discovery 
is unexpected order flow whilst expected order flow represents the inefficiencies in the FX 
market.  Our results indicate that unexpected order flow has a permanent effect only in the 
official market during both periods.  This is consistent with previous literature that 
unexpected flows convey incremental private information that affects exchange rates.  In 
other words, it is the shock component of flows that matters.   
We find that unexpected order flow is highly significant and positively correlated with 
changes in the official.  The only exception is the parallel market during the stable period 
where unexpected order flow is negatively correlated with exchange rates.  In the official 
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market, unexpected order flow has a relatively larger impact on the exchange rate changes 
for both crisis and stable period.  
 
The smaller impact of unexpected order flow on the parallel rate might be due to the fact 
that there are numerous smaller players in the parallel market.  The lack of price discovery 
in the parallel market could be due to the fact that a majority of the FX transactions (by 
firms and individuals) occur in the official market.  On the other hand, transactions on the 
parallel market are significantly lower in terms of volume and value. Not surprisingly, 
most of these transactions are conducted by individuals and petty traders.  During the 3rd 
quarter of 2007, total purchases by banks were $1.1bn compared to $96m for FX bureaus 
whilst total sales by banks were $882m compared to $95m for FX bureaus. We also 
observe that the lagged parallel market premium (highly significant) is negatively 
correlated with changes in the parallel market rate.  This suggests that it is rather the 
parallel market rate that adjusts to the official rate to cause equilibrium.  For this reason, 
we drop the levels of parallel market rates in our subsequent cointegration analysis. 
 
Cointegration tests reveal that there is a long-run relationship between levels of official 
rates and cumulative order flow.  Consistent with market microstructure theory, 
cumulative order flow is positively correlated with the official exchange rate.  Adjustment 
to equilibrium is ambiguous with error correction terms being wrongly signed.  We believe 
this is connected to the omission of the central bank flow variable, which is properly dealt 
with in chapter 6. 
Generally our results give us a deeper insight into the relationship between order flow and 
the exchange rates for different regimes in emerging markets.  Specifically, there is strong 
evidence of information aggregation and price discovery for the official market during 
both regimes, similar to findings of Evans and Lyons (2002a).  
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However for the official FX market during the stable period, order flow is as a result of a 
mixture of price discovery and negative feedback trading by firms similar to findings by 
Marsh and O’Rourke (2005).  
 
Unexpected order flow is correctly signed and has a larger impact on exchange rate as 
theory suggests.  Nonetheless, expected order flow too seems to have an impact on order 
flow and this is due to inefficiencies in the FX market.  There is evidence of both price 
discovery and negative feedback trading but the former overshadows the latter.  Yet the 
negatively signed order flow in the dynamic model during the stable period indicates that 
expected order flow dominates in terms of volume.  Specifically the bank customers are 
liquidity providers.  They react to changes in the exchange rate in order maximise profits 
from their business operations. Not only do we confirm the contemporaneous relationship 
(between flows and exchange rate) suggested by previous literature (Evans and Lyons 
(2002a) but we also observe a lagged interaction between order flow and exchange rates.  
These lagged effects are due to the delays in the price transmission which are associated 
with inefficiencies.  Additionally we observe that when the market is almost illiquid during 
crisis, order flow has a relatively larger impact on exchange rates than the in the stable 
period when the market is more liquid.  This confirms findings by Marsh and O’Rourke 
(2005) who find that there is a connection between the price impact of the order flow and 
the degree liquidity in the FX market. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Long-run Liquidity Provision in the Ghanaian FX market 
6.1 Introduction 
Liquidity, as a fundamental concept in finance is largely regarded as the ability to buy or 
sell quantities of an asset quickly and at a low cost. Liquidity provision of a Central Bank 
(BOG) is very important since any runs and crises could lead to fear of future liquidity 
shocks with its associated policy implications.  In Ghana, the study of FX liquidity 
provision is justified, particularly; researchers would like to know which group of market 
participants provide long-run liquidity in the foreign exchange market.   
 
Recently there has been intense debate, amongst practitioners and academics, over the 
stability of the cedi-US dollar exchange rate. They have questioned the extent of BOG’s 
involvement in the foreign exchange market, which allows it to influence the exchange 
rate so heavily.  
According to the 2007 IMF country report, “Staff believes that beyond good 
macroeconomic policies that build confidence, the stability of the cedi with respect to the 
U.S. dollar in recent years is a result of the Bank of Ghana’s statutory involvement in the 
foreign exchange market, which allows it to manage the exchange rate 
heavily………….Consequently, the interbank foreign exchange market is shallow and 
banks often rely on the BOG for foreign exchange.  The authorities maintained that 
confidence-inducing macroeconomic policies alone were responsible for the relative 
stability of the cedi against the U.S. dollar”. 
It is widely believed that the BOG’s continuous interventions in the market render the 
inter-bank foreign exchange market shallow since commercial banks continue to rely on 
the former (BOG) for foreign exchange.  
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The Centre for Policy Analysis, an independent Ghanaian think-tank, also noted that 
“What is perceived as Excessive Central Bank manipulation as well as that by the major 
dealers are the two most important non-fundamental factors affecting the exchange rate”. 
Therefore, knowledge about the foreign exchange provisioning in the country would help 
elucidate the existing controversy. Secondly, this knowledge is important to investors and 
traders who are developing trading strategies and are therefore attempting to identify 
conditions likely to disturb their operations.   
 
We believe this paper will provide a microscopic view of the Ghanaian FX market in 
terms of liquidity provision. In fact, the study provides satisfactory answers to the 
questions about the degree of liquidity in the Ghanaian foreign exchange market and what 
causes its daily movements. The study covers a sample period long enough to subsume a 
variety of events, for only then could one be reasonably confident of the results.  
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6.2 Theoretical Approach and Econometric Analysis 
This study adopts the framework proposed by Bjønnes et al. (2005) to address the 
following important issues. 
1. Does order flow explain long-run movements in exchange rates? 
2. Which player(s) in the Ghanaian FX market supply liquidity (are pulled by market) 
and which demand liquidity (push the market around). 
3. Is BOG intervening (pushing) or providing balance of payments (BOP) support (i.e. 
being a pull customer)? 
Bjønnes et al. (2005) use an exclusive dataset from the Swedish Krona market.  This 
dataset covers 90-95% of all worldwide trading in SEK and spans six years (January 1993-
June 2002).  It consists of daily buying and selling transactions of both Swedish and 
foreign market making banks.  They acknowledge that this data is confidential and is not 
readily available to the market as a whole.  At best, reporting banks are able to obtain 
summaries of flows from the central bank at a substantial lag.  This data allows for a 
classification of market participants into 4 distinct groups namely market making banks 
(MM), Financial customers (Fin), Non-Financial customers (Non-Fin) and BOG.  A 
market maker trades with other market makers and the other 3 market participants.  It is 
from this relationship that they obtain the flows of the market making banks: 
  iiiii MMCBFINNONFINtradeMM ∆−=∆+−∆+∆+−∆ )()()(                    (6.1) 
 
Where a positive number is equivalent to a net buy of foreign currency 
With reference to and with the help of the theory of market making,   Bjønnes et al. (2005) 
highlight two main characteristics that should aid in the identification of liquidity 
providers: 
1) The net flows of a liquidity provider should be negatively correlated with the level 
of exchange rate. 
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2) Liquidity providers are usually not the active parties in FX trades.  They passively 
match others demand and supply. 
In order to examine this key relationship (between FX rate and flows), the empirical 
section starts with a test for cointegration between the FX rate and the cumulative flows of 
the Financial and non-Financial customers.  They examine the short-run dynamics at 
various frequencies.  In particular, they need to ascertain that the correlation between the 
flows of a particular group and the exchange rate are robust.  Additionally they have to 
show that this correlation with the exchange rate is matched by and has the opposite sign 
for another group.  Finally they need to establish that the flows of the group positively 
correlated with the exchange rate is the active side of the market while the flows of the 
group negatively correlated to the exchange rate is on the passive side. 
 
Bjønnes et al. (2005) use the log of the SEK/EUR measured at close of the Swedish FX 
market.  They also use the 10year bond yield differential and the 3 month interest 
differential as proxies for macroeconomic variables.  The 10year differential is supposed 
to take into account long-term macroeconomic expectations and the 3month differential 
will take into account short-term expectations. 
 
The Evans and Lyons (2002a) model presents Bjønnes et al. (2005) with a set of equations 
that can be estimated using their data.  The first three equations (6.2 to 6.4) represent the 
first three rounds of trading while the last equation (6.5) represents the relationship 
between the daily flows of the customers.  The nature of their data means that the 
equations (6.2 to 6.5) can be estimated.   
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The cointegration relations in equations 6.2 & 6.4 are similar and cannot be estimated 
together.  As a result they estimate one of the price equations with the flows equation 
(6.5).  There are two versions of the cointegrating system.  The first version involves 
estimating the price equation with the flows of financial customers and the flows equation.  
The second version is similar to the first but with financial customers being replaced with 
non-financial customers.  With the exception of the central bank variable, unit root test 
show that all variables are non-stationary.  However, they point out that omitting the 
central bank from the regression does not impact the cointegration tests.  
 The Johansen methodology is used to estimate the cointegrating equations.  Only the 
exchange rate level and customer flows are modelled in the VAR.  The other variables are 
not modelled but their differences are added to the VAR as exogenous variables.  This 
special treatment is due to the fact these variables are still stationary. 
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Table 6.1: Bjønnes et al. 2005 cointegration results 
Cointegration results, daily observations 
 Financial  Non-Financial  
 SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos 
(a) 
Cointegration     
Financial 0.0092(0.0036) -1(-) 0(-) -1(-) 
Non-
Financial 0(-)  -0.0063(0.0021)  
10-year bond 
diff 4.83(1.42) 0(-) 3.52(1.36) 0(-) 
3-month diff -1.89(1.00) 0(-) -1.38(1.09) 0(-) 
CB-position 0(-) -1.68(0.20) 0(-) -1.83(0.26) 
MM-position 0(-) -0.65(0.19) 0(-) -0.53(0.24) 
Trend 0.00020(0.00006) 0(-) 0(-) 0(-) 
     
(b) Error correction term 
SEK/EUR -0.0131(0.0029) -0.000121(0.000054) -0.0121(0.0030) - 0.000047(0.000041) 
Non-
Financial 0(-) -0.001863(0.000541) 0(-) -0.001635(0.000473) 
Financial 0(-) 0(-) 0(-) 0(-) 
     
(c) Test     
LR test of Test stat. 4.84 Test stat 8.09 
restrictions p-value 0.85 p-value 0.62 
     
No. 
observations 2214 2214 
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002.  Cointegration estimated with the Johansen method.  The VAR models the exchange 
rate change and the flow of the two customer groups.  The other variables in the cointegrating vectors are not 
modelled.  Differences of these, and one lag of differences, are included in the VAR.  The VAR contains two 
lags, determined by F-test.  Standard errors of coefficient in parenthesis.  The SEK/EUR cointegrating 
vectors are normalized on the exchange rate, while the position cointegrating vectors in column Non-Fin pos 
are normalized on the position of the Non-Financial customers.  Cointegration results are reported as if the 
normalizing variable is a left-hand-side variable.  Panel (b) reports the error correction term.  The columns 
indicate the cointegrating vector, while the rows indicate which equation in the VAR the vector enters.  All 
cells without standard error are the result of restrictions.  The test of the restrictions is reported in panel 
(c).Panel a of the table…… presents the final version of the cointegrating vectors.  The price equations are 
normalised on the exchange rate while the flows equations are normalised on the non-financial flows.  Panel 
b consists of the error correction terms. 
 
The following restrictions were imposed; 
1) either financial or non-financial flows are omitted from the cointegrating vector. 
2) both financial and non-financial flows are omitted from the error correction term of 
the price equation.  Restriction tests indicate that all restrictions are valid. 
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From the two price equations, it can be observed that the two flows coefficients are 
significant.  Additionally the positive coefficient for the financial customers indicates that 
they are the aggressive parties in trades.  The negative coefficients for the non-financial 
customers, confirms their role as liquidity providers.  The flows equations also points to 
the fact that the two groups match each other.  Restrictions on the error correction term 
point towards the flows of both groups being weakly exogenous to price.  Weak 
exogeneity of order flow implies that error correction occurs through exchange rate 
adjustment, not order flow adjustment.  Thus, financial customers use their private 
information to ‘push’ the market.  The positive and persistent impact of financial 
customers’ flow is a sign that there is an information effect.  Also a trend is included in the 
price equation for financial customers but is restricted to zero in the price equation for 
non-financial customers.   
According to Engle and Yoo (1991), trends are included in order to take into account other 
‘unobservable variables’.  Bjønnes et al. 2005 argue that if financial customers’ actions are 
to a certain extent influenced by private information that is not readily available to the 
whole market, while non-financial customers merely act as liquidity suppliers, then they 
would expect the trend to be included only in the price equation of the financial customers.  
Weak exogeneity of flows means that they can estimate ‘single-equation error correction 
models with contemporaneous flow as an exogenous variable’. 
Indeed, the researchers find evidence of FX liquidity provision in the long-run.  Similarly, 
by looking at short-run dynamics, they investigate liquidity provision overnight.  The error 
correction term from the previous cointegration analysis is added to all the subsequent 
regressions.  They employ a GMM procedure to take into account the overlapping 
observation beyond one day horizons.  Exchange rate returns are regressed on FX flows of 
financial and non-financial customers across various time horizons ranging from 5-90 
days. 
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Analysis of the results shows that the financial customer coefficient is positive and 
significant for all horizons.  As a result an increase in the standard deviation of the 
coefficient will lead to an increase in the exchange rate.  The magnitude of the coefficient 
rises with the time horizons.  The size of the coefficient increase rises from 0.37% at the 5-
day horizon to 0.71% per SEK 10 billion at the 90-day horizon.   
As expected the error correction term is negatively signed and significant for all horizons.  
The adjustment to long-term equilibrium takes place by 5%, 21% and 49% in each period 
for the 5, 30, 90 day horizons respectively.  R-squared is relatively high and ranges from 
30-72%.  This implies that the regressions explain a significant portion of the variation in 
exchange rate returns. 
The regressions are repeated with financial customer flows being replaced by non-
financial customer flows.  The coefficients are negatively signed and significant for all 
time horizons.  The magnitude of the coefficient varies from -0.30% at the 5-day horizon 
to -0.67% per SEK 10 billion at a 90-day horizon.  Coefficients of the error correction term 
and macro variables are comparable to those of the previous regressions.  Again R-squared 
is relatively high and ranges from 29% to 69%.  They also observe that the coefficient for 
non-financial customers is approximately an opposite of the coefficient of financial 
customers.  This is interpreted to mean that non-financial customers also provide liquidity 
during shorter horizons. 
Equally important, they test for parameter stability by running a rolling regression with a 
3-year window.  The result, that coefficients of financial flows are positively signed while 
those of the non-financial flows are negatively signed, is applicable to all the 3-year 
windows in the sample.  This reinforces the different roles played by the two customer 
groups. 
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Furthermore, at the 1-day horizon, the positive correlation between the exchange rate 
returns and financial customer flows is matched by the negative correlation between the 
market-making bank flows and exchange rate returns.  However, beyond the 1-day 
horizon, the non-financial customers emerge as the liquidity providers.  In other words, 
market-making banks act as liquidity providers at a 1-day horizon but beyond that non-
financial customers gradually take over the role of liquidity provision. 
Finally, Bjønnes et al. 2005 use Granger causality to ascertain which customer groups are 
on the passive or active sides trades.  The Granger causality gives an indication of the 
ability of one series to forecast the other. 
The hypothesis that non-financial customer flows do not Granger cause other flows cannot 
be rejected.  Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the financial customer flows and market 
making bank flows do not Granger-cause non-financial customer flows is rejected.  This 
implies that non-financial customers are on the passive side of trades whiles financial 
customers are the aggressive party in trades.   
In this chapter, we attempt to find evidence of cointegration between the FX rate and some 
measure of cumulated flows on the Ghanaian FX market.  More specifically we require a 
positive cointegrating relationship; 
lspot= x cumflow  
and the FX rate has to adjust to restore equilibrium (negative alpha on the exchange rate). 
After confirming that there is correlation between one particular group and the FX rate, we 
check whether this correlation matches and has the opposite sign for another group.  
Equally important, we also tackle the issue of BOG’s actions.  We ascertain whether the 
results of our analysis tallies with prior beliefs about the actions of BOG. 
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We are therefore faced with four testable hypotheses that will aid us in our empirical 
analysis: 
Hypothesis 1: The exchange rate levels and cumulative order flows are not only separately 
non-stationary but also jointly cointegrated. 
Hypothesis 2: Cumulative customer order flows are equally matched by cumulative central 
bank flows. 
Hypothesis 3:  There is Granger causality from customer flows to central bank flows 
Hypothesis 4:  Adjustment to equilibrium occurs through exchange rate adjustment, 
customer flows and/or central bank flows. 
 
The alternative hypothesis is feedback trading, assuming cointegration has been 
established.  This would mean either sign (positive or negative) on the cointegrating 
relationship with the alpha being significant in the flows equation.  In this case flows will 
react to restore equilibrium. 
Although the original data is at a daily frequency (except BOG data), preliminary 
regressions indicate that daily data is noisy.  Thus we conduct subsequent analysis in a 
weekly frequency. 
 
6.2.1 Granger Causality 
Following Granger (1969), a variable P Granger-causes Q if the prediction of Q is 
improved by including past values of P than by not including them if other relevant 
information, including past values of Q, are also considered. It therefore follows that tests 
for causality are essentially tests of the prediction ability of time-series models. If P 
Granger-causes Q and Q Granger-causes P, then bi-directional causality (or feedback) 
relationship is said to exist between P and Q. 
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It is now well known (e.g. Engle and Granger 1987; MacDonald and Kearney 1987) that if 
two nonstationary time series are cointegrated, then the traditional tests for Granger 
causality (see Guilkey and Salemi 1982; Geweke, Meese and Dent 1983) are mis-
specified, which may lead to erroneous and misleading inferences regarding the direction 
of causality (i.e. detection of causality where it does not exist or non-detection of causality 
where it exists). Checking for cointegration properties of the series of interest prior to 
testing for causality is therefore an important first step. Should two I(1) variables, say, P 
and Q, be cointegrated then testing for causality between them must be undertaken by 
specifying the following ECMs: 
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The optimal lag length k is determined using one of the model selection criteria. The 
variable Q is deemed to cause P if j 3 q , j=1,2,…,k are significant as a group based on 
conventional F tests. Likewise, the variable P is deemed to cause Q if j 3 g , j=1,2,…,k  are 
significant as a group. If Q causes P and P causes Q, bi-directional causality (or feedback 
relationship) between P and Q is deemed to exist. In traditional tests for causality, the error 
correction terms are omitted from both equations 3 and 4. This omission is valid only if the 
two time series under investigation are not cointegrated.  
 
The Granger causality test investigates which customer group is on the passive side of 
trading.  The granger causality test allows us to test whether the flows of one group is able 
to forecast the flows of another group.  This enables us to catch a glimpse of the different 
roles played by different participants.  For example, if customers flow forecasts bank 
flows, then bank flows are on the passive side. 
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Table 6.2: Probabilities from Granger causality tests 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests  
Sample: 10/28/2002 12/30/2007  
Lags: 1    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob. 
    
 BANKS does not Granger Cause BOG 265 1.1172 0.2915 
 BOG does not Granger Cause BANKS 0.94 0.3332 
    
 CUSTOMERS does not Granger Cause BOG 265 4.8022 0.0293 
 BOG does not Granger Cause CUSTOMERS 0.0457 0.8309 
    
 CUSTOMERS does not Granger Cause BANKS 265 0.8217 0.3655 
 BANKS does not Granger Cause CUSTOMERS 0.08 0.7775 
 
According to table 6.2, we cannot reject the hypothesis that banks flows do not Granger-
cause other flows.  We also cannot reject the hypothesis that BOG flows do not Granger-
cause other flows.  On the contrary, we can reject the hypothesis that customer flows do 
not Granger-cause BOG flows.  This means that BOG is on the passive side of trading and 
thus, gives an indication that customers could be ‘pushing’ the market whilst BOG is being 
pulled into the market.  In other words customers demand liquidity and BOG supplies this 
liquidity in the long-run. In the short-run, it is the banks that supply liquidity to the 
customers.  
 
We use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to determine the appropriate lag length of 1.  
An increase in the lag length to 2, however, led to a rejection at the 10% significance level. 
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6.2.2 Cointegration 
We test for cointegration between the FX rate and the cumulated flows of BOG and those 
of the customers.  In our cointegration analysis we use the log of the cedi/dollar rate 
measured at close. 
 
Prior to testing for cointegration among the variables under study, we test for stationarity 
of the series using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Table 6.3).  The results of the 
standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests used to check the order of 
integration of these variables are reported in Table 6.3. The results suggest that stationarity 
in the variables can be induced in all the variables by differencing the data once. Thus all 
the variables were found to be integrated of order 1.   
 
Table 6.3: Unit root test on levels of exchange rate and cumulated flows 
Table:  ADF test   
  P-values t-stat 
Lspot 0.722 -1.085 
BOG 1.000 2.318 
Customers 1.000 6.783 
 
The cointegrating equations are estimated by applying the Johansen methodology on 
weekly observations.  Using the exchange rate levels and cumulated flows, we formulate a 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and determine the appropriate lag length using the 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria.  Based on the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), table 
6.4 shows the appropriate lag length for this model is 4.  This is equivalent to 4 trading 
weeks. 
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Table 6.4 :VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: LSPOT TOTALXADB CBR   
      
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
            
0 NA  815555.5 22.12526 22.16657 22.14187 
1 4852.281 0.004418 3.091556 3.25681 3.158005 
2 58.71755 0.003749 2.927389   3.216583* 3.043676 
3 35.58371 0.003483 2.853674 3.266809 3.019797 
4   32.86793*   0.003266*   2.789286* 3.326362   3.005247* 
5 4.926177 0.003433 2.838698 3.499714 3.104495 
6 7.028187 0.003575 2.879059 3.664015 3.194693 
7 10.75627 0.003664 2.903249 3.812145 3.26872 
8 10.91534 0.003751 2.926169 3.959006 3.341478 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion   
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)  
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion    
 SC: Schwarz information criterion    
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion   
 
We now proceed to carry out the cointegration test using the Johansen technique.  The 
Johansen technique generates a Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue Tests, which identify the 
number of cointegrating vectors.  From Table 6.5  the null hypotheses of ‘none’ and ‘at 
most one’ cointegrating vectors are rejected against an alternative at a 5% significance 
level.  For the trace test, the null of no cointegrating vectors is rejected since the test 
statistic of 97.27 is greater than the 5% critical value of 42.92.  The null of at most 1 
cointegrating vector is also rejected since the test statistic of 45.70 exceeds the 5% critical 
value of 25.87.  Finally the null that there are at most 2 cointegrating vectors cannot be 
rejected since the test statistic of 6.45 is below the 5% percent critical value.   
The trace test results are similar to those of the maximum eigen-value test (Table 6.5).  In 
all, these tests indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors. 
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Table 6.5: Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue Tests 
No. of Cointegrating 
Vectors 
Likelihood ratio 
Statistics LR(n) 95% critical value 
Max Eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
None * 51.57 25.82 
At most 1 * 39.25 19.38 
At most 2 6.45 12.52 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
None * 97.27 42.92 
At most 1 * 45.70 25.87 
At most 2 6.45 12.52 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
The Johansen technique also generates the unnormalised and normalised coefficients 
linked to the two cointegrating vectors.  The unnormalised coefficients are the estimated 
values of the coefficients in the cointegrating vectors.  However we prefer the normalised 
coefficients, where the coefficient value of one of the variables has been set to unity.  
Usually normalisation is done with respect to the first variable (in this case exchange rate 
variable, Lspot): 
 
trendCustomersLspot *000665.0*00011.0 +=                                                  (6.8)     
trendCustomersBOG *7473.7*3934.1 +−=                                                      (6.9) 
 
For both equations (6.8 & 6.9) the coefficients of the three variables have the appropriate 
signs.  The positive sign of the customer coefficient in equation (6.8) means that net 
customer order flow is positively correlated to the level of exchange rate whilst a negative 
sign of the customer coefficient in equation (6.9) points to a negative correlation between 
net customers order flow and the level of exchange rate.  Implicitly, in Ghana, the 
customer net purchase of dollars is associated with a depreciation of the cedi.  For the 
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second equation, a customer net purchase of dollars is associated with a net sale of dollars 
by BOG. 
 
To test the hypotheses of interest, we impose restrictions on the cointegrating relationships 
in the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Table 6.6 illustrates the two sets of 
cointegrating vectors.  We impose restrictions on the vectors and on the error correction 
terms.  Additionally we insert a linear deterministic trend to take into account 
unobservable variables.  The banks’ flow variable is not modelled.  We argue that banks 
act as liquidity providers in the short-run and basically just facilitate trading amongst 
customers.  They eventually ‘square’ their positions at the end of the trading day.  
Subsequently differences of the bank flow variable and three lags of its differences are 
included in the VAR as exogenous variables. The restrictions we impose are: 
1) That BOG is excluded from the first (exchange rate) vector i.e. (1,0,).  The 
equation is normalised on the exchange rate 
2) BOG and customers are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign i.e. (0,1,1).  The 
equation is normalised on BOG. 
3) BOG is excluded from the first error correction term i.e. (,0,µ) 
4) Customers and Lspot are excluded from the second error correction term i.e. (0,,0) 
First, we choose to present the unrestricted version of the VECM before we imposed the 
appropriate restrictions. We also try other variations of our model by imposing different 
restrictions.   
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Consequently our models will be presented in the following order: 
1. Unrestricted-no restrictions with normalisation 
2. Theory-restrictions imposed according to what basic theory states(BOG adjusts, 
customers do not, equal and opposite effects etc) 
3. Others- other variations (e.g. BOG does not adjust, customers do) 
4. Parsimonious-eliminating insignificant coefficients regardless of what theory says 
 
 
Unrestricted models 
In our unrestricted models (Appendix A), the exchange rate level and cumulative customer 
flows are positively correlated, as expected.  This positive correlation is matched by a 
negative correlation between the exchange rate level and BOG flows.   
 
The positive coefficient for customer flows and the negative coefficient for BOG flows are 
consistent with them being push and pull customers respectively.  For the second 
cointegrating relationship in both unrestricted models, the coefficients of BOG and 
customers have opposite signs but are different in magnitude (i.e. effects are not equal).   
The exchange rate and customer flows adjust to restore equilibrium in the first 
cointegrating relationship.  Only BOG flows adjust to restore equilibrium in the second 
cointegrating relationship.  Cointegration between exchange rate level and the flows of 
customers and BOG is further evidence of a permanent price effect. 
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Table 6.6: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.389 Adj. 
2R -0.239 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.009 (-2.585) 1  
trend 0.115 (4.463) 1.437 (15.116)  
error correction  (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.0001 (-2.146) 0 0.8143 (7.202) 
cointeq2 0 -0.0853  (-6.093) 0 
Sample: November 2002- December 2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR 
models the cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but 
rather its differences and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR 
has three lags.  The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second 
cointegrating vector is normalised on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also 
reported.    
 
 
Table 6.6 presents results of the VECM. The P-value for the restriction test is considerably 
larger than 0.05 so we conclude that all our restrictions are valid.  The first cointegrating 
equation is equivalent to the stable period dynamic equation in chapter 5. To reiterate, the 
customer order flow coefficient is 0.0330 whiles that of the first cointegrating relationship 
is 0.009 (approx 0.01).  
 
The magnitude of the coefficient in chapter 1 is significantly larger and this has 
implications for the price impact of order flow.  In chapter 5 a net order flow of $1m will 
result in 0.03% depreciation but in this chapter the result is a 0.01% depreciation.  The 
reduced price impact of order flow could be attributed to the fact that the actions of BOG 
have been accounted for in this chapter.   
 
Furthermore the size of customer order flow coefficient is similar to that of   Bjønnes et al. 
(2005).  In Bjønnes et al. 2005 the coefficient is 0.0092, which is equal to what we 
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obtained.  The positive coefficient of customer order flow could imply that bank customers 
are ‘push’ customers.  The result reinforces the work of Bjønnes et al. (2005) and gives our 
paper more credibility in terms of FX liquidity provision in emerging/African economies.  
 
To ascertain whether BOG and customers are on opposite sides of the market and equally 
match each other, we impose a restriction (1,-1).  This restriction is similar to the one 
imposed in Bjønnes et al. (2005) where it sought to test whether financial and non-
financial customers were on opposite sides of the market.  Consistent with existing theory 
on the subject, the results from the restrictions show that bank customers and BOG are on 
opposite sides of the market and equally match each other. By assigning the push role to 
the bank customers in the first cointegrating equation, the relationship in the second 
cointegrating relationship could imply that BOG is being pulled into the market.  
 
 In the first error correction term, we impose restrictions to find out which variables in the 
first cointegrating relationship adjust to restore equilibrium.  Exchange rate and customer 
variables are significant and correctly signed.  This indicates that both exchange rate and 
customers adjust to restore equilibrium.  However the exchange rate alphas are extremely 
small and this may give the impression that the burden of adjustment falls on bank 
customer flows.  
 
Subsequently, we find out that the pooling together of different sub-samples has a 
tremendous effect on the size of exchange rate.  Also in the second error correction we 
impose restrictions to find out which variables in the second cointegrating vector adjust to 
restore equilibrium.  The BOG variable is also significant and correctly signed, meaning 
that customers do not adjust but rather BOG adjusts to restore equilibrium.  
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This is representative of the actual situation on the Ghanaian FX market.  Customers 
approach their banks to submit their FX orders resulting in a net demand for dollars.  
Consequently the banks approach the BOG to satisfy their net liquidity demand.  In other 
words customers are ‘pushing’ the market whiles BOG is being pulled into the market.  
The adjusted R-squared is relatively high at 0.2395. 
Table 6.7: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Others) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.000 Adj. 
2R -0.241 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.015 (-2.818) 1  
trend 0.146 (3.508) 1.029 (6.617)  
error correction  (LSPOT)  (BOG)  (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.000 (-2.543) 0 0.495 (4.925) 
cointeq2 0 0 -0.061(-3.199) 
Sample: November 2002- December 2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR 
models the cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but 
rather its differences and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR 
has three lags.  The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second 
cointegrating vector is normalised on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also 
reported.    
 
 
 
Table 6.7 presents other variations of our main model.  More specifically, we impose a 
different set of restrictions on the error correction term of the second cointegrating 
relationship.  The restrictions imposed imply that customers adjust but not BOG.  All other 
restrictions remain unchanged.  However tests indicate that these restrictions are not valid. 
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Table 6.8: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory-new 
restrictions) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.368 Adj. 
2R -0.239 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.008 (2.680) 1  
trend 0.107 (4.497) 1.404 (15.811)  
error correction  (LSPOT)  (Customers)  (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.000 (-2.163) 0.909 (7.172) 0 
cointeq2 0 0 -0.09127 (-6.129) 
Sample: November 2002- December 2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR 
models the cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but 
rather its differences and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR 
has three lags.  The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second 
cointegrating vector is normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are 
also reported.  
 
 
Thereafter, we test to find out if the positive correlation between exchange rate levels and 
bank customers is matched by a negative correlation between exchange rate levels and 
BOG flows.  We test for cointegration between exchange rate levels and BOG flows and 
present the associated VECM in Table 6.8.  The restrictions imposed are similar to the 
previous model shown in Table 6.6.  These restrictions are all satisfactory with P-values 
more than 0.05 and as a result they cannot be rejected.  
 
Our results indicate that there is indeed a negative correlation between exchange rate 
levels and BOG flows.  According to the first cointegrating relationship, the negative sign 
of the BOG coefficient is consistent with one of the conditions for identifying a liquidity 
provider.  The size of the BOG coefficient (0.008) is similar to that of the bank customers 
(0.009).   
 
  185 
In the case of Bjønnes et al. (2005) the coefficients of the non-financial customers 
(liquidity providers) is 0.006, which is slightly less than the size of BOG coefficient.  The 
second cointegrating relationship is again similar to that in the previous model (table 6.6).  
Specifically BOG and bank customers are on opposite sides of the market and match each 
others flows. 
 
The adjustment dynamics are also similar to the previous case.  The exchange rate and 
bank customers adjust to restore equilibrium in the first cointegrating relationship whiles 
only BOG adjusts in the second relationship (table 6.8).  Again, we are faced with the 
problem of extremely small exchange rate alphas and adjusted 2R of 0.24. 
 
Similar to Bjønnes et al. (2005), we add a trend as an additional variable to take into 
account unobservable features in our data.  The results from the restricted model are 
similar to those of the unrestricted.  As expected, the positive correlation between the 
exchange rate level and customer flows is matched by a negative correlation between 
exchange rate level and BOG flows.   
 
The magnitudes of the two (customers and BOG) coefficients are similar.  The second 
cointegrating relationship indicates that the flows of customers and BOG are equal but 
have opposite effects.  Combined with the previous result from the first cointegrating 
relationship, this implies that BOG equally matches customer flows.   
 
Adjustment to equilibrium occurs through both exchange rate and customer flows 
adjustment for the first cointegrating relationship.  Again, adjustment occurs only through 
BOG flows adjustment.   
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6.3 Robustness Checks 
In our robustness section we deal with the problem of extremely small exchange rate 
alphas. We find out that the size of the alphas have been distorted by the pooling of two 
heterogeneous sub-samples.  Consequently the problem of small alphas could be due to 
mere statistical errors.  We also notice an inverse relationship between flows coefficients 
and exchange rate alphas.  Specifically an increase in the exchange rate alphas corresponds 
to a decrease in the flows coefficient. 
 
In order to check for the robustness of our results, we conduct further tests over two sub-
samples (relatively stable and unstable periods).  The relatively unstable period spans from 
the end of 2002 to early 2004.  The relatively stable period spans from end of 2004 to the 
middle of 2007. 
 
Generally our results do not change significantly except for a slight difference in the 
adjustment dynamics over the two periods.  Specifically it is only the exchange rate that 
adjusts to attain equilibrium in the first sample whilst the adjustment dynamics in the 
second sample is similar to that of the main result.  By splitting our sample, we observe 
that the trend has disappeared. We also observe that the alphas are much larger in 
magnitude than the alphas in the main result.   
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First Sub-sample (relatively unstable period) 
Table 6.9: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.069 Adj. 
2R -0.249 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.002 (-4.046) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.090 (-3.973) 0 15.980 (0.708) 
cointeq2 0 -0.044 (-0.866) 0 
Sample:2002-2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
Generally our main results remain almost unchanged for the first sub-sample (Table 6.9).  
As expected, the flows coefficient is positively signed but its magnitude has dropped 
significantly.  The nature of relationship in the second cointegrating vector has not 
changed.  Customers and BOG are on opposite sides of the market and match each other.  
 
On the contrary, the magnitude of the exchange rate alphas has increased dramatically.  
Notably, this sharp increase in the size of the exchange rate alphas is at the expense of the 
size of flows coefficient. We also notice an inverse relationship between the two 
coefficients.  As the exchange rate alpha increases, the flows coefficient decreases. Apart 
from the higher exchange rate alphas in the first error correction term, we observe that the 
BOG does not adjust to restore equilibrium in the second cointegrating relationship.  
 
Our first sub-sample represents a period where Ghana was emerging from a crisis of 
2000/1.  During this period, there was a recovery in Gold and Cocoa prices, a resumption 
of foreign donor inflows and a cancellation of $4bn debt due to the attainment of HIPC 
status in 2004.  These factors contributed to the gradual build-up of FX reserves.  
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Consequently, even though BOG was selling FX to customers through the banks, there 
were not enough reserves to match the customer flows.  
 
During this period the BOG was supplying less than 10% of customer orders. It is 
therefore not surprising that the exchange rate depreciated relatively faster in the first 
period compared to the second period (Fig 4.1)  Customer imbalances resulting from an 
inadequate FX supply from BOG will lead to an  increase in (or depreciation of) the 
exchange rate in order to induce liquidity from elsewhere and restore equilibrium. 
 
Second sub-sample (relatively stable period) 
Table: 6.10   Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.132 Adj. 
2R -0.205 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.0003 (-6.951) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.061 (-2.028) 0 395.013 (3.843) 
cointeq2 0 -0.076 (-3.322) 0.0000 
Sample:2004-2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
With the exception of the sizes of the exchange rate alphas, the second sub-sample results 
(Table 6.10) are similar to the main results.  The positive correlation between the exchange 
rate level and customers flows is matched by a negative correlation between the exchange 
rate level and BOG flows.  Furthermore BOG flows match customer flows and have 
opposite effects.  Exchange rate and customer flows adjust to restore equilibrium in the 
first cointegrating relationship whilst BOG flows adjust to restore equilibrium in the 
second cointegration equilibrium. 
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By 2004 the BOG had attained the optimal level (40% to 50%) of FX reserves that could 
adequately support the supply of FX liquidity to customers.  In other words, BOG was in 
the position to satisfy most of the customer imbalances.  These actions had the impact of 
reducing exchange rate volatility.  This is evident in the relatively stable exchange rate 
from 2004 onwards. 
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6.4 Results 
The coefficient on cumulative customer order flow is significant and positively signed, as 
expected.  The use of log exchange rate allows for easy interpretation of the coefficient.  
Specifically, an increase in cumulative order flow of $1m will lead to a 0.01% increase in 
the cedi/dollar exchange rate at weekly frequency.  Thus, a weekly net dollar purchase of 
$1m results in a 0.01% depreciation in the exchange rate (fall in value of the cedi).   
 
This is much larger than the impact of order flow estimated by studies like Evans and 
Lyons (2002a).  This could be due to the fact that the Ghanaian FX market is relatively 
less liquid than the more developed markets.  As a result, the price impact of order flow is 
much higher in the Ghanaian FX market.  The above interpretation may suggest that bank 
customers are driving the exchange rate or ‘pushing’ the market.   
 
The role of bank customers is confirmed by the second cointegrating relationship.  
Specifically, the restrictions we impose reveal that the customers’ flows are matched by 
BOG flows.  This leads us to conclude that customers demand liquidity (push market 
around) whiles the BOG supplies liquidity (being pulled by the customers).  BOG supplies 
customer imbalances (net purchases).  The customer flows are almost a mirror image of 
the BOG flows (Fig 4.8). 
 
Next, we examine the adjustment dynamics of this cointegrated system.  We are interested 
in which of the variables provide the adjustment to equilibrium.  In order for the system to 
return to long-run equilibrium, the adjustment of at least some of the variables should react 
to the size of the disequilibrium.  Deviations from the long-run relationship have an effect 
on short-run dynamics.  The error correction model (ECM) will help explain the 
adjustment dynamics of the system.  In order to find out which variables react to 
  191 
deviations from equilibrium, we look at the test for weak exogeneity of these variables.  In 
this case, test for weak exogeneity will centre on the statistical significance of the ECM 
coefficients.  Weak exogeneity of a particular variable means that error correction in the 
cointegrating relationship occurs through that variable’s adjustment.  
 
This implies that the error correction term is significant in that variable’s equation.  The 
lower section of Table 6.10 presents evidence on the adjustment dynamics.  Restrictions 
on the error correction terms in the first cointegrating relationship indicate that error 
correction occurs through both exchange rate and customer order flow adjustment.   
 
The error correction term is significant in both the exchange rate and order flow equations 
and this means that the weak exogeneity hypothesis has been strongly rejected.  
Restrictions on the error correction terms in the second cointegrating relationship indicate 
that error correction occurs through BOG flow adjustment.  Again the error correction is 
significant in the BOG equation implying that the weak exogeneity hypothesis has been 
rejected. 
The error correction model that could apply to this system is: 
( ) Sttst CSS εβα +−=∆ −1                                                                                       (6.10) 
( ) Cttct CSC εβα +−=∆ −1                                                                                       (6.11) 
( ) bogttBOGt CBOGBOG εα ++=∆ −1                                                                         (6.12) 
Where bogtCtSt andεεε ,  are white-noise disturbances which may be correlated, 
ttt andBOGCS , are exchange rates, customer flows and BOG flows respectively,  is the 
coefficient estimate of customers flow variable and bogcs andααα ,  are the speed of 
adjustment parameters for the respective variables.  The speed of adjustment coefficients 
measure the degree to which a respective variable reacts to the deviation from the long-run 
  192 
equilibrium.  For example, the larger sα  is, the greater the response of exchange rate to the 
previous period’s deviation from long-run equilibrium.   
 
Deviations from long-run equilibrium are represented by ( ) 1−− tCS β  and ( ) 1−+ tCBOG . 
The product of the speed of adjustment coefficients and the deviation from long-run 
equilibrium forms the error correction term e.g. ( ) 1−− ts CS βα . ttt andBOGCS ,  change in 
response to stochastic shocks ( bogtCtSt andεεε , ) and also in response to the previous 
period’s deviation from long-run equilibrium.  
 
We then substitute the various parameters in the above system of equation to give us the 
adjustment process. 
  
( ) Sttt CSS ε+−−=∆ −1009.0000107.0                                                                (6.13) 
( ) Cttt CSC ε+−=∆ −1009.081424.0                                                                    (6.14) 
( ) bogttt CBOGBOG ε++−=∆ −108528.0                                                             (6.15) 
For equations (6.13 - 6.15), a positive customer order flow (net purchase of dollars) would 
imply that the previous period’s deviation is negative ( ( ) 0009.0 1 − −tCS ).  Together with 
their respective adjustment parameters, this means during the next period, the cedi/dollar 
rate would rise (depreciation) and the customer order flow would fall.  The previous 
period’s deviation for the BOG equation is positive ( ( ) 1−+ tCBOG ).  Due to the negative 
speed of adjustment coefficient, the BOG flows would fall i.e. BOG would sell dollars.   
 
However it should be noted that the absolute value speed of adjustment coefficient of the 
exchange rate is relatively small.  This may imply the slow adjustment of exchange rate 
compared to the other variables.  In the short-run a net customer purchase of £1m during 
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the previous period will lead to a relatively small depreciation of 0.0001% in the next 
period.  This also leads to a 1% decline in the customer flows for the next period.  There is 
also an 8% decrease in BOG flows (i.e. BOG sells/supplies dollars) in the next period.  
The problem of extremely small exchange rate alphas is dealt with by dividing our sample 
into two sub-samples in the robustness section.   
 
We found out that this problem was due to mere statistical failure as a result of pooling 
together two sub-samples.  In our first sub-sample (crisis period), a net customer purchase 
of US$1m during the previous period will lead to a significant depreciation of 0.09% in the 
next period.  Also in our second sub-sample (stable period), a net customer purchase of 
US$1m during the previous period will lead to a relatively smaller depreciation of 0.06%.  
It is evident that the slower rate of depreciation in the second sub-sample could be due to 
the supply of liquidity by the BOG.   
 
6.5 Liquidity provision during the pre-intervention period 
We analyse the period before BOG actions and attempt to find out which market 
participant plays the role of liquidity provider.  In the absence of BOG, who fills the role 
of liquidity provider? With the exception of the remittance bank, bank customers are 
generally net buyers of dollars.  As a result we have two main market participants, 
remittance customers and normal bank customers.  The previous methodology is applied 
here with the remittance customers replacing BOG in the model (Table 6.11). 
 
The restrictions we impose are: 
1) Customers are excluded from the first (exchange rate) vector i.e. (1, , 0).  Equation 
is normalised on the exchange rate 
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2) REM and customers are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign i.e. (0,1,1).  
Equation is normalised on REM. 
3) REM and Customers are excluded from the first error correction term i.e. (,0,0) 
 
The coefficient on remittance customers is significant and positively signed, as expected.  
However we are more concerned with the alphas in the error correction terms.  
Restrictions on the cointegrating vectors indicate that during the ‘pre-intervention’ period, 
both bank customers and remittance customers are adjusting (table 6.11).   
 
The corresponding alphas are similar in both magnitude and statistical significance.  
Exchange rate adjustment is extremely slow and as a result the burden of adjustment falls 
on the flows.  In other words, the crisis ‘forced’ the various market participants and the 
exchange rate to adjust simultaneously to equilibrium.  In this case the various market 
participants cannot be described as push/pull customers.  The ‘situation’ called for an 
adjustment by all variables involved (table 6.11).  
 It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of bank and remittance customers flows 
are equal in the magnitude for the second error correction term. 
Table 6.11: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.081 Adj. 
2R -0.540 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
REM -0.009 (-3.261) 1  
error correction  (LSPOT)  (Customers)  (REM) 
cointeq1 -0.012 (-3.234) 0 0 
cointeq2 0.000 (2.463) -0.029 (-2.192) -0.029 (-4.574) 
Sample: 2000 -2002.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of remittance (REM) and normal Customers.  The VAR has three lags.  The first 
cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is normalised 
on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported.    
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Table 6.12:Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.079 Adj. 
2R -0.541 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
REM 0 1  
Customers 0.008 (4.806) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (REM) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.012 (-3.222) 0 0 
cointeq2 0.000 (2.743) -0.029 (-4.573) -0.029 (-2.192) 
Sample: 2000 -2002.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of remittance (REM) and normal Customers.  The VAR has three lags.  The first 
cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is normalised 
on REM.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported.   
 
 
6.6 Discussion  
Our results suggest that bank customers, banks and BOG play different roles in the 
Ghanaian FX market.  Bank customers “push” the market.  Banks provide liquidity to their 
customers in the short-run, while BOG acts as a liquidity provider in the long-run. 
It seems logical that bank customers are push customers.  Over past decades, Ghana has 
pursued weak macroeconomic policies.  Periodic monetary and fiscal indiscipline has led 
to high and volatile inflation, large movements in exchange rates and negative real interest 
rates over long periods.  This unstable macroeconomic environment has created a high 
degree of uncertainty and potentially has the effect of discouraging customers from 
willingly holding the domestic currency (cedi).  The continued lack of trust in sustained 
economic policies has naturally induced customers to hold relatively more FX or conduct a 
significant portion of transactions in FX.  As a result Ghanaian bank customers are 
constantly purchasing/demanding FX (predominantly dollars).  This is evident in the 
positive order flow (net dollar purchases) for the whole data sample.  
 
Furthermore it is important to note that the Ghanaian economy is heavily dependent on 
imports.  The manufacturing sector is almost non-existent.  Subsequently most of the bank 
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FX transactions are induced by importers due to the nature of their business. The constant 
net purchase of dollars emanating from importers is responsible for the positive order flow 
experienced in our dataset.  In the category of Push customers, importers could be viewed 
as dominant players. 
 
BOG actions are consistent with actions of ‘pull’ customers.  BOG does not sell FX to the 
market for the purpose of intervening or pushing the market.  Specifically BOG sells FX to 
banks to enable them cover oil payments or to provide BOP support.  At the end of each 
trading/week, in the event of customer imbalance (unmet demand) (e.g. net dollar 
purchases), the bank approaches BOG to submit an order to buy dollars at prevailing 
market rates.  The order flow is usually equivalent to the magnitude of the customer 
imbalance and in some cases the BOG rations FX depending on the availability.  In other 
words, BOG stands to passively supply FX to any authorised dealer bank that submits an 
order.  In effect BOG is being ‘pulled’ into to the market.  BOG actions seem to have the 
effect slowing the rate of depreciation of the cedi. 
During the pre-intervention period, we are not able to assign push/pull roles to any of the 
market participants.  This emanates from the fact the FX crisis induced a collective 
adjustment by all parties involved.  Market participants endeavour to make the best out of 
a chaotic situation. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
The importance of liquidity provision in the FX market cannot be over-emphasised.  In an 
attempt to answer the question of which market players provide liquidity, we gain a deeper 
understanding of FX market dynamics and ultimately exchange rate determination.  It is 
well-known that banks usually provide liquidity in the short-run.  The aim of this paper is 
to investigate which market players provide liquidity in the long-run in the Ghanaian FX 
market.  We adopt the liquidity provision framework proposed by Bjønnes et al. (2005).  
Consistent with the Bjønnes et al. (2005), our study highlights two main characteristics 
that should help identify liquidity providers:  
(i) The net flows of a liquidity provider should be negatively correlated with the 
level of exchange rate. 
(ii) Liquidity providers are usually not the active parties in FX trades.  They 
passively match others’ demand and supply. 
However, unlike Bjønnes et al. (2005), our unique data does not distinguish between the 
various customer types.  Thus our analysis focuses on three main FX market participants 
namely: Market making banks, banks customers and the Central Bank.  Our results seem 
to suggest that the central bank (BOG) is the main liquidity provider in the Ghanaian FX 
market.   
 
Using the Johansen cointegration technique, we prove that there is indeed a positive 
correlation between customer order flow and exchange rate movements.  This implies that 
when customers buy dollars, the cedi depreciates (dollar appreciates).  This positive 
correlation is matched by a negative correlation between exchange rate level and BOG 
flows.   
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In addition, we find that customer order flows are equally matched by BOG flows.  
Restrictions indicate that coefficients of customer and BOG flows are similar in magnitude 
but opposite in sign.  These results reinforce the liquidity provision role of BOG. 
 
Furthermore we use Granger causality test to find out if indeed the BOG is passive in 
matching the liquidity demand of bank customers.  We find that bank customer flows can 
forecast BOG flows (unidirectional causality).  We deduce this as evidence that BOG is 
the passive party in trading. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study long-run liquidity provision in 
an emerging economy using such a unique dataset.  It becomes immediately obvious that, 
unlike developed economies (Bjønnes et al. 2005), the central bank is a major player in the 
Ghanaian FX market.  Exchange rates adjust to ensure that liquidity supply matches 
liquidity demand.  Thus by passively matching the net liquidity demand (unmet demand) 
of customers, the central bank may be influencing exchange rate movement and 
smoothening out the FX market in terms of volatility.  It is therefore not surprising that our 
results point to a relatively slow exchange rate adjustment to equilibrium. 
The findings raise further fruits for thought. For instance, will the findings apply to other 
emerging/African economies? If so, what factors determine customer order flows in 
Ghana? We shall try to address these questions in the next chapter. 
From chapter 5, we observe how customer order flows push the exchange rate around.  In 
this chapter, we show that the BOG intervenes to supply liquidity and as a result slow 
down the rate of depreciation of the exchange.  However, BOG is rather a pull player not a 
push player.  Evidently, customers are of paramount importance. 
This is in line with the situation in the advanced markets where central banks are largely 
absent and lends huge support to the microstructure approach.   Moreover, understanding 
what drives customer order flows is critical.  As already mentioned above, flows are not 
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the underlying causes but just the proximate causes.  This means that flows are carriers of 
information to the market and so investigating what drives flows is very crucial.  Ghana is 
both a smaller and simpler economy and because our data is complete, we might expect to 
gain a deeper insight into what drive flows in Ghana than elsewhere.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Macroeconomic determinants of order flow in Ghana 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, our results confirm a clear correlation between order flows and the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate.  Furthermore, in chapter 6, we identify the roles played by various market 
participants in the FX market.  Specifically, we find that bank customers ‘push’ the market 
by demanding dollars whiles the central bank is ‘pulled’ and thus passively supplies 
dollars.  Logically, the next step is to determine the drivers of order flow.  Unearthing the 
drivers of order flow would go a long way in resolving the issue of macroeconomic 
variables’ inability to explain exchange rates.  Order flow is defined as a proximate cause 
of exchange rate returns but this does not imply that it drives exchange rates.  According to 
Sarno and Taylor (2001),  
“The fact that order flow helps explain exchange rate behaviour does not necessarily 
imply that order flow drives exchange rates.  Indeed, it may well be that macroeconomic 
fundamentals are the driving force, but that conventional measures of the macroeconomic 
fundamentals are so imprecise that order flow ‘proxy’ performs better in estimation .”   
Following the seminal paper by Evans and Lyons (2002a), several studies have emerged 
which fail to find a robust link between macroeconomic information and exchange rate 
fluctuations (Cheung, Chinn and Pascual, 2005).  This is in sharp contrast to previous 
research by some renowned economists Chenn and Rogoff (2003).  Moreover, Chen, 
Rogoff and Rossi (2008) assert that, to their knowledge, no study has considered the 
relation between order flow and commodity prices.  King, Sarno and Sojli (2010), 
however, documents other studies which appear to have found a strong relation between 
order flow, commodity prices and macroeconomic fundamentals.  Sojli also documents a 
strong relation between order flows and changes in commodity prices especially gold and 
aluminium.  Clearly, the evidence surrounding the question as to whether there is a strong 
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link between order flow and economic fundamentals and commodity prices appear to be 
mixed. 
 
Consequently, we proceed to investigate the hypothesis that there is a strong relation 
between order flow, commodity prices and macro fundamentals using emerging market 
data, particularly African data.   
Thus our null hypothesis, 0H , is that fundamental information and commodity price 
changes are the main drivers of order flow. 
Indeed, the assumptions underlying our study are consistent with those of King, Sarno and 
Sojli (2010).  For instance, our approach draws heavily on market microstructure work and 
relies on different set of assumptions from classical macroeconomic studies.  Besides, 
macroeconomic models assume that agents are identical, information is perfect, trading is 
costless, and the trading process is irrelevant.  However, micro-based FX models relax all 
these assumptions.  Furthermore, microstructure models examine more realistic settings 
where information is dispersed and heterogeneous agents have different information sets 
and models.  Consequently, we adopt the approach used by King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) 
in the subsequent analysis. 
In this chapter, we lay emphasis on the role of order flow as transmitter of macroeconomic 
information.  In other words, order flow could be the missing link between 
macroeconomic information and exchange rate returns.  Does order flow convey any 
fundamental information?  Thus the main objective of this chapter is to examine the 
underlying macroeconomic determinants of order flow, in the context of Ghana.  This 
work is unique in so many ways.  In terms of emerging markets/African FX 
microstructure, this is the first study that attempts to empirically investigate the 
relationship between order flow and macroeconomic fundamentals.  We examine 6-years 
of order flow data based on spot transactions reported by the top 5 Ghanaian-based banks 
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with their customers.  Additionally, the order flow data is disaggregated into local and 
foreign customer flows.  This dataset covers about 80% of the daily FX volumes in spot 
cedi/dollar transactions between 2002 and 2007.  To the best of our knowledge, our FX 
microstructure study has a large span of data from an emerging (African) economy.    
All our macroeconomic variables are available in a monthly frequency.  Accordingly, we 
aggregate our daily order flow data into a monthly frequency.   
Tables and Charts with descriptive statistics of the data can be found in Figures 7.1 and 
7.2. It is worthwhile to look at the correlations between the different order flows, as it can 
give us a preliminary hint on the roles of different customer types. One interesting result is 
that some order flow indicators show strong correlations with each other. It can be noted 
therefore that in general correlation between banks and customers order flow is negative. 
This suggests that they may play opposite roles on the market, i.e. being “push customers” 
and “pull customers” as shown in chapter 6. 
 
7.2 Preliminary analysis 
As indicated in Chapter two, Ghana is predominantly an agricultural economy whose 
currency is affected by global commodity (gold, cocoa and crude oil) prices.  It has also 
been argued in literature that exchange rates of commodity exporting countries are closely 
linked to commodity prices.  Ghana, being a small open economy, is directly affected by 
developments on the international markets.  Consequently any small deviation or volatility 
in the external commodity prices has huge implications for cedi/dollar exchange rate 
movements.  In other words, the major foreign exchange earners for Ghana are cocoa and 
gold.  Meanwhile, the nation spends almost 70% of its foreign exchange earning on crude 
oil importation.  For these reasons, we feel it is expedient to incorporate commodity prices 
into our analysis. 
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Additionally, it has been posited in the microstructure literature, that order flow shoul 
reflect changes in expectations of macroeconomic conditions.  Since the generally 
accepted core variables used in macroeconomic announcements are inflation, GDP, 
interest rates, money supply, fiscal deficit, trade deficit etc, we select those series that are 
available in the country and at a higher frequency basis.  On the real sector side, GDP is 
available on an annual basis so we compute it into a monthly series using interpolation 
techniques.    
Previous research (Chen and Rogoff, 2003; Chen, Rogoff and Rossi, 2008) has 
documented a strong relation between commodity currencies and commodity prices.  
King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) is able to show that including order flow to regressions on 
exchange rate returns that include commodity variables and interest rate expectations 
considerably increases the explanatory power.  According to King, Sarno and Sojli (2010), 
this implies that order flow may contain additional information that affects exchange rate 
movements. 
As argued by Evans and Lyons (2005a), order flow may be viewed as a medium for 
aggregating both differences in interpretation of news in real time and changes in 
heterogeneous expectations about the developments of the economy.  The exchange rate 
can be written as the discounted present value of current and expected fundamentals: 
)()1(
0
jtt
j
j
t fEs +
∞
=
−= δδ
                                                                                            (7.1)                              
Where ts  is the log normal exchange rate (defined as the domestic price of the foreign 
currency), δ is the discount factor, tf denotes the fundamentals at time t, and )( jtt fE + is 
the market-makers expectation about future fundamentals conditional on information 
available at time t. 
By iterating the equation forward and reorganising terms  we obtain: 
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It is important to note that, in present value models, current fundamentals are observable 
without error in real time i.e. ttt ffE = .  Nevertheless, in reality, macroeconomic data are 
not available in real time because most data is reported at a monthly or quarterly lag. 
The form for fundamentals differs according to the macroeconomic structure of the 
economy.  For example in Evans and Lyons (2004b), tf includes home and foreign money 
supplies and household consumption.  It is asserted that, in models where central banks 
conduct monetary policy via the control of short-term interest rates (i.e. follow Taylor 
rules), tf will include variables used to set policy.  More generally, tf will include a term 
that identifies the foreign exchange risk premium. 
  
Our dataset of monthly macroeconomic indicators and commodity prices is obtained from 
the BOG database. Below is a definition of the main variables: 
tX∆ - Net order flow 
tCPI -Consumer Price Index 
tGOLD -Gold Price per metric tonne 
tM 2 -Money Supply 
tPR -Prime rate 
tGDP -Gross Domestic Product 
tOIL -Oil Price per barrel 
tCOCOA -Cocoa Price per metric tonne 
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Figure 7.1 Graphs of the variables 
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Figure 7.1a: Levels of monthly series for the period 2002-2007
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Figure 7.1b: Changes in monthly series for the period 2002-2007
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Throughout our analysis, we spilt the order flow into domestic and foreign flows and 
repeat the regression over the full sample space.  We attempt to address the issue of 
heterogeneity by splitting the flows into foreign and domestic components.  This is 
principally because Ghana, as an emerging economy, relies heavily foreign capital flows.  
As a result a large proportion of Ghanaian macroeconomic fundamentals governing the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate are dependent on external factors.  Implicitly, the foreign flows 
dictate the direction of the information flow into the FX markets through trading activities.  
Therefore we expect to see strong relationships between foreign flows and domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This is achieved by analysing the nature of the customer base of these banks.  Foreign-
owned banks have a relatively larger proportion of expatriate customers while the 
customers of Ghanaian owned banks are predominantly Ghanaian.  Based on this 
assessment, total order flow is split into local and foreign components.  By so doing, we 
are able to examine the relationship between fundamentals/commodity prices and the 
different components of order flow. 
 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 7.2 below shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for the monthly 
aggregated data.  The mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviations of all the series 
are all presented. The probability for the null hypothesis for the Jacque-Bera test for 
normality is also shown.  The sample size is 71 covering the period from January 2002 
through December 2007.  Generally, analysis of figure 7.1 shows that the series have very 
low correlations.  Thus we expect to generate reasonable and interpretable, significant 
results.   
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Figure 7.2: Preliminary Statistics 
 
 
 
         
         
   Correlations      
 
tX∆  ∆ CPI ∆ GOLD ∆ M2 ∆ PR ∆ GDP ∆ OIL ∆ COCOA 
tX∆  1.0000 0.1770 -0.1012 -0.0629 -0.0980 0.5354 -0.0104 -0.0471 
∆ CPI 0.1770 1.0000 -0.0258 -0.0798 0.0872 0.1586 0.1507 -0.1836 
∆ GOLD -0.1012 -0.0258 1.0000 0.1531 0.0280 -0.0746 0.1639 -0.0175 
∆ M2 -0.0629 -0.0798 0.1531 1.0000 -0.1352 -0.0076 0.0944 0.0039 
∆ PR -0.0980 0.0872 0.0280 -0.1352 1.0000 -0.1235 -0.1508 0.0651 
∆ GDP 0.5354 0.1586 -0.0746 -0.0076 -0.1235 1.0000 0.0595 -0.1179 
∆ OIL -0.0104 0.1507 0.1639 0.0944 -0.1508 0.0595 1.0000 0.1354 
∆ COCOA -0.0471 -0.1836 -0.0175 0.0039 0.0651 -0.1179 0.1354 1.0000 
         
         
         
   Variance-Covariance     
 
tX∆  ∆ CPI ∆ GOLD ∆ M2 ∆ PR ∆ GDP ∆ OIL ∆ COCOA 
tX∆  6049741 6.7454 -10.1665 -4.2883 -8.6941 4.1712 -2.2238 -3.8431 
∆ CPI 6.7454 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 
∆ GOLD -10.1665 0.0000 0.0017 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
∆ M2 -4.2883 0.0000 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
∆ PR -8.6941 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0001 
∆ GDP 4.1712 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆ OIL -2.2238 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0076 0.0004 
∆ COCOA -3.8431 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0011 
         
         
         
   
Descriptive statistics 
    
 
tX∆  ∆ CPI ∆ GOLD ∆ M2 ∆ PR ∆ GDP ∆ OIL ∆ COCOA 
 Mean -3098.06 0.0122 0.0152 0.0240 -0.0098 0.0182 0.0222 0.0026 
 Median -2505.71 0.0112 0.0179 0.0176 0.0000 0.0168 0.0330 0.0027 
 Maximum -26.2452 0.1035 0.1201 0.0948 0.0770 0.0240 0.2047 0.0780 
 Minimum -8893.25 -0.0254 -0.1140 -0.0365 -0.1484 0.0145 -0.2226 -0.1044 
 Std. Dev. 2477.13 0.0156 0.0411 0.0279 0.0363 0.0032 0.0876 0.0334 
 Skewness -0.6393 2.7369 -0.1712 0.5620 -1.6148 0.6540 -0.5693 -0.4161 
 Kurtosis 2.3485 18.1875 3.5745 3.2135 7.0717 1.9200 2.9977 3.9027 
         
 Jarque-Bera 6.0924 771.01 1.3230 3.8727 79.9020 8.5117 3.8357 4.4594 
 Probability 0.0475 0.0000 0.5161 0.1442 0.0000 0.0142 0.1469 0.1076 
         
 Sum -219962 0.8686 1.0818 1.7066 -0.6931 1.2896 1.5744 0.1841 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4300000 0.0171 0.1185 0.0546 0.0923 0.0007 0.5368 0.0781 
         
 Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
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From the correlation matrix, we are given the first glimpse of the expected signs of the 
various coefficients.  We observe negative correlations between order flow and 
fundamental and commodity price changes.  The only exceptions are the positive 
correlations observed between order flow and changes in CPI and GDP.   One expects that 
any significant increases in the prices of gold and cocoa would lead to an appreciation of 
the cedi/dollar.  Gold and cocoa prices increases point to a future appreciation of the 
exchange rate and in anticipation of this movement, individuals and institution will reduce 
their holding of dollars.  Therefore increases in these prices are associated with the selling 
of dollars.  Favourable commodity prices imply a buoyant economy and translate into 
higher profit repatriation for foreign firms.  Thus foreign firms will buy relatively more 
dollars (7.5).  On the contrary, significant increases in the prices of crude oil would lead to 
massive depreciation and increase inflationary expectations.  Typically, agents will take 
advantage of the high interest rate environment by selling dollars and buying cedi-
denominated short-term instruments (e.g. 91-day treasury bills).  Higher oil prices will 
mean a reduction in profits for foreign firms and thus they will buy fewer dollars (7.5).  
The a-priori signs of the coefficients are indicated below the relevant variables as shown in 
equations 7.4 to 7.9. 
Thus the corresponding effect on order flow can be presented in the following equations: 
),,(
−−−
∆∆∆=∆ tttt oilgoldcocoafX                                                                                   (7.4) 
),,(
−++
∆∆∆=∆ ttt
for
t oilgoldcocoafX                                                                               (7.5) 
),,(
−−−
∆∆∆=∆ ttt
loc
t oilgoldcocoafX                                                                                (7.6) 
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According to the correlation matrix, an increase in GDP is associated with the purchase of 
dollars and vice versa.  This is not surprising because foreign flows constitute a large 
portion of total order flow and thus an increase in GDP is associated with increased profit 
repatriation.  In other words, when the economy is doing well, foreign firms earn more 
profits and therefore increase their repatriations to their home countries. 
Changes in the broad money supply and interest rates are also negatively correlated with 
order flow.  Increases in money growth are normally due to lax fiscal and monetary 
policies.  Naturally, this development contributes to increased inflationary expectations 
and points to future interest rate hikes.  In trying to hedge against present and future 
inflation, local customers will demand more cedis to facilitate the purchase of short-term 
government securities.   
The same argument applies to the relationship between order flow and interest rates. The 
prime rate represents the benchmark interest rate in the economy. An increase in this prime 
rate is associated with an increase in the rates of return on government short/medium term 
instruments. For example, an increase in the prime rate that is associated with an increase 
in the 3-month Treasury bills will require customers to buy more of the local currency (or 
sell dollars) to facilitate the purchase of the relevant instruments in order to take advantage 
of the real positive returns. 
However, we also observe that changes in CPI are positively correlated to order flow. 
Similarly, the relationship between order flow and macroeconomic variables is presented 
in the following equation: 
),,,(
−
−++
∆∆∆=∆ IRMGDPfX tttt pi                                                                                      (7.7) 
),,,(
++++
∆∆∆=∆ IRMGDPfX tttfort pi                                                                                   (7.8) 
),,,(
−
−−+
∆∆∆=∆ IRMGDPfX tttloct pi                                                                                    (7.9) 
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Where tX∆ is equal to order flow, 
for
tX∆ is foreign order flow, 
loc
tX∆  is local order flow, 
tcocoa∆ is equal to cocoa price changes, tgold∆ is equal to gold price changes, toil∆  is 
equal oil price changes, tpi  is equal to changes in CPI (inflation), tGDP∆  is equal to 
changes in GDP, tM∆  is  equal to changes in broad money supply and IR∆ is equal to 
interest rate changes. 
 
Based on our a-priori expectations, we are faced with six testable hypotheses that will 
guide us in subsequent empirical analysis. 
Hypothesis 1: Changes in cocoa, gold and oil prices are negatively correlated with total 
order flow. 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in cocoa and gold prices are positively correlated with foreign 
order flow whiles oil price changes are negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in cocoa, gold and oil prices are all negatively correlated with local 
order flow. 
Hypothesis 4: Inflation and GDP growth are positively correlated with total order flow 
whiles money growth and interest rate movements are negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 5: Inflation, GDP growth, money growth and interest rate changes are all 
positively correlated with foreign order flow. 
Hypothesis 6: Only inflation is positively correlated with local order flow whiles GDP 
growth, money growth and interest rate changes are negatively correlated. 
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  7.4 Variables and Stationarity Test  
Non-stationarity, a property common to many macroeconomic and financial time series, 
means that a variable has no clear tendency to return to a constant value or a linear trend. 
As shown in Figure 7.1 above, most of the series (the levels) do not appear to be 
stationary, i.e., return to a fixed value or fluctuate around a linear trend (in which case the 
deviations from trend are stationary). It is therefore proper to assume that they have been 
generated by non-stationary processes and follow stochastic trends. 
An important objective of empirical research in macroeconomics is to test hypotheses and 
estimate relationships, derived from economic theory, among such aggregate variables. 
The statistical theory that was applied well into the 1980s in building and testing large 
simultaneous-equation models was based on the assumption that the variables in these 
models are stationary. The problem is that statistical inference associated with stationary 
processes is no longer valid if the time series are indeed realizations of non-stationary 
processes. 
Consistent with our a-priori expectations, the variables (with the exception of order flow) 
are non-stationary in levels.  However, subsequent OLS analysis requires the use of 
stationary variables in order to avoid spurious results.  Consequently, we compute the 
changes in variables and conduct unit root tests to ascertain their stationarity.  ADF tests, 
as shown in Table 7.1, indicate that the changes in the variables are all stationary at a 5% 
significance level.  Changes in GDP, however, are only stationary at a 10% significance 
level. 
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Table 7.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on levels of variables 
Variable ADF, p-value 
tX∆  0.027 
tCPI  0.940 
tGOLD  0.998 
tM 2  1.000 
tPR  0.677 
tGDP  1.000 
tOIL  0.963 
tCOCOA  0.143 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on changes in variables 
Variable ADF, p-value 
tX∆  0.027 
tCPI∆  0.000 
tGOLD∆  0.000 
tM 2∆  0.000 
tPR∆  0.000 
tGDP∆  0.096 
tOIL∆  0.000 
tCOCOA∆  0.000 
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7.5 Econometric Analysis 
In a bivariate OLS framework, total order flow is regressed on changes in fundamentals 
and commodity prices.  This is represented by the equation: 
t
N
n nt
N
n ntt
ucfx +++=∆ 
=
−
=
− 030
α
                     (7.10) 
Where tx∆  is the total order flow,  tf is macro variable and tc  is commodity price 
variable. 
Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using 
the Newey-West HAC correction.   Serial correlation shows the p-values for the Breusch-
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests for first-order residual correlation.  Heteroscedasticity 
shows the p-value for the White first-order conditional heteroscedasticity test with cross 
terms in the residuals.  Significant variables are reported at least at a 10% level.  In order 
to obtain a more parsimonious model, a general-to-specific modelling approach is adopted.   
Besides the macro variables and commodity prices, two dummy variables were added to 
ascertain the significance of certain developments in the economy.  To be precise,  REDM, 
is a dummy variable which represents the introduction of currency revaluation which 
occurred effective July 2007.  As described in chapter 2, this redenomination exercise 
involved the elimination of four zeros from the national currency.  It is therefore prudent to 
assess how the exercise has impacted on the order flow analysis.  Additionally, Ghana 
became classified as a HIPC country in 2004, during which period it received a substantial 
debt cancellation from both bilateral and multilateral sources.  A dummy variable called 
HIPC is accordingly used to represent this significant event to enable us assess its 
effectiveness on subsequent analysis.  
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7.6    RESULTS 
With regard to the regressions, we start by first using current commodity prices and 3 
month lagged fundamental variables.  Principally, because any major shift in international 
commodity prices has an instantaneous effect on the nation’s FX flows, while the impact 
of the flows becomes clearly evident on quarterly basis. 
 
Table 7.3   Relationship between changes in fundamentals/commodity prices and order flow 
 
OLS regression of total order flow on lagged changes in fundamentals and commodity prices 
(General model).  Coefficients of lags have been added together: 
t
N
n nt
N
n ntt
ucfx +++=∆ 
=
−
=
− 030
α .. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West 
HAC correction.   Serial correlation shows the p-values for the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests 
for first-order residual correlation.  Heteroscedasticity shows the p-value for the White first-order conditional 
heteroscedasticity test with cross terms in the residuals.  Significant variables are reported at least at a 10% 
level.  For each equation, the total number of observations is 71, spanning the period from January 2002 – 
December 2007 
 
 
 
total
tX∆  
tGDP∆  -4.225  
tCPI∆  -0.647 
tM 2∆  -0.175 
tPR∆  -0.201 
tCOCOA∆  -0.339 
tOIL∆  0.001 
tGOLD∆  -0.050 
REDM -0.016 
HIPC 0.013 
  
2R  0.159 
Diagnostics 
Serial  0.034 
heteroscedasticity 0.863 
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Table 7.3 represents the results of the regression between the order flow and changes in the 
fundamentals and commodity prices.  This is a general model that includes both significant 
and insignificant variables.  In other words, all the explanatory variables have been left in 
the equation.  More importantly, the diagnostics suggests the presence of auto-correlation 
and heteroscedasticity in this regression.  In an attempt to tackle auto-correlation, 
subsequent analysis will include lagged flows.  Also due to publication lags, the first and 
second lags of fundamental changes will be excluded in all regressions. We proceed by 
employing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) in selecting the optimal lag lengths of 
the variables.   
Further regressions were carried out by regressing order flow (total, foreign and local) on 
changes in commodity prices only (Table 7.4) and similar regression were repeated for 
changes in fundamentals (Table 7.5).  Finally, order flow was regressed on both changes in 
fundamentals and commodity prices (Table 7.6). 
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Table 7.4   Relationship between changes in commodity prices and order flow 
 
OLS regression of order flow (total, foreign and local) on lagged changes in commodity prices 
(General-to-Specific Approach): 
t
N
n ntt
uredmhipccx ++++=∆ 
=
−00
α .. 
 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
using the Newey-West HAC correction.   Serial correlation shows the p-values for the Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange multiplier tests for first-order residual correlation.  Heteroscedasticity shows the p-value for the 
White first-order conditional heteroscedasticity test with cross terms in the residuals.  Significant variables are 
reported at least at a 10% level.  For each equation, the total number of observations is 71, spanning the period 
from January 2002 – December 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
total
tX∆  
foreign
tX∆  
local
tX∆  
1−∆ tCOCOA   -0.053 (-1.849)  
OIL∆  
  0.573 (6.421) 
1−∆ tGOLD  0.070 (1.876)   
1−∆ tX  0.866 (13.183) 0.771 (10.343)  
REDM -0.069 (-13.406) -0.027 (-11.301) -0.029 (-9.769) 
2R  0.671 0.539 0.244 
 Diagnostics  
Serial  0.056 0.099 0.011 
heteroscedasticity 0.000 0.047 0.540 
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Table 7.5   Relationship between changes in fundamentals and order flow 
 
OLS regression of order flow (total, foreign and local) on lagged changes in fundamentals only 
(General-to-Specific Approach): 
t
N
n ntt
uredmhipcfx ++++=∆ 
=
−30
α  
 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
using the Newey-West HAC correction.   Serial correlation shows the p-values for the Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange multiplier tests for first-order residual correlation.  Heteroscedasticity shows the p-value for the 
White first-order conditional heteroscedasticity test with cross terms in the residuals.  Significant variables are 
reported at least at a 10% level.  For each equation, the total number of observations is 71, spanning the period 
from January 2002 – December 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
total
tX∆  
foreign
tX∆  
local
tX∆  
4−∆ tCPI    0.064 (1.976) 
5−∆ tCPI  -0.176 (-2.397)   
3−∆ tGDP  0.351 (2.881)   
52 −+∆ tM  -0.094 (-2.662)   
3−∆ tPR  -0.103 (-1.785)  -0.065 (-3.110) 
1−∆ tX  0.552 (5.115) 0.587 (5.877) 0.197 (2.175) 
3−∆ tX    0.325 (2.402) 
4−∆ tX  0.432 (3.377) 0.350 (3.018) 0.374 (4.606) 
HIPC   0.003 (4.435) 
REDM -0.081 (-15.833) -0.040 (-7.783) -0.023 (-7.699) 
2R  0.758 0.593 0.452 
 Diagnostics  
Serial  0.194 0.116 0.180 
heteroscedasticity 0.032 0.005 0.414 
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Table 7.6   Relationship between changes in fundamentals/commodity prices and order flow 
 
OLS regression of order flow (total, foreign and local) on lagged changes in fundamentals and 
commodity prices (General-to-Specific Approach): 
t
N
n nt
N
n ntt
ucfx +++=∆ 
=
−
=
− 030
α .. 
 
 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
using the Newey-West HAC correction.   Serial correlation shows the p-values for the Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange multiplier tests for first-order residual correlation.  Heteroscedasticity shows the p-value for the 
White first-order conditional heteroscedasticity test with cross terms in the residuals.  Significant variables are 
reported at least at a 10% level.  For each equation, the total number of observations is 72, spanning the period 
from January 2002 – December 2007 
 
 
 
 
total
tX∆  
foreign
tX∆  
local
tX∆  
1−∆ tX  0.575 (5.415) 0.581 (6.298)  
3−∆ tX    0.413 (3.664) 
4−∆ tX  0.401 (3.074)  0.389 (3.466) 
5−∆ tX    0.197 (2.221) 
6−∆ tX   0.258 (2.782)  
4−∆ tCPI    0.118 (3.364) 
4−∆ tGDP   0.241 (2.597)  
2−∆ tCOCOA   0.056 (2.469)  
3−∆ tGOLD   0.051 (1.768) -0.057 (-2.276) 
5−∆ tOIL   -0.028 (-2.052)  
52 −+∆ tM  -0.087 (-2.348)  -0.077 (-2.127) 
3−∆ tPR  -0.106 (-1.878)  -0.114 (-5.972) 
REDM -0.081 (-15.214)   
    
2R  0.749 0.550 0.551 
 Diagnostics  
Serial  0.390 0.122 0.384 
heteroscedasticity 0.006 0.001 0.030 
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Tables 7.4 to 7.6 show the results of the regressions.  Evidently, most of the signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with expectations (equation 7.4 to 7. 9). 
In Table 7.4, changes in gold price are significant (10% significance level) and are 
negatively correlated with total order flow.  This is contrary to expectations (equation 7.4) 
but not surprising because in times of recession and uncertainty, gold is viewed as a safe-
haven.  Investors sometimes use gold to hedge against future inflation.  An increase in 
gold prices may signal bad macro news and may induce local customers to purchase 
dollars and sell the local currency, resulting in the positive correlation between local order 
flow and changes in gold price.  Changes in cocoa price are significant and negatively 
correlated with foreign order flow, as expected (equation 7.4).  It must be noted that cocoa 
is the main foreign exchange earner for the Ghanaian economy.  Favourable cocoa prices 
(assuming volume remains constant) imply that there’s excess FX in the economy.  From 
the point of view of local customers, this is good macro news and as result would prefer to 
buy cedis (and sell dollars) (equation 7.6).  
Contrary to expectations, changes in oil price are positively correlated with local order 
flow (equation 7.6).  Ghana is a net importer of crude oil and any sharp rise in the oil price 
could have serious repercussions on the macroeconomy.  Local individuals and customers 
may decide to hedge against these adverse domestic conditions by increasing their holding 
of FX (selling cedis).  
In Table 7.5, changes in CPI, money supply and prime rate are negatively correlated with 
total order flow.  Changes in GDP, on the other hand, are positively correlated as expected 
(equation 7.7).  With the exception of changes in CPI, the signs of the variables are in line 
with our expectations (equation 7.7). Increases in the CPI are an indication of the upward 
movements in the general price level in the economy.  This has direct implications for food 
prices, cost of production for local firms, real wages and cost of living.  Relatively more 
cedis would be needed to be able to afford the higher price level, and this would lead to the 
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purchase of more cedis (or sale of FX).   Changes in CPI are positively correlated with 
local order whiles changes in the prime rate are negatively correlated, as expected 
(equation 7.9). 
 
Table 7.6 contains one the most important results of this chapter.  Changes in money 
supply and prime rate are significant and negatively correlated with total order flow, as 
expected.  Also changes in GDP, gold and cocoa prices are significant and positively 
correlated to foreign order flow.   
Most of these foreign customers are multi-national, mining companies etc.  We therefore 
observe that repatriation of their profits involves selling the local currency and buying FX 
(mainly dollars) and transferring funds to their parent companies. Furthermore, in Ghana, 
such corporate entities usually maintain most of their cash holding in foreign currency due 
to the constant depreciation of the local currency and the uncertainties related to 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Consequently, an increase in the GDP emanating from rising export prices and/or 
increased real sector activity will translate into foreign customers having more dollars to 
sell or buying more cedis. The estimated regression further shows that changes in gold 
prices, money growth, prime rate and consumer price index are significant in explaining 
local customer flows.  Changes in gold prices, money growth and prime rate are negatively 
correlated with local flows, as expected. On the other hand, changes in CPI are positively 
correlated with local flows.  
We observe that foreign firms are much more concerned with general state of the economy 
(movements in GDP) and the performance of the export sector whiles local firms are 
preoccupied with demand factors (changes in CPI, money growth and prime rate) that 
directly influence their business operations. 
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Adjusted 2R is relatively high in terms of FX microstructure and ranges from 24% to 78%.  
Our diagnostics indicate that the models are of a relatively good fit and the auto-
correlation present in the initial stages has been successfully eliminated. 
It is also interesting to note that the currency redenomination is significant in the total 
order flow equation.  This confirms the possible relationship between currency 
redenomination and order flows. 
Similar to King, Sarno and Sojli (2010), we have been able to ascertain that fundamentals 
explain order flow. 
The above regressions will form the basis for decomposition of order flow into its 
expected and unexpected components in the next section. 
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7.7 Order flow and Macroeconomic expectations 
 
In order to assess whether order flow reflects changes in expectations, with regard to 
current economic conditions, we continue to conduct further investigations.  As has been 
argued in the literature, order flow should reflect changes in expectations with regards to 
current economic conditions (King, Sarno and Sojli (2010)).  Accordingly, our analysis is 
performed by splitting foreign and local order flows into their expected and unexpected 
components.  From the equation in table 7.6, the fitted values are stored as expected flows 
while residual values are stored as unexpected flows. 
We also add together the expected flows from locals and foreign flows, and unexpected 
flows from local and foreign flows in order to obtain just one series of expected and 
unexpected flows, and then use those in the subsequent regression.  Subsequently, the 
changes in exchange rate are regressed on the unexpected flows and the expected flows 
(7.7).  The REDM and HIPC dummies are included in all the equations.    The approach 
used to obtain this measure of order flow is different from the approach adopted in chapter 
5, where we regress order flow on changes in exchange rates and interest rates.  It is 
interesting to note that the overall results are similar and fall in line with our initial 
expectations.  First, order flow performed well in explaining changes in the exchange rate 
dynamics.  The unexpected flows coefficient is significant and positively signed (Table 
7.7) and confirms our previous findings in chapter 5. Expected order flow, on the other 
hand, is insignificant. According to table 7.7, an unexpected net purchase of $1m is 
associated with a 0.12% depreciation of the CEDI.  The magnitude of this unexpected flow 
coefficient is not directly comparable to the coefficient in chapter 5.  In chapter 5, we test 
our model on different sample periods, the data was weekly and order flow was spilt using 
a different set of variables.  This explains the difference in magnitude between the two 
unexpected order flow variables.   
 
  224 
 
Table 7.7: Relationship between changes in exchange rate and expected and unexpected 
flows 
 
OLS regression of changes in exchange rate on Foreign and Local expected/unexpected 
order flows and lagged changes in exchange rate   (General model): 
tn ntn ntt
uHIPCREDMUFEFS +++++=∆ 
=
−
=
−
1
0
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00
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 tS∆  
tEF∆  -0.026 (-1.317) 
  
tUF∆  0.076 (2.907) 
  
HIPC -0.003 (-5.087) 
 
 
REDM 0.007 (3.295) 
2R  0.173 
  
Serial 0.485 
heteroscedasticity 0.000 
 
T-values are in parenthesis. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction.   Serial correlation shows the p-values for the 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests for first-order residual correlation.  Heteroscedasticity shows the 
p-value for the White first-order conditional heteroscedasticity test with cross terms in the residuals.  
Significant variables are reported at least at a 10% level.  For each equation, the total number of observations 
is 71, spanning the period from January 2002 – December 2007 
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7.7.1 Forecasting Future Fundamentals 
We have not only been able to show that current flows are in part a reflection of past 
fundamentals, but also show that these fundamentals are reflected in the current exchange 
rate since the expected flows derived from past fundamentals are not significant in 
explaining exchange rate changes.  Nevertheless, since unexpected flows are significant, the 
question becomes “what do these flows represent?”  Preferably, these flows should 
represent future fundamentals, much like the Citibank flows of Evans and Lyons (2007) 
which predict future fundamentals.  In the spirit of Evans and Lyons (2007), we test one of 
the empirical implications of their model which states that flows should convey more 
precise information about future fundamentals much better than current spot rates do.  
According to their model, order flow should have significant forecasting power for future 
spot rates when agents’ transactions flows transmit information about future fundamentals 
that is news to dealers.  
Order flow will have forecasting power when agents have different forecasts of future 
fundamentals, information aggregation is partial or the distribution of wealth has forecasting 
power for fundamentals. 
Our approach to forecasting fundamentals is similar to that of Evans and Lyons (2007).  
They compare the goodness of fit between models forecasting say GDP growth using just 
lagged GDP growth, just lagged spot rates, just lagged order flow and using all three since 
this demonstrates the marginal contribution of order flow.  As a result, one can conclude 
that order flow has substantial forecasting power when this forecasting power is a 
significant increment over the forecasting variables.  Also, we present all the regression 
outputs illustrating the general-to-specific approach (Appendix C1-C3). 
Our previous results indicate that flows from different sources are explained by different 
fundamentals.  Therefore, we would also like to find out if unexpected flows from different 
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sources help explain different future fundamentals.  Thus, we attempt to forecast using local 
and foreign banks flows separately and test for the differences in forecasting power. 
Our results (table 7.8-7.10) are mixed and ambiguous.  Order flow does not seem have 
adequate forecasting power which represents a significant increment over the forecasting 
power of the other variables.  The results indicate that, in the CEDI/USD market, most of 
the future fundamentals can be forecast with past fundamental information and spot rates. 
Contrary to Evans and Lyons (2007), the marginal contribution of unexpected order flows 
to forecasting future fundamentals is not obvious. 
We observe that though flows alone are relatively successful in predicting GDP growth, 
lagged GDP growth is able to perfectly forecast GDP growth.  This leaves no allowance for 
the marginal contribution of order flow to forecasting GDP growth (table 7.8 – 7.10). 
Spot rates are relatively much more successful in forecasting inflation.  This observation is 
not too surprising, considering the BOG’s passive FX interventions which keeps the 
exchange rate stable.  Flows provide information about future fundamentals but not more 
than spot rates (table 7.8). 
Flows are relatively unsuccessful in forecasting money growth, gold and cocoa prices.  
However adding flows to the system increases the 2R .  Additionally local flows help in 
forecasting money growth and cocoa prices whiles foreign flows contribute to predicting 
gold prices (table 7.9 – 7.10). 
Foreign unexpected flows have forecasting power for oil price changes (table 7.10 and 
appendix C3).  Generally, we do not expect flows to have significant forecasting power for 
commodity price changes. Yet, we observe that foreign unexpected flows are able to predict 
future oil prices changes.  This result is driven by the fact that the foreign bank customers 
(i.e. mainly multinationals) could be incorporating global economic information into 
Ghanaian flows.   
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Our results fall short of backing and confirming the empirical findings of Evans and Lyons 
(2007) who find that transaction flows have forecasting power for future fundamentals 
relative to current spot price and fundamentals.  Similarly, Evans and Lyons (2007) show 
that transaction flows in the EUR/USD market forecast GDP growth, money growth and 
inflation.  Using their empirical findings, they argue that if dealers believe that signals of 
future macro realizations are truly incremental to public macro information, then they will 
impound this information in price-setting. 
So in conclusion, there is no overwhelming evidence that flows predict future fundamentals 
and more data is needed to thoroughly investigate this relationship. 
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Table 7.8: Forecasting Fundamentals using total order flow 
Forecasting Variables GDP Forecasting Variables PR 
GDP 0.946 PR 0.011 
Spot 0.137 Spot 0.028 
GDP & Spot rates 0.965 PR & Spot rates 0.028 
Order Flow 0.690 Order Flow 0.010 
ALL 0.973 ALL  0.051 
Forecasting Variables CPI Forecasting Variables Oil 
CPI 0.014 Oil 0.032 
Spot 0.135 Spot 0.029 
CPI & Spot rates 0.275 Oil & Spot rates 0.034 
Order Flow 0.064 Order Flow 0.058 
ALL 0.289 ALL 0.024 
Forecasting Variables M2+ Forecasting Variables Cocoa 
M2+ 0.079 Cocoa 0.053 
Spot 0.053 Spot 0.023 
GDP & Spot rates 0.209 Cocoa & Spot rates 0.098 
Order Flow 0.059 Order Flow 0.041 
ALL 0.292 ALL 0.165 
Forecasting Variables Gold   
Gold 0.057   
Spot 0.057   
Gold & Spot rates 0.088   
Order Flow 0.028   
ALL 0.173   
The table reports the 2R from the forecasting OLS regression for the fundamentals and 
commodity prices listed in the header of each panel using the forecasting variables on 
the left.  The regressions are estimated in monthly data.  The monthly estimates of 
fundamentals are based on the history of macro announcements. 
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Table 7.9: Forecasting Fundamentals with Foreign Flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forecasting Variables GDP Forecasting Variables PR 
GDP 0.946 PR 0.011 
Spot 0.137 Spot 0.028 
GDP & Spot rates 0.965 PR & Spot rates 0.028 
Order Flow 0.588 Order Flow 0.001 
ALL 0.971 ALL 0.027 
Forecasting Variables CPI Forecasting Variables Oil 
CPI 0.014 Oil 0.032 
Spot 0.135 Spot 0.029 
CPI & Spot rates 0.275 Oil & Spot rates 0.034 
Order Flow 0.068 Order Flow 0.063 
ALL 0.349 ALL 0.169 
Forecasting Variables M2+ Forecasting Variables Cocoa 
M2+ 0.079 Cocoa 0.053 
Spot 0.053 Spot 0.023 
GDP & Spot rates 0.209 Cocoa & Spot rates 0.090 
Order Flow 0.004 Order Flow 0.000 
ALL 0.209 ALL 0.096 
Forecasting Variables Gold   
Gold 0.026   
Spot 0.057   
Gold & Spot rates 0.088   
Order Flow 0.004   
ALL 0.141   
The table reports the 2R from the forecasting OLS regression for the fundamentals and 
commodity prices listed in the header of each panel using the forecasting variables on 
the left.  The regressions are estimated in monthly data.  The monthly estimates of 
fundamentals are based on the history of macro announcements. 
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Table 7.10: Forecasting Fundamentals with local order flow 
Forecasting Variables GDP Forecasting Variables PR 
GDP 0.946 PR 0.011 
Spot 0.137 Spot 0.028 
GDP & Spot rates 0.965 PR & Spot rates 0.028 
Order Flow 0.748 Order Flow 0.006 
ALL 0.975 ALL 0.078 
Forecasting Variables CPI Forecasting Variables Oil 
CPI 0.014 Oil 0.032 
Spot 0.135 Spot 0.029 
CPI & Spot rates 0.275 Oil & Spot rates 0.034 
Order Flow 0.064 Order Flow 0.019 
ALL 0.286 ALL 0.034 
Forecasting Variables M2+ Forecasting Variables Cocoa 
M2+ 0.079 Cocoa 0.053 
Spot 0.053 Spot 0.001 
GDP & Spot rates 0.209 Cocoa & Spot rates 0.098 
Order Flow 0.117 Order Flow 0.044 
ALL 0.302 ALL 0.187 
Forecasting Variables Gold   
Gold 0.057   
Spot 0.057   
Gold & Spot rates 0.088   
Order Flow 0.004   
ALL 0.117   
The table reports the 2R from the forecasting OLS regression for the fundamentals and 
 commodity prices listed in the header of each panel using the forecasting variables on 
the left.  The regressions are estimated in monthly data.  The monthly estimates of 
fundamentals are based on the history of macro announcements. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
As argued by King, Sarno and Sojli (2010), there has been decades of unsuccessful 
attempts to link exchange rates to macroeconomic fundamentals.  In recent times, 
however, several studies have emerged with strong contemporaneous relation between 
order flow and exchange rate.  Most researchers conclude that any attempt to contribute 
meaningfully to the debate would require a long and comprehensive dataset in order to 
provide robust and reliable results for easy replication.   
In this chapter, we examine the link between order flow, commodity prices and macro 
fundamentals in the context of the Ghanaian economy (an emerging economy in sub-
Saharan Africa).  We employ monthly order flow data reported by five commercial banks 
(both foreign and domestic). 
This chapter has four key empirical findings: 
1. A significant proportion of flows can be forecasted using lagged public information  
2. Flows from different sources are driven by different fundamentals 
3. Expected flows do not affect spot rates but unexpected flows do.  This is a very 
significant result since the advanced market literature cannot really find much predictable 
flow (all flow is surprising) 
4.  There is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that unexpected flows predict future 
fundamentals.  Results are mixed. 
 
The empirical results are broadly in line with the microstructure approach to exchange 
rates.  In general, we find a strong link between order flow commodity prices and macro 
fundamentals.  Also, our presumptions about the different (expected and unexpected) 
flows and their impact on the exchange rates of an emerging economy in sub-Saharan 
Africa are backed by our data.   
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We would like to emphasis that our analysis reveals some additional features worth 
commenting on.  For example, contrary to our a-priori expectation, only changes in money 
growth and prime rate were significant in explaining monthly order flow in the Ghanaian 
economy.  Implicitly, changes in growth of the economy (GDP) and the performance of 
the export sector are the most important factors determining foreign order flows; all other 
macroeconomic indicators do not matter much. However, changes in other macroeconomic 
variables (prime rate, money supply, CPI) and oil prices are the major determinants of 
local order flows.  These results imply that while foreign customers only consider the 
performance of the general economy, local customers consider ‘demand’ factors that have 
a direct bearing on their operations. 
The results are consistent with Sarno and Taylor‘s assertion that order flows better proxy 
macro determinants than macro variables themselves.  Furthermore, order flows are 
closely related to commodity price fluctuations as one would expect from a small open 
economy like Ghana.  Our results fall short in confirming the empirical findings of Evans 
and Lyons (2007) who observe that order flow aid in predicting future fundamentals.  
Additional data may be needed to thoroughly investigate the forecasting power of order 
flow. 
In summary, the results provided in this chapter adds further evidence to existing literature 
that order flow is key to understanding changes in exchange rate.  This relationship may be 
responsible for the high explanatory power of order flow found in previous literature and 
reinforces other empirical evidence that macro information influences exchange rates at 
high frequency (Andersen et al., 2003).   King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) makes similar 
observations for Canadian FX market.  Specifically, King, Sarno and Sojli (2010) asserts 
that order flow captures changes in expectations for macroeconomic fundamentals and 
responds to changes in commodity futures, especially gold and aluminum.  This view is 
consistent with leading microstructure theories which consider order flow as a forward 
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looking variable (Evans and Lyons, 2005).  Order flow is, thus, strongly related to 
economic fundamentals which in turn can provide useful guidance for macroeconomic 
management.   Thus our results confirm previous findings by Evans and Lyons (2007) and 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) who argue that the order flow channel is the missing 
link between exchange rates and fundamentals. 
In general, this chapter lends further support to past empirical findings that order flow is 
vital to understanding exchange rate movements. 
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   Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
Customer order flow is a key concept in the microstructure approach to exchange rates. 
The contribution of this thesis to empirical exchange rate economics is three-fold.  First, 
the Evans and Lyons (2002a) model is applied to Ghanaian data using the analytical 
framework of the FX microstructure literature, in order to find out the nature of the 
relationship between order flow and exchange rates.  This unique dataset is the first of its 
kind for Africa and spans a relatively longer time period than most papers in existing 
literature.   
Our key results can be summarised as follows. Weekly customer order flow is able to 
explain a significant part of the fluctuations of the Cedi/US$ exchange rate. The 
explanatory power of the different models considered is comparable to other empirical 
findings. 
The positive correlation between exchange rate movements and order flow, which has 
been reported in numerous studies in microstructure literature, is confirmed.  Specifically, 
this positive relationship is observed during the crisis period whiles a negative relationship 
observed for the relatively stable period.  This finding is consistent with the model of 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ customers. However, this result differs from the findings of other authors 
who usually find that financial clients are the push customers and non-financial customers 
are the pull ones, irrespective of location. 
Our key results are relatively stable over time. The sign and the magnitude of the key order 
flow coefficients are similar in both the pre-2003 and the post-2003 sample, and they are 
also comparable to the full-sample results. The only key exception is the central bank’s 
order flow, which is present with a strong and significant coefficient in the full-sample 
regression, and is insignificant in the post-2003 regression. 
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Another interesting finding is related to central bank intervention: it seems that central 
bank is highly successful during times of market turmoil, but its FX transactions during 
normal times have no measurable impact on the exchange rate. Future research is needed, 
however, to confirm these claims with stronger evidence. We regard this analysis as a first 
step in understanding the microstructure of the CEDI/USD market. 
 
We believe the negative relationship between order flow and exchange rates points to the 
possible presence of negative feedback trading by the corporate entities.  However, this 
paper lays more emphasis on the nature of expected and unexpected flows and how each 
component influences exchange rate movements.   
 
In the spirit of Love and Payne (2008), the Campbell-Schiller decomposition is used to 
split order flow into expected and unexpected components.  As expected, unexpected 
flows are statistically significant and positively signed.  We also discover that the highly 
inefficient FX market is mainly responsible for the significance of expected flows in 
explaining exchange rate movements.   
 
We acknowledge the existence of the parallel market and find that the parallel market rate 
adjusts to the official market rate in the long-run.  The issue of liquidity has serious 
implications for the relationship between order flow and exchange rate.  During the crisis 
period, the Ghanaian FX market is relatively illiquid and this results in a relatively larger 
impact of order flow on exchange rate movements.  An unexpected net customer purchase 
of $1m during the crisis period results in a 0.37% depreciation of the exchange rate while 
the same purchase results in only 0.03% depreciation during the stable period.   
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The issue of information effects of order flow was also tackled.  The persistent long-run 
effect of order flow on exchange rate movements is evidence of the information 
aggregation role of order flow.  Using Wald coefficient restrictions tests, we find that 
unexpected order flows have a permanent effect on exchange rates.  Even though the static 
E&L model has been altered to account for the inefficiencies in the FX market, this is the 
first time that the E&L model has been applied in any form to African data.    
 
This is the only microstructure study that has acknowledged the role of parallel FX 
markets in emerging markets and has accordingly incorporated this in its analysis.  
Attempts to establish a long-run relationship between order flow and exchange rate levels 
proved futile as the Johansen methodology yielded inconclusive results.  However, it must 
be stressed that this cointegration framework does recognize the central role being played 
by BOG in the FX market. 
 
The issue of BOG activity on the FX market leads to our second contribution.  After a 
establishing a strong positive correlation between order flow and exchange rate 
movements, we attempt to examine how customers’ demand for dollars is satisfied.  BOG 
activity has generated intense debate amongst practitioners and academicians.  Whiles 
BOG always describes its role on the FX market as passive, critics accuse it of actively 
embarking on sustained long-term interventions to smoothen volatility and maintain a 
stable exchange rate.   
 
Delving into Ghanaian FX market and identifying liquidity demanders and suppliers will 
help us to better understand the role of BOG, banks and customers.  Bjønnes et al. (2005) 
use the Johansen cointegration framework to identify liquidity demanders and suppliers in 
the Swedish Krona market.  They find that non-financial customers are liquidity suppliers 
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(pull customers) whiles financial customers are liquidity demanders (push customers).  
Subsequently, we adopt the Bjønnes et al. (2005) framework and apply it to Ghanaian 
data.  However, the variables used in our study differ significantly from those used by 
Bjønnes et al. (2005).  Instead of financial and non-financial variables, the main variables 
in our study are BOG, bank and customers.  Initially, Granger-Causality tests indicate that 
BOG is on the passive side of trades whiles bank customers are the aggressors.  In other 
words, as customers demand liquidity, BOG passively supplies liquidity.   
 
In the Ghanaian context, BOG is the pull customer and bank customers are the push 
customers.  In the short-run, the banks assume the role of liquidity providers.  These 
preliminary results are reinforced by the main results obtained from the Johansen 
cointegration framework.  
 
Interestingly, the customer flow is positively correlated with exchange rate levels in the 
long-run for the first cointegrating equation.  According to the second cointegrating 
equation, BOG equally matches customer flows.  In the error correction model, customer 
flows and exchange rate adjust to attain equilibrium in the long-run for the first 
cointegrating equation whiles only BOG adjusts in second cointegrating relationship.   
 
 
 
Small sizes of the exchange rate alphas indicate the relatively slow speed of exchange rate 
adjustment.  The problem of extremely small exchange rate alphas is resolved by splitting 
the data set in to crisis and stable periods.  The previous results are robust across the two 
sub-samples and the exchange rate alphas assume ‘normal’ sizes.  During the pre-
intervention period, it is the remittance customers that act as liquidity providers.  These 
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results have been corroborated by Ghanaian bank treasurers.  Typically, BOG satisfies 
roughly 40 to 50 percent of FX orders, consisting of unmet customer demand.  However, 
during crisis periods characterised with inadequate FX reserves, BOG barely satisfies 10% 
of FX orders thus leading to an accelerated depreciation of the CEDI. 
 
This has serious policy implications for the economy as a whole.  Banks should actively 
search for other sources of FX in order to reduce over-reliance on Ghana’s scarce FX 
reserves.  A shift from this practise will definitely free up more FX to develop vital sectors 
of the economy.  Ideally, BOG should only intervene in times of crisis, where short-term 
interventions would aid in the smoothening of any sharp volatility on the FX market. 
 
Our third and most important contribution consists of unearthing the main drivers of order 
flow.  After establishing the positive correlation between order flow and exchanges rates 
and identifying participants who were behind the order flow, this thesis attempts to 
investigate the determinants of order flow. In other words, we attempt to  explore the 
driving forces behind the ‘push’ customers. 
 
It is widely accepted in FX microstructure that order flow is only a proximate determinant 
of exchange rate movements.  According to Sarno and Taylor (2001), macro fundamentals 
could still be the main drivers of exchange rates but their imprecise measures renders order 
flow a better proxy in estimation.   
 
Other studies like Evans and Lyons (2002a, 2007) present results that suggest that order 
flow is the missing link between exchange rates and fundamentals.  The main aim of 
chapter 7 is to find out if changes in macro fundamentals are linked to order flow.  The 
variables in the monthly dataset consist of macroeconomic variables and commodity 
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prices.  The heavy reliance of the Ghanaian economy on commodity exports and the strong 
relationship between commodity prices and exchange rates necessitates the inclusion of 
commodity prices in our empirical analysis.   
 
Using OLS, we find that changes in fundamentals are the main drivers of order flow in 
Ghana.  Moreover, we know how the local and foreign components of order flow are 
affected by changes in macro fundamentals and commodity prices.  Flows from different 
sources are explained by different fundamentals.  It is interesting to note that, only changes 
in GDP and export sector performance explain foreign order flow whiles changes in both 
macro fundamentals and oil prices explain local flows. 
Additionally, we find that there is no overwhelming evidence that order flow has 
significant forecasting power for GDP growth, inflation and money growth.  Order flow 
has predictive power but not over and above that of spot rates and past fundamental 
information.  On the CEDI/USD market, most of the future fundamentals can be forecast 
with past fundamental information and spot rates.  A more comprehensive dataset may be 
necessary in order to facilitate a rigorous analysis of the predictive power of order flow. 
 
 
In sum, results from this thesis indicate that order flow is critical to understanding exchange 
rate movements in an emerging economy like Ghana.  We observe that order flow is 
strongly correlated with exchange rate movements and is also linked to changes in the 
fundamentals.  Consequently, order flow could be described as the missing link between 
exchange rates and macro fundamentals.  Additionally, current flows reflect changes in past 
fundamentals and these past fundamentals are reflected in the current exchange rate. The 
expected flows derived from past fundamentals are not significant in explaining exchange 
rate changes whiles the unexpected flows are significant.  Importantly, our findings are 
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consistent with the view that the key driver of exchange rate is standard macro 
fundamentals.   
Oour results confirm previous findings by Evans and Lyons (2002a and 2007) and 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) who argue that the order flow channel is the missing 
link between exchange rates and fundamentals. 
 
We believe that this thesis has made a significant contribution to FX microstructure of an      
emerging economy.  For the first time, microstructure tools have been applied to African 
data.  Taking into account the peculiar nature of the Ghanaian FX market, deepens our 
understanding of FX dynamics in Ghana.   
 
This thesis could serve as a benchmark for further FX microstructure studies in other 
African markets.  Though we present a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
relationship between macro fundamentals, exchange rates and order flow, further analysis 
will be required in order to fully appreciate the relationship between these variables. 
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A. Appendix: Further Results from chapter 6 
A1: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (unrestricted) 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R - 0.224 
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.000 (-5.255) 0.384 (4.859)  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.028 (–4.206) -8.544 (-0.242) -113.744 (-3.167) 
cointeq2 0.000 (1.773) -0.003 (-1.419) -0.012 (-5.968) 
Sample: November 2002- December 2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The 
Unrestricted VAR models the cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  The VAR has 
three lags.  The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating 
vector is normalised on BOG.  The error corrections are also reported.    
 
A2: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (unrestricted) 
  CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.224 
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.0001 (7.840) 2.601 (10.984)  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.028 (-4.206) -113.744 (-3.167) -8.544 (-0.242) 
cointeq2 0.000 (5.008) -0.004 (-4.292) -0.002 (1.693) 
Sample: November 2002- December 2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The 
Unrestricted VAR models the cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  The VAR has 
three lags.  The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating 
vector is normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error corrections are also reported.    
 
 
A3: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Unrestricted) 
  CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.262 
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.002 (-4.262) 3.205 (4.856)  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.128 (-3.003) -129.429 (-1.247) 24.370 (0.436) 
cointeq2 0.000 (-1.047) -0.167 (-2.141) 0.023 (0.543) 
Sample: 2002-2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The Unrestricted VAR models the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  The VAR has three lags.  The first 
cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is normalised 
on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
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A4: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Unrestricted) 
  CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.262 
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.001 (3.606) 0.312 (2.940)  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.128 (-3.003) 24.370 (0.436) -129.429 (-1.247) 
cointeq2 0.000 (1.785) 0.033 (0.453) -0.325 (-2.369) 
Sample: 2002-2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The Unrestricted VAR models the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers. The VAR has three lags.  The first 
cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is normalised 
on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
A5: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Others) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.009 Adj. 
2R -0.242 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.001 (2.817) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.159 (-3.905) -2.773 (-0.070) 0 
cointeq2 0 0.005 (0.194) 0 
Sample: 2002-2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
A6: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Parsimonious) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.057 Adj. 
2R -0.271 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.002 (-3.919) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.104 (-4.635) 0 0 
cointeq2 0 -0.000 0 
Sample: 2002 - 2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported.    
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A7: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Parsimonious) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.074 Adj. 
2R -0.285 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
 
   
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.001 (3.295) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.1322 (-2.932) 0 0 
cointeq2 0 0 0 
Sample: 2002-2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
A8: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Unrestricted) 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.312 
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.001 (-4.996) 11.826 (5.232)  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 0.057 (2.612) -30.879 (-0.344) -238.807 (-2.452) 
cointeq2 0.000 (-1.047) -0.023 (-2.430) -0.0028 (-0.319) 
Sample: 2004-2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The Unrestricted VAR models the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  The VAR has three lags.  The first 
cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is normalised 
on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
A9: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Unrestricted) 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.302 
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.0001 (3.606) -1.538 (-2.540)  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 0.086 (3.917) -356.507 (-3.570) -31.963 (-0.357) 
cointeq2 0.000 4.832 0.0001 (0.042) -0.011 (-3.440) 
Sample: 2004-2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The Unrestricted VAR models the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers. The VAR has three lags.  The first 
cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is normalised 
on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
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A10: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Others) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.067 Adj. 2R -0.197 
  CointEQ1 CointEQ2   
Lspot 1 0  
BOG 0 1  
Customers -0.000 (-8.945) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (BOG) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.049 (-2.059) 0.0000 417.373 (4.089) 
cointeq2 0 0 -0.079 (-3.551) 
Sample: 2004 -2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on BOG.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported.    
 
A11: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Others) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.073 Adj. 
2R -0.197 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.000 (2.817) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.043 (-2.108) -416.743 (-4.085) 0 
cointeq2 0 0.098 (-3.783) 0 
Sample: 2004-2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
 
 
 
A12: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Unrestricted) 
  CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.5049 
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
REM -0.007 (-2.520) 1.481 (18.792)  
error correction  (LSPOT) (REM) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.008 (-2.802) -1.984 (-2.687) -0.818 (-2.367) 
cointeq2 0.000 (0.959) 0.012 (0.404) -0.048 (-3.435) 
Sample: 2000 -2002.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The Unrestricted VAR models the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of remittance (REM) and normal Customers.  The VAR has three lags.  
The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term is also reported.    
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A13: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Unrestricted) 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2 Adj. 2R -0.536 
Lspot 1 0  
REM 0 1  
Customers -0.0033 (1.955) 0.695 (24.442)  
error correction (LSPOT) (REM) (Customers) 
cointeq1 -0.011 (-3.123) -0.668 (-1.542) -1.919 (-2.036) 
cointeq2 0.001 (2.155) -0.0701 (-3.352) 0.017 (0.371) 
Sample: 2000 -2002.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The Unrestricted VAR models the 
cedi/dollar exchange rate and the flows of remittance (REM) and normal Customers.  The VAR has three lags.  
The first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on REM.  The error correction term is also reported.    
 
 
A14: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.0624 Adj. 2R -0.2812 
  CointEQ1 CointEQ2   
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.001 (2.817) 1  
error correction  (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.150 (-3.120) -70.460 (-1.456) 0 
cointeq2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.042 (-0.828) 
Sample: 2002-2004.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
 
 
 
A15: Vector Error Correction Estimates, weekly observation (Theory) 
P-value 
restrictions 0.098 Adj. 
2R -0.209 
  
CointEQ1 CointEQ2  
Lspot 1 0  
Customers 0 1  
BOG 0.000 (6.734) 1  
error correction (LSPOT) (Customers) (BOG) 
cointeq1 -0.065 (-2.195) 376.686 (3.623) 0.0000 
cointeq2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.077 (-3.260) 
Sample: 2004-2007.  Cointegration estimated using Johansen technique.  The VAR models the cedi/dollar 
exchange rate and the flows of BOG and Customers.  Bank flows are not modelled but rather its differences 
and two lags of differences are included in the VAR as exogenous variables.  The VAR has three lags.  The 
first cointegrating vector is normalised on the exchange rate, while the second cointegrating vector is 
normalised on CUSTOMERS.  The error correction term and the restrictions test are also reported 
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B. Appendix: Role of BOG in Ghanaian FX market 
The Bank of Ghana’s powers to deal in Foreign Exchange is empowered in the Bank of 
Ghana Act, 2002, Act 612 part VI section 50 which states inter alia that: 
“PART VI—FOREIGN OPERATIONS 
Transactions in assets of international value 
50. (1) The Bank may 
(a) purchase and sell external convertible currencies; 
(b) discount and re-discount treasury bills drawn in convertible 
currencies; 
(c) purchase and sell bills of exchange drawn in convertible currencies; 
(d) import, export, refine, hold, sell, transfer or otherwise deal in gold, gold coins and 
bullion, silver, platinum and any other precious metals as determined by the Board; 
(e) accept deposits from foreign banking institutions, international financial institutions, 
foreign governments and their agencies or the organs of the United Nations; 
(f) acquire, hold and transfer foreign exchange and foreign government securities; 
(g) maintain accounts with central banks and reputable international financial 
institutions; 
(h) act as correspondent bank or agent for an international banking institution or a 
monetary authority; and 
(i) effect foreign exchange transactions of any kind. 
(2) The Bank shall not acquire, hold or transfer any foreign government securities unless 
those securities are denominated in convertible currency. 
Power to borrow and guarantee 
51. (1) The Bank may,  
(a) without the prior approval of the Minister borrow money from foreign institutions for 
a period not exceeding ninety days for the day-to-day operations of the Bank; 
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(b) in accordance with this Act or any other enactment, borrow money from foreign 
institutions and pledge assets held by it as security for the repayment of the loan; 
(c) lend money or grant short-term credits to any financial institutions;  
but the Bank may, without the approval of the Minister, lend to those institutions in the 
ordinary course of business. 
(2) The Bank may, at the written request of the Minister, guarantee a loan granted to the 
Government or an agency of Government by a foreign institution. 
(3)The Bank may shall put a limit on the aggregate of guarantees issued by it in each 
year. . 
(4) The Bank may request security to cover its exposure to any guarantee it issues. 
(5) The Government may guarantee on behalf of the Republic a loan granted under 
paragraph (a) and (b) of subsection (1). 
 
Exchange rate of the cedi 
52. The Board may, in consultation with the Minister, formulate exchange rate policy. 
 
Holding of state foreign exchange 
53 The Bank shall hold all foreign exchange of the State and be responsible to 
Parliament in the performance of its function in relation to the foreign exchange.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  248 
C1. Appendix: Forecasting Fundamentals using Total unexpected Flows 
 
 General tGDP∆   
 3−∆ tGDP  2.992 (7.573)  
 4−∆ tGDP  -2.080 (-5.162)  
 REDM  0.0004 (1.760)  
 HIPC -0.001 (-1.724)  
 
2R  0.946  
 Diagnostics   
 Serial  0.016  
 hetero 0.000  
    
    
General  tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  -0.068 (-0.878)  3−∆ tS  0.222 (2.305) 
2−∆ tS  0.168 (1.674)  4−∆ tS  0.235 (2.326) 
3−∆ tS  0.182 (2.099)  REDM  -0.002 (-2.805) 
4−∆ tS  0.258 (2.427)  HIPC 0.004 (4.901) 
REDM  -0.002 (-2.439)  2R  0.137 
HIPC 0.005 (5.138)  Diagnostics  
2R  0.138  Serial  0.000 
Diagnostics   hetero 0.833 
Serial  0.000    
hetero 0.459    
     
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  0.060 (2.251)  1−∆ tS  0.068 (2.877) 
2−∆ tS  0.082 (2.166)  2−∆ tS  0.086 (2.055) 
3−∆ tS  0.038 (1.346)  3−∆ tGDP  2.593 (5.677) 
4−∆ tS  0.011 (0.475)  4−∆ tGDP  -1.684 (-3.741) 
3−∆ tGDP  2.420 (4.360)  REDM  0.001 (3.150) 
4−∆ tGDP  -1.515 (-2.789)  2R  0.965 
REDM  0.001 (3.147)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.0001 (-0.949)  Serial  0.087 
2R  0.965  hetero 0.000 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.008    
hetero 0.000    
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General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−tUF  0.046 (2.604)  1−tUF  0.054 (3.205) 
2−tUF  0.021 (1.472)  3−tUF  0.052 (3.898) 
3−tUF  0.045 (3.529)  4−tUF  0.057 (3.366) 
4−tUF  0.052 (3.055)  REDM  0.004 (4.813) 
REDM  0.003 (4.046)  HIPC 0.002 (3.267) 
HIPC 0.002 (3.351)  2R  0.690 
2R  0.688  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.000 
Serial  0.000  hetero 0.216 
hetero 0.558    
     
     
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  0.056 (2.984)  1−∆ tS  0.051 (2.869) 
2−∆ tS  0.053 (1.671)  2−∆ tS  0.066 (1.671) 
3−∆ tS  0.011 (0.399)  3−∆ tGDP  2.259 (5.080) 
4−∆ tS  -0.029 (-1.425)  4−∆ tGDP  -1.425 (-3.263) 
3−∆ tGDP  2.211 (4.604)  1−tUF  0.024 (3.579) 
4−∆ tGDP  -1.403 (-2.974)  REDM  0.001 (4.661) 
1−tUF  0.021 (2.895)  2R  0.973 
2−tUF  0.001 (0.139)  Diagnostics  
3−tUF  0.002 (0.367)  Serial  0.166 
4−tUF  0.008 (1.168)  hetero 0.000 
REDM  0.001 (3.704)    
HIPC -0.0003 (-1.104)    
2R  0.971    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.217    
hetero 0.167    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
3−∆ tCPI  0.144 (1.799)  3−∆ tCPI  0.119 (2.284) 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.182 (-1.512)  2R  0.014 
REDM  -0.002 (-0.774)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.006 (-1.442)  Serial  0.157 
2R  0.046  hetero 0.935 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.114    
hetero 0.988    
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General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.569 (0.888)  2−∆ tS  1.673 (1.643) 
2−∆ tS  1.314 (1.693)  HIPC -0.008 (-3.996) 
3−∆ tS  0.949 (1.745)  2R  0.135 
4−∆ tS  0.463 (0.648)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.004 (1.853)  Serial  0.889 
HIPC -0.005 (-1.735)  hetero 0.054 
2R  0.226    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.931    
hetero 0.0002    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.252 (0.449)  2−∆ tS  1.703 (2.059) 
2−∆ tS  1.573 (2.035)  3−∆ tS  1.348 (2.542) 
3−∆ tS  1.097 (2.047)  4−∆ tCPI  -0.256 (-2.115) 
4−∆ tS  0.538 (0.564)  REDM  -0.005 (2.435) 
3−∆ tCPI  0.048 (0.334)  2R  0.275 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.252 (-2.338)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.005 (2.034)  Serial  0.831 
HIPC -0.001 (-0.241)  hetero 0.132 
2R  0.255    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.959    
hetero 0.000    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−tUF  0.089 (0.643)  4−tUF  0.277 (2.136) 
2−tUF  -0.093 (-0.542)  REDM  0.009 (2.659) 
3−tUF  0.069 (0.713)  HIPC -0.017 (-3.917) 
4−tUF  0.235 (2.339)  2R  0.064 
REDM  0.012 (3.126)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.016 (-5.910)  Serial  0.398 
2R  0.020  hetero 0.643 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.401    
hetero 0.790    
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General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.327 (0.598)  2−∆ tS  1.569 (1.976) 
2−∆ tS  1.553 (1.965)  3−∆ tS  1.131 (1.853) 
3−∆ tS  0.999 (1.683)  4−∆ tCPI  -0.284 (-2.277) 
4−∆ tS  0.584 (0.539)  4−tUF  0.153 (1.759) 
3−∆ tCPI  0.017 (0.119)  REDM  0.011 (3.002) 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.254 (-2.323)  2R  0.289 
1−tUF  -0.049 (-0.406)  Diagnostics  
2−tUF  -0.182 (-1.108)  Serial  0.714 
3−tUF  0.032 (0.310)  hetero 0.227 
4−tUF  0.251 (2.119)    
REDM  0.012 (2.571)    
HIPC -0.006 (-1.150)    
2R  0.234    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.217    
hetero 0.167    
     
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
32 −+∆ tM  -0.332 (-3.717)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.335 (-3.808) 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.061(-0.511)  REDM  0.013 (3.143) 
REDM  0.013 (2.809)  HIPC 0.025 (4.244) 
HIPC 0.026 (4.697)  2R  0.079 
2R  0.081  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.099 
Serial  0.151  hetero 0.408 
hetero 0.606    
     
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  2.842 (3.767)  1−∆ tS  1.764 (2.868) 
2−∆ tS  -0.766 (-0.835)  REDM 0.009 (2.543) 
3−∆ tS  -0.949 (-0.533)  HIPC 0.036 (9.489) 
4−∆ tS  -0.989 (-0.883)  2R  0.053 
REDM  0.008 (1.741)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.032 (6.814)  Serial  0.209 
2R  0.080  hetero 0.788 
 Diagnostics      
Serial  0.693    
hetero 0.192    
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General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  3.128 (3.811)  1−∆ tS  2.486 (3.920) 
2−∆ tS  -0.373 (-0.445)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.414 (-4.564) 
3−∆ tS  -0.698 (-0.452)  REDM  0.019 (4.947) 
4−∆ tS  -0.568 (-0.487)  HIPC 0.027 (5.138) 
32 −+∆ tM  -0.389 (-4.136)  2R  0.209 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.086 (-0.824)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.017 (3.881)  Serial  0.144 
HIPC 0.026 (5.098)  hetero 0.845 
2R  0.222    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.659    
hetero 0.096    
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−tUF  0.221 (0.686)  3−tUF  0.743 (3.871) 
2−tUF  -0.309 (-0.824)  4−tUF  -0.670 (-3.047) 
3−tUF  0.813 (3.054)  HIPC 0.045 (7.279) 
4−tUF  -0.611 (-2.046)  2R  0.059 
REDM  0.021 (1.417)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.044 (6.435)  Serial  0.112 
2R  0.024  hetero 0.138 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.048    
hetero 0.866    
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  3.033 (3.884)  1−∆ tS  2.499 (3.964) 
2−∆ tS  -0.661 (-0.649)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.358 (-3.678) 
3−∆ tS  -0.964 (-0.707)  42 −+∆ tM  -0.202 (-1.806) 
4−∆ tS  -0.947 (-0.757)  3−tUF  0.713 (3.143) 
32 −+∆ tM  -0.326 (-3.567)  4−tUF  -0.603 (-2.564) 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.177 (-1.798)  REDM  0.022 (2.267) 
1−tUF  0.132 (0.404)  HIPC 0.040 (5.635) 
2−tUF  -0.169 (-0.477)  2R  0.292 
3−tUF  0.8.2 (3.214)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  -0.473 (-1.662)  Serial  0.229 
REDM  0.031 (1.972)  hetero 0.491 
HIPC 0.034 (3.634)    
2R  0.257    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.486    
hetero 0.701    
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General tPR∆     
3−∆ tPR  0.054 (0.612)    
4−∆ tPR  0.087 (0.696)    
REDM  0.008 (1.430)    
HIPC 0.008 (1.430)    
2R  0.011    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.401    
hetero 0.979    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.723 (0.742)  4−∆ tS  1.596 (2.108) 
2−∆ tS  0.912 (0.532)  REDM 0.101 (2.051) 
3−∆ tS  -0.102 (0.066)  HIPC 0.013 (2.454) 
4−∆ tS  1.145 (1.112)  2R  0.028 
REDM  0.013 (2.881)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.015 (2.853)  Serial  0.312 
2R  0.046  hetero 0.844 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.331    
hetero 0.773    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.788 (0.768)  1−∆ tS  1.596 (2.108) 
2−∆ tS  0.879 (0.501)  REDM  0.010 (2.051) 
3−∆ tS  -0.165 (-0.103)  HIPC 0.013 (2.454) 
4−∆ tS  1.029 (0.944)  2R  0.028 
3−∆ tPR  0.024 (0.252)  Diagnostics  
4−∆ tPR  0.073 (0.599)  Serial  0.312 
REDM  0.012 (2.173)  hetero 0.844 
HIPC 0.014 (2.135)    
2R  0.051    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.305    
hetero 0.975    
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General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−tUF  0.166 (0.367)  3−tUF  -0.133 (-0.488) 
2−tUF  -0.083 (-0.137)  HIPC 0.009 (1.954) 
3−tUF  -0.301 (-0.549)  2R  0.006 
4−tUF  0.135 (0.270)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.007 (0.298)  Serial  0.429 
HIPC 0.007 (0.864)  hetero 0.813 
2R  0.011    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.487    
hetero 0.841    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.709 (0.597)  4−∆ tS  2.514 (2.882) 
2−∆ tS  1.625 (0.788)  2−tUF  -0.347 (-1.645) 
3−∆ tS  0.338 (0.212)  HIPC 0.016 (2.757) 
4−∆ tS  2.239 (1.439)  2R  0.051 
3−∆ tPR  -0.009 (-0.079)  Diagnostics  
4−∆ tPR  0.083 (0.648)  Serial  0.271 
1−tUF  -0.158 (-0.307)  hetero 0.733 
2−tUF  -0.283 (-0.478)    
3−tUF  -0.306 (-0.533)    
4−tUF  0.191 (0.344)    
REDM  0.0001 (-0.0006)    
HIPC 0.018 (1.643)    
2R  0.098    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.228    
hetero 0.895    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ toil  -0.247 (-2.089)  1−∆ toil  -0.219 (-1.819) 
2−∆ toil  -0.207 (-2.052)  2−∆ toil  -0.182 (-2.053) 
3−∆ toil  -0.251 (-1.882)  3−∆ toil  -0.215 (-1.940) 
4−∆ toil  -0.185 (-1.396)  REDM  0.071 (5.113) 
REDM  0.077 (5.135)  HIPC 0.134 (6.446) 
HIPC 0.122 (5.739)  2R  0.032 
2R  0.043  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.621 
Serial  0.151  hetero 0.599 
hetero 0.687    
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General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  3.025 (1.129)  1−∆ tS  1.802 (1.302) 
2−∆ tS  -0.447 (-0.091)  REDM 0.062 (6.022) 
3−∆ tS  -5.024 (-0.918)  HIPC 0.088 (8.648) 
4−∆ tS  -0.026 (-0.008)  2R  0.029 
REDM  0.053 (3.965)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.077 (5.545)  Serial  0.399 
2R  0.067  hetero 0.814 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.387    
hetero 0.469    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  4.367 (1.528)  1−∆ tS  2.635 (1.675) 
2−∆ tS  -0.065 (-0.014)  1−∆ toil  -0.229 (-1.865) 
3−∆ tS  -5.409 (-1.274)  2−∆ toil  -0.187 (-2.091) 
4−∆ tS  -1.579 (-0.424)  3−∆ toil  -0.234 (-2.166) 
1−∆ toil  -0.287 (-2.165)  REDM 0.076 (4.898) 
2−∆ toil  -0.192 (-1.649)  HIPC 0.141 (6.298) 
3−∆ toil  -0.276 (-2.002)  2R  0.034 
4−∆ toil  -0.209 (-1.516)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.073 (4.018)  Serial  0.340 
HIPC 0.113 (5.274)  hetero 0.632 
2R  0.046    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.127    
hetero 0.853    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−tUF  -0.445 (-0.373)  3−tUF  -1.443 (0.062) 
2−tUF  0.376 (0.307)  4−tUF  1.518 (1.826) 
3−tUF    REDM 0.058 (2.391) 
4−tUF  -1.418 (-1.355)  HIPC 0.060 (4.190) 
REDM  1.509 (1.822)  2R  0.058 
HIPC 0.048 (1.089)  Diagnostics  
2R  0.062 (4.329)  Serial  0.476 
Diagnostics 0.061  hetero 0.481 
Serial      
hetero 0.458    
 0.930    
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General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  4.925 (1.669)  3−tUF  -0.259 (-0.527) 
2−∆ tS  -0.0520 (-0.113)  REDM 0.049 (2.109) 
3−∆ tS  -5.776 (-1.159)  HIPC 0.086 (9.109) 
4−∆ tS  -2.395 (-0.631)  2R  0.024 
1−∆ toil  -0.266 (-2.025)  Diagnostics  
2−∆ toil  -0.191 (-1.504)  Serial  0.470 
3−∆ toil  -0.276 (-2.053)  hetero 0.622 
4−∆ toil  -0.192 (1.385)    
1−tUF  -0.288 (-0.269)    
2−tUF  0.172 (0.150)    
3−tUF  -1.144 (-1.056)    
4−tUF  1.641 (1.968)    
REDM  0.081 (2.016)    
HIPC 0.085 (2.799)    
2R  0.016    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.363    
hetero 0.548    
     
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.189 (-2.198)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.180 (-2.315) 
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.219 (-1.518)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.272 (-2.028) 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.040 (-0.237)  HIPC -0.011 (-1.999) 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.168 (1.286)  2R  0.053 
REDM  -0.005 (-0.596)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.008 (-0.597)  Serial  0.068 
2R  0.029  hetero 0.600 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.375    
hetero 0.047    
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.478 (0.419)  3−∆ tS  -1.320 (-1.389) 
2−∆ tS  -1.161 (-0.952)  HIPC -0.008 (-2.175) 
3−∆ tS  -0.041 (-0.335)  2R  0.023 
4−∆ tS  -0.169 (-0.076)  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.003 (-0.657)  Serial  0.038 
HIPC -0.009 (-2.577)  hetero 0.349 
2R  0.021    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.387    
hetero 0.469    
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General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.668 (0.541)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.180 (-2.315) 
2−∆ tS  -0.577 (-0.545)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.272 (-2.028) 
3−∆ tS  -0.604 (-0.399)  HIPC -0.011 (-1.999) 
4−∆ tS  -1.095 (-0.471)  2R  0.098 
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.244 (-2.290)  Diagnostics  
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.224 (-1.659)  Serial  0.068 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.032 (-0.172)  hetero 0.600 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.155 (1.201)    
REDM  -0.006 (-0.777)    
HIPC -0.016 (-0.776)    
2R  0.147    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.744    
hetero 0.005    
     
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−tUF  0.106 (0.320)  3−tUF  -0.364 (-2.059) 
2−tUF  0.392 (0.858)  REDM -0.0145 (-2.099) 
3−tUF  -0.935 (-2.797)  2R  0.041 
4−tUF  0.275 (0.892  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.019 (-1.230)  Serial  0.067 
HIPC -0.013 (-2.459)  hetero 0.003 
2R  0.075    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.167    
hetero 0.348    
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General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.630 (0.488)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.236 (-2.879) 
2−∆ tS  -0.388 (-0.342)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.301 (-2.533) 
3−∆ tS  -0.135 (-0.103)  3−tUF  -0.370 (-1.797) 
4−∆ tS  -1.073 (-0.408)  2R  0.165 
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.244 (-2.257)  Diagnostics  
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.195 (-1.326)  Serial  0.720 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.081 (-0.389)  hetero 0.059 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.202 (1.403)    
1−tUF  -0.265 (-0.871)    
2−tUF  0.563 (1.079)    
3−tUF  -0.794 (-2.284)    
4−tUF  0.322 (0.961)    
REDM  -0.029 (-1.551)    
HIPC -0.017 (-0.757)    
2R  0.210    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.819    
hetero 0.012    
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tgold  -0.178 (-1.432)  3−∆ tgold  0.234 (1.828) 
2−∆ tgold  -0.083 (-0.544)  HIPC 0.028 (3.933) 
3−∆ tgold  0.207 (1.706)  2R  0.057 
4−∆ tgold  0.047 (0.319)  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.004 (-0.459)  Serial  0.418 
HIPC 0.027 (2.642)  hetero 0.924 
2R  0.086    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.043    
hetero 0.688    
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  2.989 (2.324)  1−∆ tS  2.508 (2.237) 
2−∆ tS  -0.736 (-0.523)  3−∆ tS  -2.858 (-2.191) 
3−∆ tS  -2.578 (-1.513)  HIPC 0.017 (2.932) 
4−∆ tS  -0.942 (-0.682)  2R  0.057 
REDM  0.054 (0.856)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.015 (2.230)  Serial  0.118 
2R  0.010  hetero 0.956 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.144    
hetero 0.998    
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General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  3.065 (2.085)  1−∆ tS  2.736 (2.593) 
2−∆ tS  0.183 (0.142)  3−∆ tS  -3.028 (-2.338) 
3−∆ tS  -2.573 (-1.547)  1−∆ tgold  -0.211 (-2.238) 
4−∆ tS  -2.043 (-1.599)  HIPC 0.014 (2.229) 
1−∆ tgold  -0.260 (-2.346)  2R  0.088 
2−∆ tgold  -0.084 (-0.519)  Diagnostics  
3−∆ tgold  0.161 (1.162)  Serial  0.469 
4−∆ tgold  0.019 (0.136)  hetero 0.977 
REDM  -0.006 (-0.671)    
HIPC 0.020 (1.580)    
2R  0.037    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.115    
hetero 0.817    
     
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−tUF  -0.317 (-0.527)  2−tUF  0.891 (2.159) 
2−tUF  1.409 (2.204)  4−tUF  -0.915 (-2.318) 
3−tUF  -0.613 (-0.959)  HIPC 0.032 (4.653) 
4−tUF  -0.648 (-1.195)  2R  0.028 
REDM  -0.035 (-1.600)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.027 (2.586)  Serial  0.114 
2R  0.010  hetero 0.959 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.133    
hetero 0.455    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
           
 
  260 
 
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  2.680 (1.650)  1−∆ tS  2.584 (1.828) 
2−∆ tS  -0.032 (-0.237)  3−∆ tS  -2.864 (-1.845) 
3−∆ tS  -2.167 (-1.332)  4−∆ tS  -3.163 (-2.183) 
4−∆ tS  -3.115 (-1.938)  1−∆ tgold  -0.264 (-2.312) 
1−∆ tgold  -0.237 (-1.687)  3−∆ tgold  0.255 (2.034) 
2−∆ tgold  -0.092 (-0.606)  2−tUF  1.305 (3.560) 
3−∆ tgold  0.253 (1.775)  4−tUF  -0.964 (-2.833) 
4−∆ tgold  -0.055 (-0.403)  REDM  -0.025 (-1.986) 
1−tUF  -0.427 (-0.576)  HIPC 0.028 (2.762) 
2−tUF  1.775 (3.034)  2R  0.173 
3−tUF  -0.563 (-0.807)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  -0.644 (-1.506)  Serial  0.612 
REDM  -0.049 (-1.924)  hetero 0.367 
HIPC 0.029 (1.919)    
2R  0.118    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.227    
hetero 0.747    
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C2. Appendix: Forecasting Fundamentals using Foreign unexpected Flows 
 General tGDP∆   
 3−∆ tGDP  2.992 (7.573)  
 4−∆ tGDP  -2.080 (-5.162)  
 REDM  0.0004 (1.760)  
 HIPC -0.001 (-1.724)  
 
2R  0.946  
 Diagnostics   
 Serial  0.016  
 hetero 0.000  
    
    
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  -0.068 (-0.878)  3−∆ tS  0.222 (2.305) 
2−∆ tS  0.168 (1.674)  4−∆ tS  0.235 (2.326) 
3−∆ tS  0.182 (2.099)  REDM  -0.002 (-2.805) 
4−∆ tS  0.258 (2.427)  HIPC 0.004 (4.901) 
REDM  -0.002 (-2.439)  2R  0.137 
HIPC 0.005 (5.138)  Diagnostics  
2R  0.138  Serial  0.000 
Diagnostics   hetero 0.833 
Serial  0.000    
hetero 0.459    
     
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  0.060 (2.251)  1−∆ tS  0.068 (2.877) 
2−∆ tS  0.082 (2.166)  2−∆ tS  0.086 (2.055) 
3−∆ tS  0.038 (1.346)  3−∆ tGDP  2.593 (5.677) 
4−∆ tS  0.011 (0.475)  4−∆ tGDP  -1.684 (-3.741) 
3−∆ tGDP  2.420 (4.360)  REDM  0.001 (3.150) 
4−∆ tGDP  -1.515 (-2.789)  2R  0.965 
REDM  0.001 (3.147)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.0001 (-0.949)  Serial  0.087 
2R  0.965  hetero 0.000 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.008    
hetero 0.000    
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General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−tUF  0.079 (3.559)  1−tUF  0.093 (3.939) 
2−tUF  0.034 (1.552)  3−tUF  0.084 (2.996) 
3−tUF  0.068 (2.423)  4−tUF  0.071 (2.140) 
4−tUF  0.066 (2.041)  REDM  0.004 (3.317) 
REDM  0.003 (2.886)  HIPC 0.002 (2.519) 
HIPC 0.002 (2.631)  2R  0.588 
2R  0.585  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.000 
Serial  0.000  hetero 0.217 
hetero 0.586    
     
     
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  0.059 (2.980)  1−∆ tS  0.057 (3.263) 
2−∆ tS  0.061 (1.689)  2−∆ tS  0.070 (2.357) 
3−∆ tS  0.019 (0.722)  3−∆ tGDP  2.382 (5.506) 
4−∆ tS  -0.019 (-0.794)  4−∆ tGDP  -1.526 (-3.604) 
3−∆ tGDP  2.343 (4.851)  1−tUF  0.028 (2.406) 
4−∆ tGDP  -1.494 (-3.125)  REDM  0.001 (3.452) 
1−tUF  0.026 (2.018)  2R  0.971 
2−tUF  0.004 (0.332)  Diagnostics  
3−tUF  -0.001 (-0.009)  Serial  0.170 
4−tUF  0.004 (0.359)  hetero 0.000 
REDM  0.001 (1.968)    
HIPC -0.0004 (-1.339)    
2R  0.968    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.091    
hetero 0.008    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
3−∆ tCPI  0.144 (1.799)  3−∆ tCPI  0.119 (2.284) 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.182 (-1.512)  2R  0.014 
REDM  -0.002 (-0.774)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.006 (-1.442)  Serial  0.157 
2R  0.046  hetero 0.935 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.114    
hetero 0.988    
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General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.569 (0.888)  2−∆ tS  1.673 (1.643) 
2−∆ tS  1.314 (1.693)  HIPC -0.008 (-3.996) 
3−∆ tS  0.949 (1.745)  2R  0.135 
4−∆ tS  0.463 (0.648)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.004 (1.853)  Serial  0.889 
HIPC -0.005 (-1.735)  hetero 0.054 
2R  0.226    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.931    
hetero 0.0002    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.252 (0.449)  2−∆ tS  1.703 (2.059) 
2−∆ tS  1.573 (2.035)  3−∆ tS  1.348 (2.542) 
3−∆ tS  1.097 (2.047)  4−∆ tCPI  -0.256 (-2.115) 
4−∆ tS  0.538 (0.564)  REDM  -0.005 (2.435) 
3−∆ tCPI  0.048 (0.334)  2R  0.275 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.252 (-2.338)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.005 (2.034)  Serial  0.831 
HIPC -0.001 (-0.241)  hetero 0.132 
2R  0.255    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.959    
hetero 0.000    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−tUF  0.294 (1.065)  4−tUF  0.429 (2.231) 
2−tUF  -0.238 (-0.970)  REDM  0.007 (2.925) 
3−tUF  0.125 (0.858)  HIPC -0.015 (-4.354) 
4−tUF  0.332 (2.248)  2R  0.068 
REDM  0.014 (2.640)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.016 (-4.433)  Serial  0.484 
2R  0.044  hetero 0.593 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.399    
hetero 0.871    
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General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.257 (0.540)  2−∆ tS  1.545 (1.971) 
2−∆ tS  1.584 (2.075)  3−∆ tS  1.169 (1.968) 
3−∆ tS  0.926 (1.694)  4−∆ tCPI  -0.271 (-2.222) 
4−∆ tS  0.619 (0.579)  4−tUF  0.235 (2.096) 
3−∆ tCPI  -0.002 (-0.017)  REDM  0.009 (3.442) 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.265 (-2.319)  2R  0.349 
1−tUF  -0.182 (-0.796)  Diagnostics  
2−tUF  -0.427 (-1.579)  Serial  0.714 
3−tUF  0.071 (0.392)  hetero 0.319 
4−tUF  0.298 (2.316)    
REDM  0.013 (1.966)    
HIPC -0.005 (-1.160)    
2R  0.249    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.829    
hetero 0.317    
     
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
32 −+∆ tM  -0.332 (-3.717)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.335 (-3.808) 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.061(-0.511)  REDM  0.013 (3.143) 
REDM  0.013 (2.809)  HIPC 0.025 (4.244) 
HIPC 0.026 (4.697)  2R  0.079 
2R  0.081  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.099 
Serial  0.151  hetero 0.408 
hetero 0.606    
     
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  2.842 (3.767)  1−∆ tS  1.764 (2.868) 
2−∆ tS  -0.766 (-0.835)  REDM 0.009 (2.543) 
3−∆ tS  -0.949 (-0.533)  HIPC 0.036 (9.489) 
4−∆ tS  -0.989 (-0.883)  2R  0.053 
REDM  0.008 (1.741)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.032 (6.814)  Serial  0.209 
2R  0.080  hetero 0.788 
 Diagnostics      
Serial  0.693    
hetero 0.192    
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General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  3.128 (3.811)  1−∆ tS  2.486 (3.920) 
2−∆ tS  -0.373 (-0.445)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.414 (-4.564) 
3−∆ tS  -0.698 (-0.452)  REDM  0.019 (4.947) 
4−∆ tS  -0.568 (-0.487)  HIPC 0.027 (5.138) 
32 −+∆ tM  -0.389 (-4.136)  2R  0.209 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.086 (-0.824)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.017 (3.881)  Serial  0.144 
HIPC 0.026 (5.098)  hetero 0.845 
2R  0.222    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.659    
hetero 0.096    
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
3−tUF  0.486 (1.189)  HIPC 0.033 (7.958) 
4−tUF  -0.177 (-0.482)  2R  0.019 
REDM  0.022 (1.719)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.033 (5.830)  Serial  0.143 
2R  0.043  hetero 0.498 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.266    
hetero 0.301    
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  3.141 (3.762)  1−∆ tS  2.486 (3.920) 
2−∆ tS  -0.679 (-0.648)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.414 (-4.564) 
3−∆ tS  -0.943 (-0.605)  REDM  0.019 (4.947) 
4−∆ tS  -1.184 (-0.945)  HIPC 0.027 (5.138) 
32 −+∆ tM  -0.405 (-4.250)  2R  0.209 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.129 (-1.029)  Diagnostics  
1−tUF  -0.182 (-0.461)  Serial  0.144 
2−tUF  0.252 (0.563)  hetero 0.845 
3−tUF  0.642 (1.320)    
4−tUF  -0.130 (-0.304)    
REDM  0.036 (2.437)    
HIPC 0.022 (2.564)    
2R  0.218    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.719    
hetero 0.331    
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General tPR∆     
3−∆ tPR  0.054 (0.612)    
4−∆ tPR  0.087 (0.696)    
REDM  0.008 (1.430)    
HIPC 0.008 (1.430)    
2R  0.011    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.401    
hetero 0.979    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.723 (0.742)  4−∆ tS  1.596 (2.108) 
2−∆ tS  0.912 (0.532)  REDM 0.101 (2.051) 
3−∆ tS  -0.102 (0.066)  HIPC 0.013 (2.454) 
4−∆ tS  1.145 (1.112)  2R  0.028 
REDM  0.013 (2.881)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.015 (2.853)  Serial  0.312 
2R  0.046  hetero 0.844 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.331    
hetero 0.773    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.788 (0.768)  1−∆ tS  1.596 (2.108) 
2−∆ tS  0.879 (0.501)  REDM  0.010 (2.051) 
3−∆ tS  -0.165 (-0.103)  HIPC 0.013 (2.454) 
4−∆ tS  1.029 (0.944)  2R  0.028 
3−∆ tPR  0.024 (0.252)  Diagnostics  
4−∆ tPR  0.073 (0.599)  Serial  0.312 
REDM  0.012 (2.173)  hetero 0.844 
HIPC 0.014 (2.135)    
2R  0.051    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.305    
hetero 0.975    
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General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−tUF  0.182 (0.281)  HIPC 0.009 (1.954) 
2−tUF  0.616 (1.084)  2R  0.001 
3−tUF  -0.619 (-0.774)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  -0.298 (-0.544)  Serial  0.429 
REDM  -0.011 (-0.485)  hetero 0.813 
HIPC 0.012 (1.635)    
2R  0.029    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.367    
hetero 0.973    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.660 (0.549)  4−∆ tS  1.594 (2.127) 
2−∆ tS  1.353 (0.670)  HIPC 0.013 (2.465) 
3−∆ tS  0.349 (0.217)  2R  0.027 
4−∆ tS  1.858 (1.189)  Diagnostics  
3−∆ tPR  0.004 (0.032)  Serial  0.299 
4−∆ tPR  0.026 (0.176)  hetero 0.766 
1−tUF  -0.082 (-0.102)    
2−tUF  0.323 (-0.561)    
3−tUF  -0.639 (-0.718)    
4−tUF  -0.354 (-0.659)    
REDM  -0.016 (-0.704)    
HIPC 0.023 (2.127)    
2R  0.092    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.237    
hetero 0.912    
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ toil  -0.247 (-2.089)  1−∆ toil  -0.219 (-1.819) 
2−∆ toil  -0.207 (-2.052)  2−∆ toil  -0.182 (-2.053) 
3−∆ toil  -0.251 (-1.882)  3−∆ toil  -0.215 (-1.940) 
4−∆ toil  -0.185 (-1.396)  REDM  0.071 (5.113) 
REDM  0.077 (5.135)  HIPC 0.134 (6.446) 
HIPC 0.122 (5.739)  2R  0.032 
2R  0.043  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.621 
Serial  0.151  hetero 0.599 
hetero 0.687    
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General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  3.025 (1.129)  1−∆ tS  1.802 (1.302) 
2−∆ tS  -0.447 (-0.091)  REDM 0.062 (6.022) 
3−∆ tS  -5.024 (-0.918)  HIPC 0.088 (8.648) 
4−∆ tS  -0.026 (-0.008)  2R  0.029 
REDM  0.053 (3.965)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.077 (5.545)  Serial  0.399 
2R  0.067  hetero 0.814 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.387    
hetero 0.469    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  4.367 (1.528)  1−∆ tS  2.635 (1.675) 
2−∆ tS  -0.065 (-0.014)  1−∆ toil  -0.229 (-1.865) 
3−∆ tS  -5.409 (-1.274)  2−∆ toil  -0.187 (-2.091) 
4−∆ tS  -1.579 (-0.424)  3−∆ toil  -0.234 (-2.166) 
1−∆ toil  -0.287 (-2.165)  REDM 0.076 (4.898) 
2−∆ toil  -0.192 (-1.649)  HIPC 0.141 (6.298) 
3−∆ toil  -0.276 (-2.002)  2R  0.034 
4−∆ toil  -0.209 (-1.516)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.073 (4.018)  Serial  0.340 
HIPC 0.113 (5.274)  hetero 0.632 
2R  0.046    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.127    
hetero 0.853    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−tUF  -0.368 (-0.234)  3−tUF  -2.430 (-2.289) 
2−tUF  0.549 (0.309)  4−tUF  2.069 (2.059) 
3−tUF  -2.552 (-1.570)  HIPC 0.083 (7.819) 
4−tUF  2.012 (1.973)  2R  0.063 
REDM  -0.001 (-0.012)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.010 (7.113)  Serial  0.457 
2R  0.065  hetero 0.481 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.487    
hetero 0.835    
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General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  4.691 (1.610)  1−∆ tS  3.433 (1.827) 
2−∆ tS  -0.587 (-0.123)  1−∆ toil  -0.221 (-1.669) 
3−∆ tS  -4.901 (-1.065)  2−∆ toil  -0.191 (-1.995) 
4−∆ tS  -1.879 (-0.491)  3−∆ toil  -0.239 (-2.082) 
1−∆ toil  -0.264 (-1.785)  3−tUF  -2.667 (-2.389) 
2−∆ toil  -0.187 (-1.528)  4−tUF  1.672 (1.657) 
3−∆ toil  -0.275 (-2.136)  HIPC 0.143 (5.115) 
4−∆ toil  -0.171 (1.097)  2R  0.169 
1−tUF  -0.122 (-0.083)  Diagnostics  
2−tUF  0.656 (0.367)  Serial  0.375 
3−tUF  -2.106 (-1.385)  hetero 0.739 
4−tUF  1.511 (1.513)    
REDM  0.026 (0.556)    
HIPC 0.113 (3.902)    
2R  0.228    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.283    
hetero 0.637    
     
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.189 (-2.198)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.180 (-2.315) 
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.219 (-1.518)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.272 (-2.028) 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.040 (-0.237)  HIPC -0.011 (-1.999) 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.168 (1.286)  2R  0.053 
REDM  -0.005 (-0.596)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.008 (-0.597)  Serial  0.068 
2R  0.029  hetero 0.600 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.375    
hetero 0.047    
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.478 (0.419)  3−∆ tS  -1.320 (-1.389) 
2−∆ tS  -1.161 (-0.952)  HIPC -0.008 (-2.175) 
3−∆ tS  -0.041 (-0.335)  2R  0.023 
4−∆ tS  -0.169 (-0.076)  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.003 (-0.657)  Serial  0.038 
HIPC -0.009 (-2.577)  hetero 0.349 
2R  0.021    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.387    
hetero 0.469    
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General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.668 (0.541)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.180 (-2.315) 
2−∆ tS  -0.577 (-0.545)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.272 (-2.028) 
3−∆ tS  -0.604 (-0.399)  HIPC -0.011 (-1.999) 
4−∆ tS  -1.095 (-0.471)  2R  0.098 
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.244 (-2.290)  Diagnostics  
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.224 (-1.659)  Serial  0.068 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.032 (-0.172)  hetero 0.600 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.155 (1.201)    
REDM  -0.006 (-0.777)    
HIPC -0.016 (-0.776)    
2R  0.147    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.744    
hetero 0.005    
     
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−tUF  -0.367 (-0.806)  REDM -0.001 (-0.212) 
2−tUF  0.524 (1.036)  2R  0.000 
3−tUF  -0.616 (-1.425)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  0.198 (0.366)  Serial  0.061 
REDM  -0.023 (-1.626)  hetero 0.554 
HIPC -0.003 (-0.649)    
2R  0.026    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.068    
hetero 0.265    
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General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.553 (0.430)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.170 (-2.299) 
2−∆ tS  -0.549 (-0.486)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.274 (-2.056) 
3−∆ tS  0.092 (0.062)  2R  0.096 
4−∆ tS  -1.090 (-0.387)  Diagnostics  
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.247 (-2.087)  Serial  0.107 
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.231 (-1.471)  hetero 0.476 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.096 (-0.433)    
4−∆ tcocoa  0.207 (1.353)    
1−tUF  -0.709 (-1.637)    
2−tUF  0.855 (1.354)    
3−tUF  -0.701 (-1.274)    
4−tUF  0.271 (0.499)    
REDM  -0.036 (-1.831)    
HIPC -0.006 (-0.230)    
2R  0.191    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.986    
hetero 0.009    
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tgold  -0.178 (-1.432)  3−∆ tgold  0.234 (1.828) 
2−∆ tgold  -0.083 (-0.544)  HIPC 0.028 (3.933) 
3−∆ tgold  0.207 (1.706)  2R  0.057 
4−∆ tgold  0.047 (0.319)  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.004 (-0.459)  Serial  0.418 
HIPC 0.027 (2.642)  hetero 0.924 
2R  0.086    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.043    
hetero 0.688    
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  2.989 (2.324)  1−∆ tS  2.508 (2.237) 
2−∆ tS  -0.736 (-0.523)  3−∆ tS  -2.858 (-2.191) 
3−∆ tS  -2.578 (-1.513)  HIPC 0.017 (2.932) 
4−∆ tS  -0.942 (-0.682)  2R  0.057 
REDM  0.054 (0.856)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.015 (2.230)  Serial  0.118 
2R  0.010  hetero 0.956 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.144    
hetero 0.998    
 
  272 
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  3.065 (2.085)  1−∆ tS  2.736 (2.593) 
2−∆ tS  0.183 (0.142)  3−∆ tS  -3.028 (-2.338) 
3−∆ tS  -2.573 (-1.547)  1−∆ tgold  -0.211 (-2.238) 
4−∆ tS  -2.043 (-1.599)  HIPC 0.014 (2.229) 
1−∆ tgold  -0.260 (-2.346)  2R  0.088 
2−∆ tgold  -0.084 (-0.519)  Diagnostics  
3−∆ tgold  0.161 (1.162)  Serial  0.469 
4−∆ tgold  0.019 (0.136)  hetero 0.977 
REDM  -0.006 (-0.671)    
HIPC 0.020 (1.580)    
2R  0.037    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.115    
hetero 0.817    
     
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−tUF  0.192 (0.217)  HIPC 0.021 (4.503) 
2−tUF  1.012 (1.162)  2R  0.004 
3−tUF  -0.412 (-0.398)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  -0.884 (-1.233)  Serial  0.255 
REDM  -0.014 (-0.499)  hetero 0.529 
HIPC 0.023 (3.865)    
2R  0.057    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.128    
hetero 0.045    
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General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  3.021 (1.939)  1−∆ tS  3.329 (2.884) 
2−∆ tS  -0.212 (-0.178)  3−∆ tS  -3.151 (-2.208) 
3−∆ tS  -3.056 (-1.941)  4−∆ tS  -2.718 (-1.922) 
4−∆ tS  -3.008 (-1.867)  1−∆ tgold  -0.293 (-2.876) 
1−∆ tgold  -0.275 (-2.349)  2−tUF  1.321 (2.398) 
2−∆ tgold  -0.035 (-0.247)  4−tUF  -0.909 (-1.866) 
3−∆ tgold  0.185 (1.345)  2R  0.141 
4−∆ tgold  0.019 (0.147)  Diagnostics  
1−tUF  0.386 (0.467)  Serial  0.758 
2−tUF  1.156 (1.526)  hetero 0.536 
3−tUF  -0.014 (-0.012)    
4−tUF  -0.988 (-1.513)    
REDM  -0.009 (-0.319)    
HIPC 0.016 (1.151)    
2R  0.047    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.182    
hetero 0.722    
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C2. Appendix: Forecasting Fundamentals using Local unexpected Flows 
 General tGDP∆   
 3−∆ tGDP  2.992 (7.573)  
 4−∆ tGDP  -2.080 (-5.162)  
 REDM  0.0004 (1.760)  
 HIPC -0.001 (-1.724)  
 
2R  0.946  
 Diagnostics   
 Serial  0.016  
 hetero 0.000  
    
    
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  -0.068 (-0.878)  3−∆ tS  0.222 (2.305) 
2−∆ tS  0.168 (1.674)  4−∆ tS  0.235 (2.326) 
3−∆ tS  0.182 (2.099)  REDM  -0.002 (-2.805) 
4−∆ tS  0.258 (2.427)  HIPC 0.004 (4.901) 
REDM  -0.002 (-2.439)  2R  0.137 
HIPC 0.005 (5.138)  Diagnostics  
2R  0.138  Serial  0.000 
Diagnostics   hetero 0.833 
Serial  0.000    
hetero 0.459    
     
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  0.060 (2.251)  1−∆ tS  0.068 (2.877) 
2−∆ tS  0.082 (2.166)  2−∆ tS  0.086 (2.055) 
3−∆ tS  0.038 (1.346)  3−∆ tGDP  2.593 (5.677) 
4−∆ tS  0.011 (0.475)  4−∆ tGDP  -1.684 (-3.741) 
3−∆ tGDP  2.420 (4.360)  REDM  0.001 (3.150) 
4−∆ tGDP  -1.515 (-2.789)  2R  0.965 
REDM  0.001 (3.147)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.0001 (-0.949)  Serial  0.087 
2R  0.965  hetero 0.000 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.008    
hetero 0.000    
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General tGDP∆     
1−tUF  0.066 (2.694)    
2−tUF  0.100 (4.711)    
3−tUF  0.132 (6.667)    
4−tUF  0.113 (4.869)    
REDM  0.001 (2.993)    
HIPC 0.003 (6.168)    
2R  0.748    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.000    
hetero 0.120    
     
     
General tGDP∆   Specific tGDP∆  
1−∆ tS  0.058 (3.186)  1−∆ tS  0.053 (3.264) 
2−∆ tS  0.061 (1.607)  2−∆ tS  0.055 (2.061) 
3−∆ tS  0.017 (0.735)  3−∆ tGDP  2.043 (4.290) 
4−∆ tS  -0.026 (-1.403)  4−∆ tGDP  -1.268 (-2.749) 
3−∆ tGDP  2.043 (4.159)  1−tUF  0.021 (2.143) 
4−∆ tGDP  -1.272 (-2.653)  2−tUF  0.017 (2.508) 
1−tUF  0.022 (1.961)  3−tUF  0.025 (2.154) 
2−tUF  0.019 (2.457)  4−tUF  0.029 (2.735) 
3−tUF  0.027 (2.178)  REDM  0.001 (4.512) 
4−tUF  0.029 (2.598)  2R  0.975 
REDM  0.001 (4.357)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.0004 (-0.138)  Serial  0.093 
2R  0.974  hetero 0.0001 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.064    
hetero 0.112    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
3−∆ tCPI  0.144 (1.799)  3−∆ tCPI  0.119 (2.284) 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.182 (-1.512)  2R  0.014 
REDM  -0.002 (-0.774)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.006 (-1.442)  Serial  0.157 
2R  0.046  hetero 0.935 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.114    
hetero 0.988    
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General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.569 (0.888)  2−∆ tS  1.673 (1.643) 
2−∆ tS  1.314 (1.693)  HIPC -0.008 (-3.996) 
3−∆ tS  0.949 (1.745)  2R  0.135 
4−∆ tS  0.463 (0.648)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.004 (1.853)  Serial  0.889 
HIPC -0.005 (-1.735)  hetero 0.054 
2R  0.226    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.931    
hetero 0.0002    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.252 (0.449)  2−∆ tS  1.703 (2.059) 
2−∆ tS  1.573 (2.035)  3−∆ tS  1.348 (2.542) 
3−∆ tS  1.097 (2.047)  4−∆ tCPI  -0.256 (-2.115) 
4−∆ tS  0.538 (0.564)  REDM  -0.005 (2.435) 
3−∆ tCPI  0.048 (0.334)  2R  0.275 
4−∆ tCPI  -0.252 (-2.338)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.005 (2.034)  Serial  0.831 
HIPC -0.001 (-0.241)  hetero 0.132 
2R  0.255    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.959    
hetero 0.000    
     
     
General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−tUF  -0.093 (-0.488)  4−tUF  0.465 (1.941) 
2−tUF  0.201 (0.887)  REDM  0.007 (2.089) 
3−tUF  0.263 (1.106)  HIPC -0.017 (-3.778) 
4−tUF  0.241 (1.261)  2R  0.064 
REDM  0.003 (0.809)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.014 (-5.547)  Serial  0.249 
2R  0.087  hetero 0.855 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.234    
hetero 0.973    
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General tCPI∆   Specific tCPI∆  
1−∆ tS  0.370 (0.646)  2−∆ tS  1.690 (2.065) 
2−∆ tS  1.515 (1.863)  3−∆ tS  1.339 (2.552) 
3−∆ tS  1.127 (1.831)  4−∆ tCPI  -0.255 (-2.129) 
4−∆ tS  0.478 (0.466)  2R  0.286 
3−∆ tCPI  0.053 (0.367)  Diagnostics  
4−∆ tCPI  -0.262 (-2.302)  Serial  0.816 
1−tUF  -0.416 (-1.193)  hetero 0.089 
2−tUF  0.033 (0.184)    
3−tUF  0.153 (0.859)    
4−tUF  0.291 (1.304)    
REDM  0.004 (0.918)    
HIPC -0.003 (-0.621)    
2R  0.230    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.976    
hetero 0.254    
     
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
32 −+∆ tM  -0.332 (-3.717)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.335 (-3.808) 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.061(-0.511)  REDM  0.013 (3.143) 
REDM  0.013 (2.809)  HIPC 0.025 (4.244) 
HIPC 0.026 (4.697)  2R  0.079 
2R  0.081  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.099 
Serial  0.151  hetero 0.408 
hetero 0.606    
     
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  2.842 (3.767)  1−∆ tS  1.764 (2.868) 
2−∆ tS  -0.766 (-0.835)  REDM 0.009 (2.543) 
3−∆ tS  -0.949 (-0.533)  HIPC 0.036 (9.489) 
4−∆ tS  -0.989 (-0.883)  2R  0.053 
REDM  0.008 (1.741)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.032 (6.814)  Serial  0.209 
2R  0.080  hetero 0.788 
 Diagnostics      
Serial  0.693    
hetero 0.192    
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General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  3.128 (3.811)  1−∆ tS  2.486 (3.920) 
2−∆ tS  -0.373 (-0.445)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.414 (-4.564) 
3−∆ tS  -0.698 (-0.452)  REDM  0.019 (4.947) 
4−∆ tS  -0.568 (-0.487)  HIPC 0.027 (5.138) 
32 −+∆ tM  -0.389 (-4.136)  2R  0.209 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.086 (-0.824)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.017 (3.881)  Serial  0.144 
HIPC 0.026 (5.098)  hetero 0.845 
2R  0.222    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.659    
hetero 0.096    
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−tUF  1.057 (1.607)  1−tUF  1.366 (2.257) 
2−tUF  0.025 (0.062)  4−tUF  -1.493 (-3.048) 
3−tUF  0.703 (1.564)  HIPC 0.049 (6.664) 
4−tUF  -1.718 (-2.883)  2R  0.117 
REDM  -0.006 (-0.650)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.054 (6.618)  Serial  0.056 
2R  0.098  hetero 0.169 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.055    
hetero 0.842    
     
General tM +∆ 2   Specific tM +∆ 2  
1−∆ tS  3.141 (3.762)  1−∆ tS  2.591 (3.785) 
2−∆ tS  -0.679 (-0.648)  32 −+∆ tM  -0.331 (3.218) 
3−∆ tS  -0.943 (-0.605)  42 −+∆ tM  -0.161 (-1.679) 
4−∆ tS  -1.184 (-0.945)  3−tUF  0.884 (1.976) 
32 −+∆ tM  -0.405 (-4.250)  4−tUF  -1.023(-2.314) 
42 −+∆ tM  -0.129 (-1.029)  HIPC 0.045 (5.337) 
1−tUF  -0.182 (-0.461)  2R  0.302 
2−tUF  0.252 (0.563)  Diagnostics  
3−tUF  0.642 (1.320)  Serial  0.325 
4−tUF  -0.130 (-0.304)  hetero 0.682 
REDM  0.036 (2.437)    
HIPC 0.022 (2.564)    
2R  0.218    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.719    
hetero 0.331    
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General tPR∆     
3−∆ tPR  0.054 (0.612)    
4−∆ tPR  0.087 (0.696)    
REDM  0.008 (1.430)    
HIPC 0.008 (1.430)    
2R  0.011    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.401    
hetero 0.979    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.723 (0.742)  4−∆ tS  1.596 (2.108) 
2−∆ tS  0.912 (0.532)  REDM 0.101 (2.051) 
3−∆ tS  -0.102 (0.066)  HIPC 0.013 (2.454) 
4−∆ tS  1.145 (1.112)  2R  0.028 
REDM  0.013 (2.881)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.015 (2.853)  Serial  0.312 
2R  -0.058  hetero 0.844 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.331    
hetero 0.773    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  0.788 (0.768)  1−∆ tS  1.596 (2.108) 
2−∆ tS  0.879 (0.501)  REDM  0.010 (2.051) 
3−∆ tS  -0.165 (-0.103)  HIPC 0.013 (2.454) 
4−∆ tS  1.029 (0.944)  2R  0.028 
3−∆ tPR  0.024 (0.252)  Diagnostics  
4−∆ tPR  0.073 (0.599)  Serial  0.312 
REDM  0.012 (2.173)  hetero 0.844 
HIPC 0.014 (2.135)    
2R  -0.092    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.305    
hetero 0.975    
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General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−tUF  -0.369 (-0.532)  REDM 0.009 (1.946) 
2−tUF  -1.039 (-1.243)  2R  0.010 
3−tUF  -0.052 (-0.085)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  1.106 (0.884)  Serial  0.382 
REDM  0.019 (1.234)  hetero 0.697 
HIPC -0.001 (-0.056)    
2R  0.053    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.315    
hetero 0.039    
     
     
General tPR∆   Specific tPR∆  
1−∆ tS  1.025 (0.784)  4−∆ tS  2.613 (2.949) 
2−∆ tS  1.631 (0.902)  2−tUF  -1.074 (-2.767) 
3−∆ tS  0.241 (0.144)  2R  0.078 
4−∆ tS  2.240 (1.348)  Diagnostics  
3−∆ tPR  0.025 (0.221)  Serial  0.168 
4−∆ tPR  0.119 (0.927)  hetero 0.501 
1−tUF  -1.084 (-1.628)    
2−tUF  -1.387 (-1.672)    
3−tUF  -0.271 (-0.399)    
4−tUF  1.264 (0.926)    
REDM  0.0132 (0.742)    
HIPC 0.006 (0.392)    
2R  0.169    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.092    
hetero 0.821    
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ toil  -0.247 (-2.089)  1−∆ toil  -0.219 (-1.819) 
2−∆ toil  -0.207 (-2.052)  2−∆ toil  -0.182 (-2.053) 
3−∆ toil  -0.251 (-1.882)  3−∆ toil  -0.215 (-1.940) 
4−∆ toil  -0.185 (-1.396)  REDM  0.071 (5.113) 
REDM  0.077 (5.135)  HIPC 0.134 (6.446) 
HIPC 0.122 (5.739)  2R  0.032 
2R  0.043  Diagnostics  
Diagnostics   Serial  0.621 
Serial  0.151  hetero 0.599 
hetero 0.687    
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General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  3.025 (1.129)  1−∆ tS  1.802 (1.302) 
2−∆ tS  -0.447 (-0.091)  REDM 0.062 (6.022) 
3−∆ tS  -5.024 (-0.918)  HIPC 0.088 (8.648) 
4−∆ tS  -0.026 (-0.008)  2R  0.029 
REDM  0.053 (3.965)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.077 (5.545)  Serial  0.399 
2R  0.067  hetero 0.814 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.387    
hetero 0.469    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  4.367 (1.528)  1−∆ tS  2.635 (1.675) 
2−∆ tS  -0.065 (-0.014)  1−∆ toil  -0.229 (-1.865) 
3−∆ tS  -5.409 (-1.274)  2−∆ toil  -0.187 (-2.091) 
4−∆ tS  -1.579 (-0.424)  3−∆ toil  -0.234 (-2.166) 
1−∆ toil  -0.287 (-2.165)  REDM 0.076 (4.898) 
2−∆ toil  -0.192 (-1.649)  HIPC 0.141 (6.298) 
3−∆ toil  -0.276 (-2.002)  2R  0.034 
4−∆ toil  -0.209 (-1.516)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.073 (4.018)  Serial  0.340 
HIPC 0.113 (5.274)  hetero 0.632 
2R  0.046    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.127    
hetero 0.853    
     
     
General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−tUF  -0.842 (-0.390)  REDM 0.058 (6.533) 
2−tUF  0.366 (0.239)  HIPC 0.084 (9.526) 
3−tUF  -0.157 (-0.106)  2R  0.019 
4−tUF  1.396 (0.928)  Diagnostics  
REDM  0.073 (1.903)  Serial  0.381 
HIPC 0.071 (3.626)  hetero 0.613 
2R  0.034    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.320    
hetero 0.449    
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General toil∆   Specific toil∆  
1−∆ tS  5.564 (1.791)  1−∆ tS  2.635 (1.675) 
2−∆ tS  -0.928 (-0.207)  1−∆ toil  -0.229 (-1.865) 
3−∆ tS  -6.508 (-1.250)  2−∆ toil  -0.186 (-2.091) 
4−∆ tS  -3.404 (-0.907)  3−∆ toil  -0.234 (-2.166) 
1−∆ toil  -0.321 (-2.604)  REDM 0.076 (4.898) 
2−∆ toil  -0.220 (-1.727)  HIPC 0.141 (6.298) 
3−∆ toil  -0.288 (-2.213)  2R  0.034 
4−∆ toil  -0.218 (-1.804)  Diagnostics  
1−tUF  -1.270 (-0.564)  Serial  0.340 
2−tUF  -0.214 (-0.136)  hetero 0.632 
3−tUF  0.442 (0.335)    
4−tUF  3.193 (2.372)    
REDM  0.111 (2.929)    
HIPC 0.082 (3.124)    
2R  0.032    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.533    
hetero 0.788    
     
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.189 (-2.198)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.180 (-2.315) 
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.219 (-1.518)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.272 (-2.028) 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.040 (-0.237)  HIPC -0.011 (-1.999) 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.168 (1.286)  2R  0.053 
REDM  -0.005 (-0.596)  Diagnostics  
HIPC -0.008 (-0.597)  Serial  0.068 
2R  0.029  hetero 0.600 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.375    
hetero 0.047    
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.478 (0.419)  3−∆ tS  -1.320 (-1.389) 
2−∆ tS  -1.161 (-0.952)  HIPC -0.008 (-2.175) 
3−∆ tS  -0.041 (-0.335)  2R  0.001 
4−∆ tS  -0.169 (-0.076)  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.003 (-0.657)  Serial  0.038 
HIPC -0.009 (-2.577)  hetero 0.349 
2R  0.021    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.387    
hetero 0.469    
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General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.668 (0.541)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.180 (-2.315) 
2−∆ tS  -0.577 (-0.545)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.272 (-2.028) 
3−∆ tS  -0.604 (-0.399)  HIPC -0.011 (-1.999) 
4−∆ tS  -1.095 (-0.471)  2R  0.098 
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.244 (-2.290)  Diagnostics  
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.224 (-1.659)  Serial  0.068 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.032 (-0.172)  hetero 0.600 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.155 (1.201)    
REDM  -0.006 (-0.777)    
HIPC -0.016 (-0.776)    
2R  0.147    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.744    
hetero 0.005    
     
     
General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−tUF  0.954 (1.770)  1−tUF  0.966 (1.999) 
2−tUF  0.189 (0.289)  3−tUF  -1.588 (-2.969) 
3−tUF  -1.591 (-2.874)  REDM  0.011 (1.809) 
4−tUF  -0.009 (-0.018)  HIPC -0.012 (-3.1690 
REDM  0.010 (1.159)  2R  0.044 
HIPC -0.013 (-2.208)  Diagnostics  
2R  0.009  Serial  0.251 
Diagnostics   hetero 0.067 
Serial  0.349    
hetero 0.014    
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General tcocoa∆   Specific tcocoa∆  
1−∆ tS  0.377 (0.299)  1−∆ tcocoa  -0.222 (-2.884) 
2−∆ tS  -0.094 (-0.093)  2−∆ tcocoa  -0.292 (-2.444) 
3−∆ tS  -0.469 (-0.361)  3−tUF  -1.009 (-2.080) 
4−∆ tS  -0.443 (-0.181)  2R  0.187 
1−∆ tcocoa  -0.215 (-1.664)  Diagnostics  
2−∆ tcocoa  -0.222 (-1.738)  Serial  0.436 
3−∆ tcocoa  -0.102 (-0.556)  hetero 0.149 
4−∆ tcocoa  0.119 (0.862)    
1−tUF  0.434 (0.788)    
2−tUF  0.001 (0.002)    
3−tUF  -1.279 (-2.361)    
4−tUF  0.226 (0.379)    
REDM  0.003 (0.243)    
HIPC -0.015 (-0.741)    
2R  0.204    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.418    
hetero 0.017    
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tgold  -0.178 (-1.432)  3−∆ tgold  0.234 (1.828) 
2−∆ tgold  -0.083 (-0.544)  HIPC 0.028 (3.933) 
3−∆ tgold  0.207 (1.706)  2R  0.057 
4−∆ tgold  0.047 (0.319)  Diagnostics  
REDM  -0.004 (-0.459)  Serial  0.418 
HIPC 0.027 (2.642)  hetero 0.924 
2R  0.086    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.043    
hetero 0.688    
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  2.989 (2.324)  1−∆ tS  2.508 (2.237) 
2−∆ tS  -0.736 (-0.523)  3−∆ tS  -2.858 (-2.191) 
3−∆ tS  -2.578 (-1.513)  HIPC 0.017 (2.932) 
4−∆ tS  -0.942 (-0.682)  2R  0.057 
REDM  0.054 (0.856)  Diagnostics  
HIPC 0.015 (2.230)  Serial  0.118 
2R  0.010  hetero 0.956 
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.144    
hetero 0.998    
 
  285 
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  3.065 (2.085)  1−∆ tS  2.736 (2.593) 
2−∆ tS  0.183 (0.142)  3−∆ tS  -3.028 (-2.338) 
3−∆ tS  -2.573 (-1.547)  1−∆ tgold  -0.211 (-2.238) 
4−∆ tS  -2.043 (-1.599)  HIPC 0.014 (2.229) 
1−∆ tgold  -0.260 (-2.346)  2R  0.088 
2−∆ tgold  -0.084 (-0.519)  Diagnostics  
3−∆ tgold  0.161 (1.162)  Serial  0.469 
4−∆ tgold  0.019 (0.136)  hetero 0.977 
REDM  -0.006 (-0.671)    
HIPC 0.020 (1.580)    
2R  0.037    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.115    
hetero 0.817    
     
     
General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−tUF  -0.656 (-0.831)  HIPC 0.021 (4.503) 
2−tUF  1.295 (1.439)  2R  0.004 
3−tUF  -0.719 (-1.204)  Diagnostics  
4−tUF  -0.388 (-0.397)  Serial  0.255 
REDM  -0.006 (-0.293)  hetero 0.529 
HIPC 0.019 (1.696)    
2R  0.064    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.192    
hetero 0.545    
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General tgold∆   Specific tgold∆  
1−∆ tS  2.747 (1.736)  3−∆ tS  -2.451 (-1.696) 
2−∆ tS  0.284 (0.176)  3−∆ tgold  0.349 (2.257) 
3−∆ tS  -2.076 (-1.194)  2−tUF  1.880 (2.586) 
4−∆ tS  -2.352 (-1.420)  3−tUF  -1.411 (-2.756) 
1−∆ tgold  -0.178 (-0.991)  HIPC 0.018 (2.361) 
2−∆ tgold  -0.169 (-0.905)  2R  0.117 
3−∆ tgold  0.283 (1.587)  Diagnostics  
4−∆ tgold  -0.028 (-0.163)  Serial  0.662 
1−tUF  -1.098 (-1.079)  hetero 0.967 
2−tUF  1.925 (2.366)    
3−tUF  -0.854 (-0.731)    
4−tUF  0.113 (0.131)    
REDM  -0.021 (-0.975)    
HIPC 0.226 (1.714)    
2R  0.067    
Diagnostics     
Serial  0.108    
hetero 0.954    
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